



The influence of migration “crises” on migration governance and policy responses

MAGYC SYNTHESIS REPORT
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Introduction

This synthesis report brings together the most relevant results along with policy recommendations from the MAGYC (Migration Governance and asylum Crises) project. Funded by the European Commission's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme (Grant agreement number 822806), this project assessed how migration governance responded to the 2014/15 refugee "crisis" and has since been influenced by it, and how crises at large shape policy responses to migration. The **general objective of the project was to appraise policy responses in light of the 'crisis' and assess their efficiency** for the long-term governance of migration.

The work plan of **the MAGYC project was organised around two key dimensions of the crisis**: time and space, as guided by the underlying assumption that migration 'crises' are a product of both an *acceleration* (time dimension) and a *concentration* (space dimension) of migration. Four research Work Packages (WPs) were contained in each of these dimensions. Governing times of crisis (dimension 1) comprised **WP1** Structural determinants of migration crises, **WP2** Governance through times of crises, **WP3** Constructing the crisis and **WP4** Comparing crises, while Governing spaces of crisis (dimension 2) contained **WP5** Effects of asylum-seekers concentration, **WP6** Multi-scalar responses, **WP7** The displacement continuum and **WP8** External dimensions.

The project aimed not only at providing an innovative theoretical framework to understand the crisis in a critical perspective but also to produce new data on the crisis and its management, in preparation of new venues of more efficient, forward looking and sustainable governance of

mobility. Thus, we used **both quantitative and qualitative methods** for data collection in the field of social sciences—ranging from economics to political science and international relations, sociology and geography. A key innovative aspect of the methodology was the attention provided both to local policy-makers as well as migrants and refugees themselves within and outside the EU. Overall, **the MAGYC project collected qualitative data in 28 countries**, deploying over 50 researchers and research assistants across Europe, the Middle East and Africa. The vast number of interviews and interactions with refugees, asylum seekers, undocumented migrants and diaspora organisations allowed us to **gain a better understanding of less-documented empirical realities of migration and exile**.

Besides working to achieve the main goals of the project, **two new "crises" profoundly impacted the work and scope of the MAGYC project**: the COVID-19 pandemic and the significant flows of Ukrainian refugees coming to Europe following the Russian invasion. The COVID-19 pandemic not only impacted the way in which data was collected but also broadened the project's research scope: thus, we assessed not only how the COVID-19 pandemic affected migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, but also how it, in turn, impacted migration governance. As for the Ukrainian refugee flows in the wake of the invasion, our research analysed the underexplored relationship between integration and return intentions with a specific focus on sustainable return.

The remainder of this synthesis report is divided as follows: we begin by delineating the aim and objectives of the MAGYC project. Then we move on

to describe the methodology. This section outlines how the MAGYC project was impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, and how it integrated research on Ukrainian refugee flows. Then, we present an overview of the project's results and their main policy implications. After concluding the report, we list the research outputs produced within the framework of the project as well as the research team that made it all happen.

Coordinated by the [Hugo Observatory](#) of the [University of Liège](#), the MAGYC project brought together 12 international partners: [Sciences Po](#), the [University of Economics in Bratislava](#), the [GIGA German institute of Global and Area Studies](#), [Lund University](#), the [IDMC](#), [SOAS University of London](#), the [University of Milan](#), the [Lebanese American University](#), the [University of Macedonia](#), [Sabanci University](#) and [IfPO/CNRS](#). The project ran from November 2018 until April 2023.

Aim and objectives

The MAGYC project sought to assess how migration governance has been influenced by the 2014/2015 ‘migration/refugee crisis’, **and how crises at large shape policy responses on migration.**¹

Between 2014 and 2016, EU member-states received more than 4 million first-time asylum applications, with over 1.3 million applications in 2015 alone (OECD). During the same period, a humanitarian crisis was unfolding in the Mediterranean with more than 15,000 people having perished while attempting to cross to Europe, according to the Missing Migrants project. Since the beginning of this “refugee crisis” in 2014, **different policy responses have been put forward both by governments and international organisations.** Although very different from one another, these different responses shared two common traits: 1) they were generally presented as the sole realistic solution in the face of a situation often characterized as “unsustainable” and 2) they were often geared towards a more efficient control and surveillance of the borders.

Despite repeated calls for more cooperation and solidarity, and a dire humanitarian situation in countries such as Italy, Greece or Hungary, **many of these policy responses were oriented towards a national context**, and proposals for a more integrated and cooperative asylum policy in Europe were often rebutted by governments. Instead of

prompting more cooperation in the EU, policy responses usually hinted at less cooperation, with the notable exception of the control and surveillance of the EU external border. This meant that the humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean soon transformed into a political crisis within the European Union. For instance, the Brexit referendum can be related to this crisis, as the issue of border control played a decisive role in the decision of the British electorate to leave the EU.

Therefore, within this context, MAGYC’s primary aim was **to appraise policy responses in the light of the ‘crisis’ and assess their efficiency for the long-term governance of migration.** This primary aim was fulfilled through the pursuit of 5 different specific objectives:

OBJECTIVE 1 The project **reflected on policy gaps in migration governance** through the use of innovative policy analysis methods that went beyond the mere *evaluation* of policy effectiveness of migration governance but instead jointly analysed the *emergence* and *implementation* of regulatory instruments. Such instruments included not only national public policies but also bottom-up local initiatives as well as regional and international frameworks such as EU Partnerships and the Global Compacts.

OBJECTIVE 2 The project **assessed the effectiveness of the different policy instruments developed in reaction to the crisis** by correlating policy analysis (objective 1) with migration dynamics (flow of asylum seekers, number of returnees, etc.) and developing indicators of migration governance.

1. Although initially the project aimed to focus on the 2014/2015 ‘migration crisis’ alone, the Russian invasion of Ukraine triggered the displacement of millions of Ukrainians, most of whom fled to Europe. Thus, additional research on Ukrainian refugees in Europe was carried out within the framework of the MAGYC project.

OBJECTIVE 3 The project analysed the existing feedback loops between migration dynamics and policy responses. We proposed this as a new way to analyse the effects, limitations and scale-up potential of local, national, regional and international norms and governance instruments.

OBJECTIVE 4 The project generated a dynamic model of policy analysis, whereby knowledge and behaviour are critically conceptualised in terms of cooperation to identify thresholds for policy reaction. In this regard, the project looked beyond policy evaluation to examine the interactions between knowledge and policy-making, and questioned the notion of “evidence-based” regulation. Unlike other projects, MAGYC highlights conflicts and controversies in knowledge production and integration into policy making, accentuating the politicisation of migration knowledge at times of crisis. To achieve this, we focused on epistemic points of contention, on path-dependent policies founded on “bogus” truths and the construction of misconceptions over time and in times of crisis.

OBJECTIVE 5 Finally, the project proposed possible avenues for the development of better and more proactive migration governance strategies that break away from path dependency by exploring the lack of articulation between knowledge and policy-making in EU history.

Methodology

Hypothesis

Was Europe facing a ‘migration crisis’ in 2014/15? Or was it rather the perceptions of such a crisis that constituted a challenge for policy-making? The overall hypothesis that underpinned our project was that the ‘migration crisis’ was a product of both **acceleration** and **concentration** of migration, which were in turn driving the need for policy development.

Crises as a product of both **acceleration** and **concentration** of migration

Between 2014 and 2016, EU member-states received more than 4 million first-time asylum applications, with over 1.3 million applications in 2015 alone (OECD). Yet these applications were not evenly distributed across Europe: while some countries received a very high number of applications relative to their population, others did not observe such an increase. In fact, in some countries where the ‘crisis’ was a key factor driving policy developments—such as France, the UK and Poland—the number of asylum applications was far below the EU average. Similarly, countries that appeared at the forefront of the ‘crisis’, including Greece and Italy, had also a number of applications below the EU average in 2015. Thus it appears that **the ‘crisis’ was first and foremost a distributional crisis**, resulting in very different rates of recognition across Europe.

At the same time not only was a humanitarian crisis unfolding in the Mediterranean – with more than

15,000 people having perished while attempting to cross to Europe (IOM GMDAC) – but also in Europe as the living conditions of migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers were getting increasingly dire, with living conditions in camps and detention centres often denounced by human rights organisations.

The ‘crisis’ produced a **hierarchy of migration governance**, not just between refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants, but also between EU member-states and third countries. It also raised the issue of identities and boundaries—bringing to the fore the relationship between free movement within the EU, external boundary maintenance and collective responsibility of EU members—as well as larger migration and mobility-related issues such as the relationship between universal human rights, citizenship and membership rights.

Yet the ‘crisis’ in Europe was only part of a **global crisis**. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, more than 65 million people were displaced worldwide at the end of the year 2017. Most of these refugees continue to be, in fact, hosted in developing countries or emerging economies and only a limited number have tried to make their way towards Europe.

Policy development as a product of **perceived crises**

Existing EU migration policies are usually reactive, rather than proactive, in addition to being mostly security-oriented. They are embedded in long-lasting world-views and practices that strongly

influence policy choices and **reinforce path dependency**, sometimes in spite of counter-factual assessments of their efficacy and relevance.

A key assumption of MAGYC was that **policy developments in the field of migration are often the outcome of perceived ‘migration crises’**, instead of being developed in anticipation to such ‘crises’. Therefore, the project questioned the very concept of a ‘migration crisis’, positing that such crises are first and foremost a product of perception by policy-makers and public opinion. In that regard, the project breaks away from the naturalisation of ‘crisis’, conceptualised merely as a brutal and mass increase in migration or refugee flows, and uses the usually disregarded dimension of Weiner’s (1995) famous “global migration crisis”. When Weiner first discussed the components of a “global migration crisis”, he insisted on the quasi irrelevance of data (the numbers of immigrants) and on the crucial dimension of representations and fears, taking them extremely seriously.

FIGURE 1 STRUCTURE OF THE MAGYC PROJECT

WP9: Coordination and Management	
Governing times of crisis	Governing spaces in crisis
WP1: Structural determinants of migration crises	WP5 Effects of asylum-seekers concentration
WP2: Governance through times of crises	WP6: Multi-scalar responses
WP3: Constructing the crisis	WP7: The displacement continuum
WP4: Comparing crises in MENA and the Horn of Africa	WP9: External dimensions
WP10: Communication and Dissemination	
WP11: Ethics Requirements	

Thus, we argue that the ‘crisis’ was **first and foremost a matter of perception**, induced by the acceleration and concentration of migration, rather than by its absolute numbers. In order to analyse both the acceleration and concentration of migration, the project focused its activities on two domains: 1) **Governing times of crises** and 2) **Governing spaces in crises**. Each domain consisted

of Work Packages led by different consortium members whose geographical, disciplinary and methodological strengths complement each other (Figure 1).

Methods deployed

The project aimed not only at providing an innovative theoretical framework to understanding the crisis in a critical perspective but also **to produce new data on the crisis and its management**. All of this in support of an insightful assessment of governance mechanisms for asylum and migration towards Europe and in preparation of new venues of more efficient, forward looking and sustainable governance of mobility. Thus, we deployed **both quantitative and qualitative methods** in the field of social sciences, ranging from economics to political science and international relations, sociology and geography. The methodology revolved around the combined expertise of the consortium members. A key innovative aspect of the methodology was the attention provided both to local policy-makers and migrants, and refugees themselves within and outside the EU.

Qualitative data collection and analysis were deployed to better assess the dynamics of migration management both within the EU and in partner countries to the EU migration governance. Qualitative methods included semi structured interviews, key informant interviews, participant observations and focus groups discussions with a wide range of actors including local policy makers and representatives of international organisations, diaspora organisations, and refugees and asylum seekers themselves across Europe, the Middle East and Africa (see Table 1). Data was collected in different languages including Arabic, English, French, German, Spanish and Turkish.


First contact with research participants was established through local institutions. Subsequently, participants were contacted through snowball sampling.

Overall, the MAGYC project collected qualitative data in 28 countries, deploying over 50 researchers and research assistants across Europe, the Middle

TABLE 1 LOCATIONS, METHODS AND PARTICIPANTS UNDER STUDY FOR QUANTITATIVE DATA COLLECTION

Country	Method(s) deployed	Type of actor under study
Algeria	Semi structured interviews	National government officials; Representatives of IOs; Representatives of NGOs and CSOs; Refugees and asylum seekers
Austria	Semi structured interviews; Participant observations; Key informant interviews	Representatives of diaspora organisations; Refugees and asylum seekers; Undocumented migrants; Local government officials; Representatives of NGOs and CSOs.
Belgium	Semi structured interviews; Key informant interviews	EU representatives; “Privileged” migrants; Representatives of NGOs and CSOs.
Cameroon	Semi structured interviews; Key informant interviews	Internally displaced people, Deported refugees/migrants and asylum seekers; National and local policy makers; Representatives of NGOs and IOs.
Colombia	Key informant interviews	National policy makers; Representatives of IOs.
Denmark	Semi structured interviews; Participant observations	Representatives of diaspora organisations; Refugees and asylum seekers; Undocumented migrants.
Djibouti	Semi structured interviews; Key informant interviews	Internally displaced people, Deported refugees/migrants and asylum seekers; National and local policy makers; Representatives of NGOs and IOs.
Ecuador	Key informant interviews	National policy makers; Representatives of IOs.
Egypt	Semi structured interviews	National and local policy makers; Representatives of IOs.
Finland	Key informant interviews	Local government officials; Representatives of NGOs and CSOs
France	Semi structured interviews; Participant observations	Representatives of diaspora organisations; Refugees and asylum seekers; Undocumented migrants.
Germany	Semi structured interviews; Participant observations; Key informant interviews	Representatives of diaspora organisations; Refugees and asylum seekers; Undocumented migrants; Local government officials; Representatives of NGOs and CSOs
Greece	Key informant interviews	Local government officials; Representatives of NGOs and CSOs
Iraq/Iraqi Kurdistan	Semi structured interviews	National and local policy makers; Representatives of IOs.
Italy	Semi structured interviews; Participant observations; Key informant interviews	Representatives of diaspora organisations; Refugees and asylum seekers; Undocumented migrants; Representatives of NGOs and CSOs; Representatives of IOs; Local government officials.
Jordan	Semi structured interviews; Key informant interviews	National and local government officials; Representatives of IOs; Representatives of NGOs and CSOs; Refugees and asylum seekers; Returnee migrants
Lebanon	Semi structured interviews; Key informant interviews	National and local government officials; Representatives of IOs; Representatives of NGOs and CSOs; Refugees and asylum seekers; Returnee migrants
Libya	Semi structured interviews; Key informant interviews	National government officials; Representatives of IOs; Refugees and asylum seekers
Nigeria	Semi structured interviews; Key informant interviews	Internally displaced people, Deported refugees/migrants and asylum seekers; National and local policy makers; Representatives of NGOs and IOs.
Niger	Semi structured interviews	National government officials; Representatives of IOs; Representatives of NGOs and CSOs; Refugees and asylum seekers; Returnee migrants
Peru	Key informant interviews	National policy makers; Representatives of IOs.
Sudan	Semi structured interviews	National and local policy makers; Representatives of IOs.
Sweden	Semi structured interviews; Participant observations; Key informant interviews	Representatives of diaspora organisations; Refugees and asylum seekers; Undocumented migrants; Local government officials; Representatives of NGOs and CSOs
Syria	Semi structured interviews; Key informant interviews	National government officials; Representatives of IOs; Refugees and asylum seekers
Tunisia	Semi structured interviews	National government officials; Representatives of IOs; Representatives of NGOs and CSOs; Refugees and asylum seekers; Returnee migrants
Turkey	Semi structured interviews; Participant observations	Refugees and asylum seekers; Undocumented migrants.
UK	Semi structured interviews; Participant observations	Representatives of diaspora organisations; Refugees and asylum seekers; Undocumented migrants.
Yemen	Semi structured interviews; Key informant interviews	Internally displaced people, Deported refugees/migrants and asylum seekers; National and local policy makers; Representatives of NGOs and IOs.

FIGURE 2 MAP OF LOCATIONS FOR DATA COLLECTION



East, Africa and Latin America (see Figure 2). The vast number of interviews and interactions with refugees, asylum seekers, undocumented migrants and diaspora organisations allowed us to **gain a better understanding of less-documented empirical realities of migration and exile**.

On the other hand, **quantitative data collection and analysis** concerned notably:

- The determinants of migration (ranging from environmental to economic and social), which were explored and modelled accounting for historical trends and cumulative flows (WP1).
- The political and socio-economic impact of the arrivals of refugees, which was evaluated

through empirical data collection and modelling (WP5, WP6).

- The impact of EU and non-EU policies on migrant and refugee flows during the crisis, which were evaluated and modelled (WP8).
- The discourses of policy makers and media outlets across countries and across time, which were analysed with the implementation of textometric analysis (WP3, WP8).

Furthermore, in order to conduct policy assessments, primary qualitative data collection with local and national policy makers were **complemented with desk-based research** on pre-existing documents such as political speeches,

written testimonies, discourses, overarching policy agreements and frameworks—including the Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees—and new partnerships and instruments developed between the EU and non-EU countries regarding migration and asylum.

Ethical considerations

The MAGYC project involved data collection with a wide range of actors—such as national and local policy makers, EU representatives, representatives of NGOs and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)—including with highly vulnerable and precarious populations with varied legal status in politically sensitive contexts. In addition, the project collected data in unstable countries, such as Yemen, Iraq and Sudan. Although this could have represented a potential threat to the safety of both informants (as their opinions could have endangered them or prevented the respect of their fundamental rights) and researchers, **specific preventive measures were taken from the design stage of the project to ensure the protection of both informants and researchers.** Thus, a number of ethical precautions regarding data collection, storage, protection and destruction of un-useful data were set in place to protect everyone involved in the data collection process.

Informed consent

Informed consent was obtained from all participants that took part in the MAGYC project. This consent was obtained either in writing (with the signature of informed consent forms) or verbally when participants either expressed fears for their security, when people were illiterate or where there was a legacy of human rights abuses creating an atmosphere of fear. In these cases, additional steps such as having the place of interview unidentified both in fieldwork notes and in further research, were taken. Both in **written or verbal consent, communication of information, comprehension of information, and voluntary participation were present** and conveyed by the researcher who gathered said consent. In cases where potential participants were unable to provide informed consent, they were not interviewed and did not take part in the research.

Protection of informants: confidentiality and pseudonymization

Although interviews themselves were not anonymous as researchers knew the identity of interviewees, the **confidentiality**—defined as “implicit or explicit agreement that no traceable record of the participant’s data will be disclosed (Nation 1997); only the researcher knows the response” (Ong and Weiss 2006:1684)—of both vulnerable individuals and those who did not want to be identified was guaranteed throughout the qualitative data collection process, exploitation and use of data, as well as for a period of 25 years (after which data will be purged).

This allowed MAGYC researchers to protect the identity of respondents, including against political persecution, and ensure that participation in the research did not put participants at risk of forcible return, harassment, or any other form of discrimination or abuse. In addition, **pseudonymisation**, which amounts to the removal or replacement of identifiers with pseudonyms or codes which are kept separately and are protected by technical and organisational measures, was assured. Furthermore, sections in qualitative interviews which might make participants’ identifiable (detailed description of work environment, people, neighbourhood, etc.) were not published nor shared by the team. Lastly, vulnerable participants were additionally protected by having their numbers erased from interviewers’ telephones, and by having the place of interview unidentified both in fieldwork notes and in further research.

Additional ethical obligations

In order to ensure the compliance of ethical standards in all fieldwork countries, and to gain better access to research participants, **MAGYC researchers engaged with local research institutions** which were selected based on their relevance to grant ethical clearance in social science research.

Lastly, an **external ethics officer** (Dr. Nassim Majidi from Samuel Hall) was appointed before the first MAGYC Annual Meeting to provide guidance and


SPOTLIGHT 1 Integrating Ukrainian refugee flows to the MAGYC project

In February 2022, Russia began its invasion to Ukraine in an escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War which began in 2014. This conflict has not only killed thousands of Ukrainians, including massive civilian casualties, but has also displaced over 6 million people (UNHCR 2023). Most of those fleeing their homes seeking safety and protection have crossed borders into Europe (in fact, 5,872,700 refugees from Ukraine were registered in Europe by UNHCR in August 2023). The conflict and the reception of Ukrainian refugees in Europe has also triggered new discourses and policies geared towards the management of refugee flows which put MAGYC research into new comparative perspectives. Thus, the MAGYC team decided to expand the initial scope to include research activities around Ukrainian refugee flows in the wake of the invasion. Our research on Ukrainian refugees **analyses the underexplored relationship between integration and return intentions with a specific focus on sustainable return.**

In order to explore this relationship we collaborated with the survey company KANTAR PUBLIC, which in June 2022 launched the first wave of the “**Voice of Ukraine**”, an independent survey of Ukrainian refugees living in European member states. Our collaboration began in the fall of 2022, when the MAGYC team gained access to the data from the first wave and contributed to the design of questions for subsequent waves. Collected through social media, this survey collects first-hand insights into the challenges Ukrainian displaced nationals face in host countries with the aim of supporting both governments and NGOs to identify the right interventions to ensure that Ukrainian citizens are properly supported.

Using data from the first two waves of the Voice of Ukraine survey, conducted from June to December 2022 and reaching 5,693 unique respondents, the MAGYC team explored the migration trajectories of Ukrainian refugees, their **levels of integration in host countries** as well as their **intentions to return to Ukraine**, advancing our understanding about the relationship between these last two.

FIGURE 3 FIRST DESTINATION OF REFUGEES



Source: MAGYC Infographic “The voices of Ukrainian refugees” (2023)


Between departure and return, the survey reveals a **large variation in movements across Europe**. Individuals from different Oblasts (regions) have had different migratory trajectories with Poland, Moldova, Romania, Slovakia and Hungary representing the five most common first countries of entry of survey respondents (see Figure 3). As for the return intentions of respondents, 65% plan to return to Ukraine soon or at some point, while **only 8% indicate that they do not intend to go back** to the country. Furthermore, there is significant variation in the percentage of individuals

who indicate that they are in their preferred country of settlement compared to those who are interested in moving further to another destination. Although a majority (66.1%) indicate they have reached their preferred destination, many are unsure if they will remain in their current country of residence (see Figure 4).

Our findings are likely to contribute to broadening the knowledge on refugee integration and return, not to mention the implications of **better reception policies in the absence of a crisis discourse**.

FIGURE 4 CURRENT LOCATION* AND INTEREST IN MOVING TO ANOTHER DESTINATION

* It is important to highlight that the current location of respondents matches the relative number of Ukrainian refugees across Europe.



Source: MAGYC Infographic “The voices of Ukrainian refugees” (2023)

SPOTLIGHT 2 Conducting research during a pandemic: the impact of COVID-19 on the MAGYC project

Only 1 year and 4 months into the MAGYC project, the world was paralysed due to government measures taken to halt the spread of the COVID-19 virus. Unsurprisingly, these measures, which included travel restrictions and lockdowns, severely affected the work of the MAGYC project not only because they **limited data collection during the first months of the pandemic** (and drastically changed subsequent data collection practices), but also because they **particularly affected those most vulnerable, including refugees and asylum seekers in refugee camps**. Thus, the MAGYC project broadened the scope of its research activities to include how the COVID-19 pandemic affected not only migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, but also how it, in turn, impacted migration governance.

During the first months of the pandemic, **data collection activities** came to a full stop as the MAGYC team got used to the “new normal” of lockdowns, travel restrictions and online meetings. Once it became apparent that these measures were there to stay for more than a couple of weeks, online data collection began. Although this allowed for researchers to pick up the pace for some WPs, a few essential target groups—notably migrants, refugees and asylum seekers—were completely out of reach online. Thus, researchers had to wait for several months for travel restrictions to be lifted to be able to travel and begin data collection. Once in the field, measures to prevent the spread of the virus, such as interacting with interviewees in open-air environments and respecting distancing protocols, were followed in order to protect both participants and researchers. In some extreme cases (for instance, in Niger, Libya and Algeria) data collection had to be completely redesigned: instead of travelling themselves to collect data, MAGYC researchers trained local research assistants in ethics and data collection for them to gather the necessary data for the project.

When it comes to broadening the scope of the research to include the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, the MAGYC team firstly studied the **impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the lives of refugees and asylum seekers**. In an article examining the forms of spatial mobility among refugees and asylum seekers in coping with structural constraints

on their integration paths in three Northern Italian cities, Dimitriadis and Ambrosini (2023) consider the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on people’s lives, highlighting the inefficiency of integration and reception policies. Their findings suggest that this external shock triggered different practices of (im) mobility that had heterogeneous results in terms of agency. While some refugees and asylum seekers opted to be mobile to access income through odd jobs, others remained unemployed and without available alternatives, awaiting for the end of COVID-19 restrictions. This article further advances the theoretical debate on the link between being (im)mobile and agency, and calls for researchers to pay more attention to the (in)voluntary nature of spatial (im)mobility.

As for the **impacts of the pandemic on migration governance**, in Greece, Manou and colleagues (2021) observe that the state changed both asylum procedures and access to health services for refugees and asylum seekers, focusing mostly on safety and security instead of ensuring access to basic rights. The state’s first response was to suspend asylum application procedures for a month before implementing a new law, which aimed at improving asylum application procedures but, in fact, imposed worse conditions and terms for applicants. The authors highlight that some measures and policies were implemented in contradiction with the principles of non-discrimination and proportionality: for instance, lockdowns in camps were imposed one day before the general lockdown in the country.

Lastly, the COVID-pandemic **also affected MAGYC dissemination activities**. For instance, high level events and regional workshops had to be repeatedly postponed and then subsequently cancelled due to travel restrictions and the prioritisation of the pandemic by high level partners the project was engaged with. Nonetheless, new ways of interacting with fellow researchers and broad audiences emerged in the mist of lockdowns, bringing opportunities to engage with more people at a very low cost. This includes the collaboration with sister projects TRAFIG, ADMIGOV and MIGNEX to co-organize and host the webinar series “**Zooming in on Migration & Asylum**”.

support with ethical challenges throughout the project.

Positionality

The MAGYC team acknowledges that, throughout the research project, it was essential to **recognize how and in which ways researcher’s identities, positionalities, motivations and personal, political and gender(ed) orientations might shape research.** Although a complete positionality statement for the project is beyond the scope of this report, we would like to briefly mention how being an “insider” (researchers are considered “insiders” when they share particular attributes, such as nationality or ethnicity, with study participants) might have affected research.

Although having local researchers might have indeed facilitated access to both local institutions and research participants—this was the case in Lebanon, for instance, and for collecting data with civil society Organisations and municipalities in Sweden—being an “insider” did not come without its challenges. The University of Lund (Sweden), for example, experienced challenges in accessing migrant and religious-based networks due to a general mistrust of state and public institutions. Although this was anticipated and the research was designed accordingly, it is nonetheless an interesting example of how, in a few instances, being a foreign or “outsider” researcher might facilitate access to migrants and other types of

participants (this was in fact the experience of a Unimi researcher).

The research team also included one researcher of Kurdish refugee background which facilitated the data collection and access to Kurdish refugee and migrant populations, and allowed for an “insider” perspective. At the same time, it raised a number of issues due to the sensitive nature of the research and the researcher’s own positionality within Kurdish networks and political fields, as well as the challenging and emotionally draining nature of the research, which involved at times participant observation and interviews with highly precarious and vulnerable populations.

Overview of results

This section presents a selection of the most relevant findings of the 4-year MAGYC project, in preparation of policy recommendations for more efficient, forward looking and sustainable governance of mobility. It is divided and presented according to the two dimensions of the MAGYC project: 1) Governing *times* of crisis, and 2) Governing *spaces* in crisis.

Governing *times* of crisis

We begin to summarise the findings from dimension 1, Governing *times* of crisis, by highlighting that, although a ‘migration crisis’ (in fact, crisis in general) is often perceived as an ephemeral phenomenon, there are some **structural dimensions** that alter migration dynamics at the global level, contributing to ‘migration crises’. Then, we move to identify what and who defines a ‘migration crisis’, introducing **the migration as crisis framework**—an empirically-grounded constructivist framework to understand migration crises. We then turn to the EU’s response to the migration ‘crisis’: more specifically, to the **reconfiguration of EU migration governance** by the crisis discourse. Lastly, we explore how **forced migration governance functions as a state-making strategy** for different state and non-state actors in origin, transit, and host countries.

Structural determinants of migration crises

Contributing to our understanding of migratory crises (both in the past and in the future), ULiège adopted a **three-level methodology of prediction-estimation-projection** in order to quantify

‘migration crises’ and correlate (socio-economic, demographic and environmental) long-term trends with migration dynamics at the global level.²

Our work on multiple drivers of migratory crises showed the **multiplicity of factors that impact migration**. For instance, after analysing the direct and indirect impacts on migration of both slow and rapid onset environmental changes, Yacvan (2021) shows **the relative importance of the environment on driving migration**, especially in conjunction with urbanization and agricultural dependency. These results also show the potential negative impacts of environmental changes on migration. For instance, highly damaging disasters, both in terms of human lives and in reconstruction costs, impose further pressures on economic growth and can actually act as inhibitors to mobility rather than as a push factor. Put differently, the migration-inducing effect of the disasters depends on their intensity. This is consistent with studies on environment and immobility (Zickgraf 2018), and is further supported by the mediating role of GDP per capita. More importantly, poverty and inequality are systematically found to be important drivers of migratory flows.

What and who defines a ‘migration crisis’?

The 2014/15 ‘migration (or refugee) crisis’ has become one of the major social and political

2. For an overview and justification of the chosen methodology to measure migratory crises and assess the structural determinants of these, please refer to “The correlations between long-term trends and migration dynamics (D1.1)” by Yacvan (2020).

issues in Europe in the last decade. This **crisis has been the object of different interpretations**: “to some, it is the outcome of increasing and uncontrollable migration flows to Europe, while for others it is the rather the consequence of European states’ inappropriate policy strategies and (mis) management of migration” (Cantat *et al.* 2020: 3). Besides, it has also been recognized as **either a security issue** (as migration flows would threaten the stability and well-being of European societies) or as a **human rights issue** (given that migrants, refugees and asylum seekers face serious abuses and risks not only in Europe but also in transit regions such as Libya and the Mediterranean).

The perception of the 2014/15 migration flows as a ‘migration crisis’ is extremely Eurocentric, as migration to the European Union is minimal compared to other world regions. Fröhlich and Müller-Funk (2020) analyse Tunisian and Turkish³ print media to uncover elite discourses surrounding two major migration deals—the EU-Turkey Deal 2016 and the EU-Migration Deal 2018—and **deepen our understanding of the perception of non-EU states about European ‘migration crises’**. Tunisian media discourses on the EU migration deal of June 2018 show that Tunisian political analysts are aware that the ‘migration crisis’ is actively constructed by political actors in the EU for the latter’s own political gain. In Tunisia itself, no such ‘crisis’ was diagnosed—at least in media discourse—despite the high and rising number of forced migrants entering the country. Instead, political reporting focused on local domestic crises and on Tunisia’s mediating role within the neighbouring conflict in Libya. Similarly, the reporting in Turkey on the negotiations leading up to the joint EU–Turkey statement of March 2016 shows an acute awareness of European constructions of a ‘migration crisis’. Despite Turkey’s rapid development from a migrant-sending state to one of the most important host states for forced migrants in the world, Turkish media reporting focused on local issues and conflicts and on Turkey’s strategic interests in the Syrian conflict. This means that EU perceptions of migration as a crisis, discrepancies between a rhetorical commitment to humanitarian values and

3. Both countries of first asylum which neighbour conflict countries such as Libya and Syria.

real-life actions are carefully received and critically evaluated in neighbouring states, highlighting the need to better understand perceptions of the EU, as this can be expected to impact future cooperation.

Migration as crisis framework


The MAGYC project establishes a clear distinction between migration crisis (as a common-sense category) and migration as crisis (as an analytical metaphorical device)⁴ by exploring the relationship between migration and crisis—particularly the framing, conceptualisation and management of migration as crisis in the media, in political, societal and academic discourses.

Cantat, Thiollet and Pécoud (2020) conceptualise ‘migration crisis’ as an **assemblage of fragmented, changing, and contested discourses, representations, and practices**, which not only structure the perception of the social world but also call for certain ways of governing migration. They introduce the *migration as crisis framework* to address the contingent connection between subjective construction and objective migration processes, to make sense of “migration crisis” discourses, and to explain both their pervasiveness and contingency. This new framework feeds in critical perspectives on the socially constructed nature of ‘migration crisis’, highlighting their disconnect from migration or asylum dynamics and confirming that they are politicised processes, possibly un-made by forward looking and legally consistent asylum and migration governance.

Thus, this framework identifies a metaphorical link between *migration* and *crisis* that can be activated or not, and that may or may not be correlated to empirical realities of (relatively) massive and rapid population movements. The framework offers a constructivist yet empirically grounded approach to why certain patterns of migration are crisis-producers, and others not, how, when, and why ‘crisis’ become a dominant frame to make sense of migration.

4. See also Dahinden and Anderson 2021.

FIGURE 5 THE MIGRATION AS CRISIS FRAMEWORK



Source: MAGYC Infographic “Migration as crisis” (2023).

This framework was tested in various European contexts and at various levels of migration governance. For instance, **the discursive production of the French ‘migration crisis’ was analysed as a socio-political event**—given the absence of substantial immigration and asylum flows to France from 2011 to 2017. By exploring a corpus extracted from the six main French national newspapers, Reddy and colleagues (2020) describe the emergence and framing of migration and asylum as a ‘crisis’, albeit one that is disconnected from actual inflows of foreigners, and its politicisation. Beyond the (somewhat expected) media slant between liberal and conservative newspapers, the authors found that variations occur both across *time* and across *space* in the treatment of the ‘migration/refugee crisis’. Some specific sub-events which polarised media discourses (such as the various migrant boats capsizing in the Mediterranean since 2012 and the publication of Alan Kurdi’s picture in August 2015) are identified as having a significant impact in the treatment of the ‘migration/refugee crisis’, while the origin of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers was found to have an impact on the differential treatment of migration crisis.

The reconfiguration of European migration governance by the this crisis discourse

Turning to the **ways in which European migration governance has been shaped by a ‘crisis’ discourse**, Fine (2020) analyses three cases of migration

governance (economic, bureaucratic and political) expressive of the way in which crisis interacts with a migration assemblage. The author shows that the labelling of the exponential increase in asylum claims in 2015 as a ‘migration crisis’ and its surrounding crisis discourse, in fact, embedded what is considered to be an appropriate response in terms of governing solutions at the EU level.

To start, the **economic rationality** (or the root causes narrative) is based on the need to boost development in origin countries through development aid, which may in turn dissuade migrants from leaving. **Bureaucratic rationality**, on the other hand, presents the migrant crisis in terms of respect for law and order. In this way, migrant flows are to be reduced by the strict application of law separating the *legal* from the *illegal* migrant. Lastly, **political rationality** presents the migration crisis as necessitating the assurance and protection of absolute sovereignty, which has led to a retreat from Europeanisation and multilateral cooperation.


These rationalities not only pursue different solutions and include diverse actors and practices, but their component parts (both human and non-human) are **constitutive of a migration assemblage which is both revealed and reconfigured by the ‘migration crisis’**. For example, even if the economic rationality is misaligned with the evidence on migration drivers—in fact, evidence suggests that development initiatives which raise capabilities and aspirations actually encourage migration (Van

SPOTLIGHT 3 Cross border flows in times of crisis

The MAGYC project (and more specifically, the Sciences Po team) offers a **new way to identify and characterize migration flows across borders** to redress the count of “irregular border crossings” (IBCs) given by FRONTEX. This novel yet straightforward statistical method describes refugee movements and irregular migration flows using EU policies, and distinguishes between border crossers who would likely be granted asylum in destination states (“likely refugees”) and those who would not (“likely irregular migrants”) given asylum acceptance rates.¹ This method was applied to data on IBCs into Europe between 2009-2020.

Our findings show that IBCs from **countries with a high acceptance rate tend to prefer a single primary migration route**. On the other hand, countries with low acceptance rates, such as Morocco and Algeria, usually choose two or more different routes (see Figure 6).

FIGURE 6 ACCEPTANCE RATE OF TOP 25 NATIONALITIES




1. The acceptance rate for a nationality is the share of positive decisions in the total number of asylum applications initiated by people from that nationality.

Source: MAGYC Infographic “Migration as crisis” (2023).

Furthermore, we classified IBCs between “likely refugees” and “likely irregular migrants”, both of whom cross borders without prior authorisation into Europe. Overall, our estimates show that roughly 54% of all IBCs identified between 2009 and 2020 can be classified as “likely refugees” whereas 75.5% of irregular crossings were likely refugees at the peak of arrivals in 2015. Figure 7 shows the percentage of IBCs as “likely refugees” vs “likely irregular migrants” (in this chart, countries are sorted in decreasing order of the number of people who entered Europe across all migration routes).

Thus, contrary to media and political discourses on “fake” or “bogus” refugees coming to Europe in times of crisis (e.g. 2015), our research shows that **the broad publication of irregular border numbers fuel impressions of invasion but in fact only refer to “fake illegals”** as most border crossers are likely refugees. Both across migratory “routes” and time, IBC counts numerous individuals who would likely obtain asylum in Europe given asylum acceptance rates by nationality.

FIGURE 7 PERCENTAGE OF IBCS AS “LIKELY REFUGEES” VS “LIKELY IRREGULAR MIGRANTS”



Source: MAGYC Infographic “Migration as crisis” (2023).

Hear *et al.* 2018)—European migration funding mechanisms (such as the EU’s Emergency Trust Fund for Africa) continue to be embedded with this rationality. Perhaps this can be explained by the fact that economic rationality “has a performative function, serving as a kind of ‘spectacle’ (Andreas 2000, de Genova 2013, Düvell 2012) of control whereby ‘border control efforts are not only actions (a mean to a stated instrumental end) but also gestures that communicate meaning. Thus, the root-causes narrative may function as a kind of “ceremonial practice”, not only a means to an end but an end in itself (Andreas 2000, 11)” (Fine 2020: 15-16).

Building further into the reconfiguration of European migration governance brought about by the ‘migration crisis’, Fakhoury (2020a) explores the EU’s refugee governing rationality with focus on the 2016 EU-Lebanon compact that was negotiated in the context of refugee flight from Syria. Here, the author argues that although the EU has positioned the compact within a broader “crisis governance” approach aimed at regional stabilization and resilience-building, its implementation has been derailed by tensions and contradictions. By exploring the geopolitical motives that prompted the EU to negotiate the Compact with the Lebanese government, the author demonstrates that, from the outset, the compact was set to be a “letter of intent” rather than an actionable policy option.

Migration governance and state making

Refugee management is not traditionally considered a dimension of foreign-policy decision-making within international relations. However, within the subfield of security studies, there is growing interest in explicitly studying the intersection of refugees and foreign policies, particularly in terms of interstate conflict. Thus, MAGYC addressed the question of **how different actors attempt to control mobility during civil war, and how mobility control and processes of state-making interact** in such settings. To do this, the GIGA team developed a theory of forced migration governance along the displacement continuum, as well as a theory of forced migration governance and its interactions with processes of statebuilding by drawing on different historical and current

displacement situations. These theories were then tested to different cases, for instance to mobility control in civil war states (Syria and Libya) and its role as a survival strategy of state and non-state actors.

Mobility in civil wars is often considered a political act by the various actors involved: leaving the country can be perceived as an act of opposition, as can be moving between territories which are controlled by different, opposing factions. Drawing on literature on strategic displacement and migration politics and combining this with empirical insights from the ongoing wars in Libya and Syria, Fröhlich and Müller-Funk (2023) identify **three mechanisms of mobility control in civil war settings: forcing exit, selective return as a form of expulsion, and strategic laissez-faire** as the intentional absence of regulation regarding displacement and return. The analysis reveals that all three mechanisms are employed by state actor(s), rebels, and militias, and can be understood as elements of a new (post)war order that includes some citizens while excluding others depending on perceptions of political threats. The authors interpret the three mechanisms as ways in which actors in civil war settings attempt to manipulate a country’s demography in their own favour in a process of state-making.

Furthermore, Fröhlich and colleagues (2023) identify three **key drivers of forced migration governance** that explain variation in governance outcomes: domestic, geopolitical and international-normative drivers by drawing on different historical (Algerian) and contemporary (Syrian and Libyan) displacement situations. While forced migration governance is negotiated around humanitarian principles in which international organisations and civil society play a crucial role, their findings suggest that the international-normative driver remains strongly bound to domestic and geopolitical logics. In fact, political and economic interests are key factors of forced migration governance in host countries, especially if they align with political interests and state-making strategies of state and non-state actors in origin countries. Moreover, they highlight the **relevance of personalist relationships and ties on both national and local scales** in Middle East forced migration governance. Building on insights on institutional path-dependencies in

refugee hosting states and combining these with knowledge from the Comparative Politics of the Middle East, they propose to add a ‘personalism lens’ as a cross-cutting analytical perspective to better capture policy variation. Drawing on empirical insights from the governance of Syrian forced migrants in Jordan and Lebanon, Fröhlich and Bank (2022) trace how, on the national level, individual actors’ policy priorities can make a difference in the design of forced migration governance, and how their frequent rotation undermines potential innovations. They illustrate how actors’ varying personalist ties are linked with divergent policy priorities which are crucial for the (non-) implementation of policies designed by the central government, thereby contributing to the emergence of quite diverse local outcomes on the ground.

The critical role of forced migration governance was also analysed at critical junctures of state formation by Müller-Funk and Natter (2022). Drawing on interviews and archival material from Tunisia between 1950 and 2020, they analyse how the Tunisian state has dealt with the large-scale arrival of forced migrants from neighbouring countries during two critical junctures of state formation: its independence in 1956 and its democratic opening since 2011. Their findings show that perceptions of displaced Algerians as political assets on the domestic, geopolitical and international level outweigh perceptions of economic and political risks, resulting in a supportive-open approach in the 1950s-60s. On the other hand, displaced Libyans have been perceived as economic assets on the domestic level but also as political risks at the domestic, geopolitical, and international level, explaining Tunisia’s laissez-faire approach since 2011. The analysis highlighted that it was the combination of three factors—the redefinition of national identity domestically and towards the (European, African) other, the balancing of different state actors between security and economic interests, and the integration but also control of IOs in forced migration governance—that can explain Tunisia’s response to Algerian and Libyan displacement on the ground. Ultimately, at both critical junctures of state formation, **the affirmation of national sovereignty was a key factor in forced migration governance**, with the international refugee regime being used and integrated but also

strongly controlled to not jeopardize the political transformation process. Thus, **forced migration governance functions as a state-making strategy** for different state and non-state actors in origin, transit, and host countries.

Governing spaces in crisis

In this dimension, we addressed the tension between territorial sovereignty and the networked dispersion of people across Europe and its neighbouring countries. The tension relates to the multiple dimensions of governance—between international frameworks, regional or bilateral partnerships, national policies and local initiatives—as well as the importance of responses to migration flows provided by diverse actors including pro-refugee civil society, diaspora organisations, coalitions of diverse pro-refugee actors, opponents to refugee reception, local governments, asylum seekers and irregular immigrants.

We begin by introducing the concept of **battlegrounds of migration**, which deepens our understanding on the multilevel governance of asylum and immigration. Focusing on the local level, we move on to examine the role of the civil sector in refugee reception and integration. To do this, we firstly describe the role of CSOs in refugee reception and integration in Sweden, highlighting the **strength of weak ties**. Then, we describe the **role of Kurdish Diaspora organisations** as brokers or interlocutors between arriving refugees and new “host societies”. Both of these serve us to highlight the need for **models of integration that are transnational and multi-scalar**. Lastly, we move to the national and regional levels by introducing the concepts of **refugee rentier states in the Global South**, as well as the **consequences of externalisation policies** in times of crisis.

Battlegrounds of migration

In order to better analyse the multilevel governance of asylum and immigration, UNIMI introduces the concept of **battleground of asylum and immigration policies**, a more dynamic and confrontational vision that can be applied at the international, national and local levels. By building on the

“venue shopping approach”,⁵ the “multi-level governance approach”⁶ and critical humanitarian studies,⁷ Ambrosini (2020) introduces this concept highlighting that the governance of asylum and immigration is a highly contentious field in which **different actors** (including political parties, social movements, mass media and different subjects from civil society) **at different levels** (international, national and local) interact to shape migration and asylum governance. This concept emphasizes that not only does public responsibility span vertically at different levels (regional, national and local) but also that both public and non-public actors (horizontal dimension) play a significant role in migration and asylum governance. In fact, the role of public actors goes beyond humanitarian support by encompassing both pro-migrant supporters and xenophobic movements.

Although the concept can also be applied at the international level—consider, for instance, search and rescue operations undertaken by NGOs boats despite governmental and judicial opposition—and national levels, the dynamics of the **battleground become more visible at the local level**. Local authorities interact with civil society actors in different ways (*cooperating, tolerating or conflicting*) and adopt different strategies to either align or break away from central governments, which in turn, can be more open or more hostile to the reception of asylum seekers and migrants. Furthermore, CSOs themselves play a crucial role as their activities of support can help “curb the effectiveness of restrictions, as occurs in the typical cases of rejected asylum seekers and unauthorized

immigrants” (Ambrosini 2020: 380) as long as they can overcome the spread of xenophobic attitudes. In this way, expressions of active citizenship produce what the author calls “**de-bordering solidarity**” by actively and in practice contesting policies of asylum and borders. Thus, local actors can influence the outcome of asylum governance pursued by central governments by taking part in this “battleground”.

The concept of battleground moves further away from critical humanitarian studies as it claims (humanitarian) civil society is in fact an extensive network of subjects, with different activities, levels of political engagement and formalisation, and professional capacities (see Table 2).

The role of CSOs on refugee reception and integration: the strength of weak ties

Civil society actors are not only key to actively and in practice contest policies of asylum and borders, but they can also **balance the anti-immigration governance and populism** imposed by both left and right political regimes. Taking the case of Sweden—the country which accepted more migrants per capita than any other EU country following the 2015 inflows, but then swung abruptly to become among the strictest recipient countries—Olsson and colleagues (2023) argue that “the rapid shift in asylum politics and public opinion towards migration is not profoundly shared in society” (Olsson *et al.* 2023: 1).

Using a mixed methods approach which combines a qualitative content analysis on migration in small and medium-sized rural municipalities with a quantitative survey on reception, integration, and attitudes towards migrants with civil society Organisations in all 290 municipalities in Sweden, the authors confirm that “‘weak ties’ provided by acquaintances (such as civil society) play a decisive role in social change (Granovetter 1973, 1983) in terms of paving the way for employment, integration, and mobility among asylum seekers” (Olsson *et al.* 2023: 16). Furthermore, they draw on the theory of strategic action fields to better explain the discrepancy between the rise of anti-migration politics and the practice of supporting the reception and integration of asylum seekers by civil society

5. “the venue shopping approach brilliantly highlighted how border control and related decisions are shifting from the national level in three directions: “upward to intergovernmental fora, downward to elected local authorities, and outward to private actors” (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000, 164).” (Ambrosini 2020: 376).

6. Breaking away from the central role of the public authorities from the “venue shopping” approach, the multi-level governance approach perceives “the construction of immigration and asylum policies as a complex process in which diverse institutional and also non-institutional subjects play a role (Scholten *et al.* 2018) (...) showing that political processes and decisions depend on interactions and negotiations among multiple levels of policy-making.” (Ambrosini 2020: 377).

7. Critical humanitarian studies have filled a gap by considering NGOs as key actors in response to crises that endanger a considerable number of people.

TABLE 2 TYPES OF SUBJECTS IN THE (HUMANITARIAN) CIVIL SOCIETY SPACE

	NGOs and specialized Organisations	Other CSOs (associations of volunteers, churches, trade unions...)	Social movements	Citizens
Main activities	SAR in the sea, reception on land	Language schools; Medical services; Legal advocacy; Bureaucratic assistance; Provision of basic assistance	Political protest, but increasingly provision of services (e.g. accommodation in squatted buildings)	Donation of food, clothes, money; accommodation; Volunteering; socialization, leisure
Political engagement	Variable, recently higher against harsher closure of borders	Variable, but increasingly coupled with the provision of services	Main focus (no borders movements)	Variable, often relevant as the reason to mobilise
Formalization	High (formal Organisations, contracts with public authorities)	Mix of formal structures and informal activities	Low, but self-organization	Low (spontaneous mobilization)
Human resources	Mainly professionals, volunteers as supplementary resources	Variable, but often volunteering is relevant	Militants/volunteers	Only volunteers

Source: Ambrosini and Dimitriadis (2023)

actors. They suggest that populist anti-migration politics can be conceptualized as a “severe challenge to the incumbent regime of generous migration politics and, thus (is), an emerging strategic action field” (Olsson *et al.* 2023: 17).

The role of Diaspora organisation in refugee reception and integration

Responding to the increasing interest in the participation of civil society organisations, NGOs and humanitarian actors in refugee reception and integration, SOAS studied the **role of Kurdish Diaspora organisations as brokers or interlocutors between arriving refugees and new “host societies”**. Diaspora organisations are a specific type of subject in the civil society space as they not only have vertical (with local and national authorities) and horizontal links (with other diaspora organisations and CSOs) but also transnational ones with the same Diaspora within Europe, and to their “homeland”. Kurdish Diaspora are of particular interest as they are a “stateless” diaspora—thus often invisible in official statistics—which has significantly grown since the refugee influx from

Syria, Turkey and Iraq during 2015-16. Thus, Kurdish Diaspora organisations provide a useful contrast with state-led diaspora engagement (Adamson *et al.* 2023).

Building from over 200 interviews and participant observations with Kurdish diaspora groups and refugee communities across 18 sites in 7 states in Europe (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, UK), Adamson, Dag and Craven (2022) were able not only to map the Kurdish diaspora in Europe and to establish a typology of different types of diaspora organisation (see Table 3), but also to connect literatures on “migrant integration,” “diaspora politics” and “migration diplomacy/geopolitics” to better our understanding of informal transnational governance structures.

The growth of numerous Kurdish-oriented diaspora organisations across Europe has been guided by the history of Kurdish migration to Europe, and more recently, by the ongoing conflicts in the homeland(s). This has led to the blossoming of very different types of diaspora organisations across Europe: some which are larger, more established and highly networked with strong transnational


SPOTLIGHT 4 Differentiated electoral effects of Syrian refugees in Turkey

The MAGYC research challenges the one-size-fits-all approach in studies on immigration impact on domestic politics. The Sabanci team shows that, in Turkey, although right wing anti-immigrant parties did rise overall since the Syrian refugee ‘crisis’, the electoral impact of refugee flow varies greatly across localities. Despite increasing numbers of Syrians refugees, the popularity of the Republican People’s Party (CHP)—a party which has increasingly emphasized anti-immigrant policies since the eruption of the Syrian civil war—has only marginally increased.

Figure 9 shows the provinces where the vote shares of the government’s party *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)* and opposition party *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP)* have increased in 2018 in comparison with the previous election. CHP’s vote share increased mainly in some larger cities, which might be related partly to their anti-immigrant sentiments. However, in regions with a higher fraction of refugees, their vote share didn’t grow considerably. For instance, in the South Eastern part of Turkey, a region hosting a growing number of Syrian refugees, CHP was not successful in terms of increasing its vote share.

FIGURE 8 VOTING CHANGES BETWEEN ELECTIONS

This maps shows the provinces where the vote shares of the government’s party *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)* and opposition party *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP)* have increased in 2018 in comparison with the previous election. CHP’s vote share increased mainly in some larger cities, which might be related partly to their anti-immigrant sentiments. However, in regions with a higher fraction of refugees, their vote share didn’t grow considerably.



Source: MAGYC Infographic “Differentiated electoral effects of the Syrian refugees in Turkey” (2023)

connections (in Germany, for instance), and others which are more informal and unaffiliated structures, often established by refugees themselves and based on self-help and kinship (Adamson *et al.* 2022). The types of **Kurdish organisations can be loosely categorised into Moderate Broker, Radical Homeland and Self-Organised and Unaffiliated** (Table 3). While Moderate Broker Organisations are more present in locations with established Kurdish populations and strong government refugee support, Self-organised and Unaffiliated can be found in non-metropolitan areas with both strong or weak social services. Although Politicised Homeland Organisations can also be found mostly in metropolitan areas, their networks stretch across to other localities and are thus linked to broader transnational governance structures, something that Self-organised and Unaffiliated organisations are not.

TABLE 3 TYPES OF KURDISH DIASPORA ORGANISATIONS

1	Moderate Broker Organisations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Work closely with local governments and officials — Receive funds for integration programs — Focused on Kurdish culture w/in country of residence — Example. KONIKAR
2	Radical Homeland Organisations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Highly politicized — Linked to broader transnational governance structures — Internal “diaspora governance” — Associated with the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK)
3	Self-Organising and Unaffiliated	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Local and spontaneously organised — Provide self-help, welfare, community, some governance — Emerge in absence of established diaspora Organisations — Examples: Malmo, Bari

Source: Adamson, Dag and Craven (2023).

Furthermore, this research calls attention to the fact that **diaspora networks have a direct impact on the trajectories and integration of newly-arrived Kurdish refugees in Europe**. Not only do they facilitate mobility (by providing informal and trans-border flows of information and resources) and act as intermediaries with “official” integration programs but they also direct welfare or “self-help” initiatives,

sometimes performing “internal governance” functions, either in parallel or in conjunction with local authorities (Adamson *et al.* 2023). Nonetheless, these organisations can in some cases place obstacles to integration through gatekeeping or through the instrumentalisation of the political economy of refugee integration.

Transnational and multi-scalar models of integration

More importantly, as refugees and asylum seekers often continue to be influenced by developments in their homelands, so do diaspora networks. Although through integration, refugees can flourish in their country of reception, they remain embedded in broader geopolitical dynamics that affect their everyday lives, and are influenced by a wide range of transnational actors, ties, and forms of diaspora politics. Thus, there is a need to move beyond local and national-level **models of integration to one which is also transnational and multi-scalar**. By taking into account the enduring effects of homeland politics on integration processes, Adamson *et al.* (2022) suggest that processes of integration should be thought of as taking place within a multi-scalar context whereby refugees can live connected lives that are simultaneously rooted but also stretch across borders.

Our contribution to a multi-scalar understanding of migration governance was further deepened by the ULund team by linking concepts of civil society, social resilience and solidarity when **analysing the collaborative governance at the local level in migration/refugee reception and integration**. Fry and Islar (2021) examine the case of Malmö, Sweden, a city which in 2015 became the centre for the Swedish refugee reception and solidarity initiatives. The authors use theory on solidarities in the “refugee crisis” together with social cohesion and inclusion as a framework for identifying the key challenges and opportunities that exist for horizontal collaborations to bring about social resilience. Their findings are threefold. First, although in fact short-term project collaborations between civil society actors may indeed “fill the gap” left by neo-liberal local governments in reception and

integration, they do not bring about the much needed structural changes. Nonetheless, these horizontal collaborations can be a successful strategy for civil society actors to bring the realities of refugees into local policy making (especially those who have been rendered invisible due to legal categorisations), and thus influence more inclusive alternatives to migration governance. Lastly, the authors argue that increased coordination between the national level of crisis management and local civil society groups could benefit to create inclusive response efforts in times of national crises (such as the COVID-19 pandemic) and build resilience.

Refugee rentier states in the Global South

Through their work in **WP8**, Tsourapas (2019) **identified the concept of the *refugee rentier state*** in the Middle East, to describe “states that employ their position as host states of forcibly displaced populations to extract revenue, or refugee rent, from other state or nonstate actors in order to maintain these populations within their borders” (Tsourapas 2019: 465). Drawing on data collected in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey—which are in fact the countries that constitute the largest host states of displaced Syrians in the post-2011 Syrian refugee crisis—the author identifies two strategies through which a host state may exercise refugee rent-seeking behaviour in its foreign policy. States can threaten to “flood a target state(s) with refugee populations within its borders, unless compensated” (Tsourapas 2019: 468) via *blackmailing* or they can promise to maintain refugee populations within its borders, if compensated, via *back-scratching*. The choice between adopting either blackmailing or back-scratching depends on the perspective of domestic elites’ vis-à-vis the target states: blackmailing is more likely to be adopted when domestic elites host a significant number of refugees and when they perceive that their state is geopolitically important vis-à-vis target states.

The concept of refugee rentier state was placed in conversation with the literature on policy diffusion by Freier and colleagues (2021) in order to better understand how states in the Global South develop similar strategies to “extract payments

from other state or non-state actors in exchange for maintaining refugees within their borders” (Freier *et al.* 2021: 2748). Using data from a diverse number of states in the Global South, including Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia, as well as regional groups, the authors find that **states use their position as recipient states of refugees to obtain financial benefits**. Their refugee rent-seeking strategies are disseminated within and across regions through **three mechanisms: learning, cooperation, and emulation**. These three processes are not mutually exclusive and often intertwine.

At the national level, officials learned to use rhetorical threats to make their warnings more distinct and effective at extracting aid, describing overwhelming numbers of refugees and emphasising their fears of potential state collapse (*learning*). At the regional level, states adopt refugee rentierism through international cooperation by signing tri-partite agreements to build trust with donors, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration (*cooperation*). At the global level, refugee rentierism becomes an international norm through *emulation*. Unlike cooperation, emulation involves rent-seeking that responds to international norms. For example, in 2016, the UN, the World Bank, and the Islamic Development Bank created the Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF) to provide loans to assist refugees and host countries. Such initiatives contribute to normalizing the logic of using refugee populations as leverage for additional aid or loans on favourable terms.

Externalisation policies in times of crisis

Besides clarifying what and who defines a crisis, and identifying the feedback loops that exist between perceptions, migration knowledge and migration policy-making, the MAGYC project **assessed the impact of externalisation policies on irregular migration flows and refugee movements** in times of crisis.

Through an events study and differential analysis, Savatic and colleagues (n.d) analyse the effects of the EU-Turkey statement on the number of Irregular

Border Crossings. The EU-Turkey statement was chosen mainly for two reasons: 1) that a large proportion of IBCs identified on the Eastern Mediterranean route (from Turkey into Greece or Bulgaria) are Syrian nationals; 2) the proximity to Turkey may explain why Syrian nationals may be unable to divert to alternative pathways to Europe while simultaneously being granted refugee status at a high rate. Their research shows that, even though the **EU-Turkey Statement may have had a significant diversionary effect of “likely irregular migrants”** to alternative migration routes (away from the Eastern Mediterranean route), **“likely refugees” remained blocked** or continued to traverse despite reduced possibilities for requesting asylum.

Results show that, on the Eastern Mediterranean route, the decline in the number of IBCs from “far” countries of origin (Figure 9) is greater than for “close” countries of origin. The result is not robust when excluding Syrians, however, indicating that non-Syrian nationals located close to the Eastern Mediterranean route (i.e. Iraqis and Iranians) may have diverted while Syrians in particular remained stuck following the EU-Turkey Statement. The relative distance of Iraq and Iran from Greece may account for this result. In turn, on the Central Mediterranean route, the number of IBCs from “far” countries of origin rises dramatically more than those from “close” countries of origin. In other words, the rising cost of traversing the Eastern Mediterranean route after the EU-Turkey Statement was adopted led to a shift in migration towards the Central Mediterranean route.

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Thus, border control policies relying upon diplomatic partnership between the EU and non-EU countries **tend to affect the ability of forced migrants to seek asylum in Europe**: they block/deflect them from crossing borders while other migrants, less likely to obtain asylum given their nationality, are diverted to other routes of irregular border crossings.


Furthermore, MAGYC explored the **concept of “internal externalisation”** whereby states increasingly deploy the body of the refugee to externalise their responsibility for protection. Yavcan (2023) compares two border crises—that of Calais at the French-UK border, and the short-lived

events in Pazarkule of Edirne at the Greek-Turkish border in 2020⁸—to examine the implications of externalisation policies on both humanitarian response and border management policies. Although these two border crises are seemingly very different, considering the classical concept of externalisation, it seems that the former is a case of the UK externalising its migration management and border controls to France while the second case is an example of the EU externalising its migration management to Turkey in order to stop migratory flows. Furthermore, using the notion of “internal externalisation” through “politics of exhaustion” (Welander 2019) and “practices of neglect” (Loughnan 2022), Yavcan (2023) puts forward that these two crisis exemplify how the state holds no responsibility for the suffering which emanates from neglect and withdrawal of basic services, showing the wider implications of externalisation policies.


8. In February 2020, the Turkish government suspended their commitments to the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal following the death of 34 Turkish soldiers at Pazarkule of Edirne during Turkey’s operations in Syria’s Idlib province. In the wake of these developments, the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced that Turkey would stop controlling outflows from its western borders, sparking a crisis with the EU. “As a result, an estimated 12,000-25,000 refugees, asylum-seekers, and migrants from 29 countries gathered on the border with Greece. Several accounts by NGOs and migrants interviewed which were present in Pazarkule suggest that the authorities were encouraging migrants to go to Pazarkule, some even arguing that the irregular migrants under administrative control, waiting to be returned to their countries of origin were allowed to go to Pazarkule. Greece responded by closing its borders, with strong operational and political support from the EU and temporarily suspended asylum applications—a violation of international law that EU officials were reluctant to condemn.” (Yavcan 2013: 12).

FIGURE 9 EFFECT OF THE EU-TURKEY STATEMENT ON IBCs ACROSS THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN ROUTES

EFFECT OF THE EU-TURKEY STATEMENT ON IBCs ACROSS THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN ROUTE



EFFECT OF THE EU-TURKEY STATEMENT ON IBCs ACROSS THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN ROUTE



PPML - Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimations

Source: MAGYC infographic “Externalisation policies in times of crisis: The impact of the EU-Turkey declaration on the trajectories of refugees and migrants” (2023)

Policy implications and recommendations

This section⁹, based on the MAGYC project's research findings, **proposes possible avenues for the development of better and more proactive migration governance strategies**. Instead of being inspired by enduring misconceptions about migration realities and a strongly distorted evaluation of policy efficiency, we explore policy recommendations that break away from path dependency and are more aligned with the experiences of experts, civil society actors and migrants, refugees and asylum seekers themselves in Europe and beyond. Firstly, we discuss recommendations regarding EU externalisation policies. Then, we move to explore pathways to support the reception and integration of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in Europe.

EU externalisation policies

Externalisation policies were first adopted by Western European states following the end of the Cold War in order to minimise the risk of substantial migration from Eastern European states (Mesnard *et al.* 2022). Since the 2000s, however, both the geographic scope and the variety of policy instruments (both formal and informal) of the EU's externalisation policies have expanded. Nowadays, these policies include not only partnerships and cooperation with countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea (such as Libya, Morocco, Turkey, etc.) but also include bilateral and regional multilateral negotiations further south

on the African continent. Furthermore, they now encompass both irregular migration as well as issues of asylum. The MAGYC project evaluated the impact of a series of externalisation policies, with the aim of providing policy recommendations for more proactive migration governance strategies.

Insights from key trends on the development of externalisation policies since the 1990s¹⁰

Exploiting a novel **multidimensional dataset on EU externalisation policies**, Mesnard and colleagues (2022) link policies to Frontex data recording irregular border crossings across the EU and Schengen Area's external frontiers in order to better understand the effects of externalisation and assess their efficacy. Including both migration-related bilateral and multilateral agreements between 31 European destination countries and all possible migrant origin countries worldwide, this database incorporates migration policy packages, labour migration programs, readmission procedures, ad hoc statements and declarations and international fora, amongst others. The main trends observed are the quantitative and geographical expansion of externalisation policies, and the informalisation of policy instruments.

9. In the same manner as the Overview of results section explores only some (albeit essential ones) of the project's findings, this list of policy implications is by no means an exhaustive one. We invite you to explore all the MAGYC Policy Briefs generated within the project.

10. Further reading: Mesnard, A., Jaulin, T., Savatic, F., Senne, J-N and Thiollet, H. [Migrants, Refugees, and Policies: A Gravitational Analysis of Irregular Population Movements in Times of Crisis](#). MAGYC Policy brief, D.8.3, January 2022.

Focusing on EU readmission agreements (EURAs) and their bilateral implementation protocols (IP-EURAs), as well as visa liberalisation decisions, their results suggest that, if the sole policy objective of externalisation is to decrease the number of IBCs both IP-EURAs and visa liberalisations appear to be effective policy instruments. Nonetheless, these instruments fall short when it comes to protecting refugees as “people who are likely refugees attempt to cross Europe’s borders to escape from violence whatever the risk this implies, which leads to greater IBCs in the absence of legal migration channels” (Mesnard and colleagues 2022: 1).

If the EU policy objectives are two-pronged and include both refugee protection and the reduction of IBCs flows, **creating legal channels for migration would need to be seriously considered in the design of future policies.** For instance, visa liberalisation could be an effective way both of decreasing IBCs to Europe while protecting the lives and asylum rights of likely refugees.

Insights from the implementation of Law 36-2015 in Niger¹¹

Circular migration from Niger to Libya has historically been long standing, and Nigerien migrants continue to be the biggest migrant group in Libya today. However, on 26 May 2015, under pressure from its European partners, the Nigerien government issued **Law 36-2015**, which **forbids Nigeriens from transporting international migrants north** from Agadez towards Libya or Algeria. While this law supposedly targets only international migrants, a closer look by **WP4** reveals its extended impact on circular migration and the local population.

Weihe and colleagues (2021) show that this European externalisation policy **hampered regional circular migration as a resilience strategy for local populations.** Nigeriens’ migration routes to Libya have shifted and have become more diverse, more dangerous, more expensive and

more irregular—resulting in a decline in the official overall number of Nigerien migrants. This has led to unintended consequences for their local communities for whom income from different forms of migration is part of an important resilience strategy to counter unemployment, poverty, and droughts.

Interviewees also reported an overall **economic slowdown in Agadez** as a result of the law, increasing corrupt practices from migration facilitators and local authorities, and a hierarchisation between migrant groups in their access to humanitarian aid in the region.

It is therefore recommended that policy makers, including from the EU and EU member states:

- Avoid implementing migration policies that undermine circular migration as a form of resilience.
- Stop using humanitarian aid as a bargaining chip to implement European externalisation policies. Instead, design international humanitarian aid by integrating opinions and knowledge of affected local populations—migrants and non-migrants, without discrimination.
- Truly incorporate perspectives of local actors and regional migrants when developing international migration policies. To properly address the issue of migration, the Nigerien government must involve elected local authorities in the process by creating a permanent framework for consultation.
- Stop marginalising Nigerien migrants in terms of aid or humanitarian assistance, which is mostly given to international migrants, as this creates frustrations and grievances which can ultimately lead to violence.

Insights from the adoption of the Jordan and Lebanon Compacts^{12,13}

Fleeing war, repression, and economic breakdown in their home country, Syrians have become the largest group of forced migrants in the Middle East.

11. Further reading: Weihe, M., Sea-Watch e.V., Müller-Funk, L. and Abdou, M. [Negotiating circular migration from Niger to Libya and back: Between policies and non-policies](#). MAGYC Policy Brief, D4.6, August 2021.

12. Further reading: Fröhlich, C. and Bank, A. [Forced Migration Governance in Jordan and Lebanon: Lessons from two EU Compacts](#). MAGYC Policy Brief, D4.8, April 2021.

13. Further reading: Fakhoury T. (2020), [Refugee Governance in Crisis: The Case of the EU-Lebanon Compact](#) MAGYC Deliverable, D2.3.

Relative to their own populations, neighbouring Jordan and Lebanon have hosted the largest number of Syrians per capita, becoming key host states for forced migrants in the Middle East (Fröhlich and Bank 2021). Thus, the MAGYC research team set out to evaluate both the Jordan and Lebanon compacts five years after their signing in order to draw some recommendations for a more reflective EU policy approach.

Although it has been argued that the compact model is a “game changer” for refugee responses across the world, Fröhlich and Bank (2021) reflect on a major problem that persist five years after the implementation of both the Jordan and Lebanon Compacts: that is that **they hardly consider the root cause of the problem they were supposed to address**—the Syrian war. Instead, they “were created as technical policy tools with European, Jordanian, and Lebanese audiences in mind, hoping to appease economic, societal, and political woes while suggesting there could be a lasting solution for Syrians without addressing the situation in Syria itself” (Fröhlich and Bank 2021: 6). Thus, any future attempt to solve the Syrian (or any) crisis needs to place a stronger focus on achieving tangible, legally binding outcomes for refugees and their hosts. One path to achieve this would be to **identify political, societal, and economic barriers to success and address them through policy dialogue**, including with refugees, host communities and local authorities.

Moreover, since the adoption of the Lebanon Compact, Lebanon has gone through overlapping crises while denying refugees prospects for inclusion, which calls for a revamping of the EU’s refugee “governing intervention” in the country. For instance, the 2019 nation-wide protest movement that took place at the heels of a harrowing financial crash, has deeply shaped the realities of both host and refugee populations. In this context, “the EU is **set to reconfigure its approach to the humanitarian-development nexus in Lebanon**, as complex modes of poverty and destitution have shaped and will dramatically shape the realities of both host and refugee populations” Fakhoury (2020a:13)

Therefore, Fakhoury (2020a) calls for the **EU’s migration policy templates to become more attuned to local and rapidly shifting dynamics**. They

should also seek to transcend a “crisis governance” perspective and align themselves with a rights-based approach that goes beyond urgency and temporality, by being adaptive and reflexive rather than reactive. More importantly, policies should put good governance on refugee and citizen rights as the primary goal of international humanitarian and development aid (Fakhoury 2020b).

This policy recommendation was further highlighted by analysis of the expansion of EU external migration policy into the Horn of Africa. Jaulin and Thiollet (2021) recommend for European leaders to “set out to create migration policy frameworks that genuinely take into account the political, social and economic costs that the lack of migration opportunities entails for African countries, especially refugee-sending and refugee-hosting countries” (Jaulin and Thiollet 2021:12).

Policies that support reception and integration in Europe

MAGYC research found that, in the face of incapacity or voluntary inertia of national and local governments to manage the reception, settlement and integration of refugees and asylum seekers, civil society actors play an essential role. As highlighted in the overview of results section, not only do they have a direct impact on the trajectories and integration of newly-arrived refugees in Europe, but they can even balance the anti-immigration governance and populism imposed by both left and right political regimes. Nonetheless, civil society actors (CSAs) continue to face challenges to support the reception and integration of migrants. This section offers policy recommendations to support the role of civil society in the reception and integration of newcomers in Europe.

Including local communities to fill newcomers’ basic needs¹⁴

The 2015-16 influx of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers found Greece on the frontline

14. Further reading: Blouchoutzi, A., Manou, D., and Papathanasiou, J. [Policy brief on migration governance in Greece](#). MAGYC Policy Brief, D6.7, June 2022.

facing unprecedented challenges. Given that the country did not have a long-term history of hosting asylum seekers, both national and local authorities were unprepared to promptly and effectively respond to the pressure brought about by these large-scale arrivals. Then, the two most urgent issues were 1) the allocation of these populations after first reception and 2) the effective integration of newcomers. In the midst of a recession—which deeply affected the country’s labour market and the third-country nationals already integrated in it—the focus of public action was largely on reception measures.

In Greece, the accommodation scheme for asylum seekers included not only government-led initiatives such as the Reception and Identification Centres (or hotspots) and open temporary reception facilities but also other schemes involving municipalities, NGOs, the Orthodox Church of Greece and the UNHCR Emergency Support to Integration and Accommodation scheme (ESTIA). Thus, from the onset, **NGOs, and IOs were of great importance in facilitating access and service provision for people in need of international protection.** To make it easier for these organisations to provide the necessary support, we recommend that policy makers:

- Clear the way for **a more active role of the local communities** (municipalities, grassroots organisations, etc.) in designing allocation policies, managing housing to avoid segregation and facilitate integration, promoting equal access to basic services, and reducing bureaucracy would make a significant difference, as **local communities are in a better place to identify local needs and restrictions** with regard to labour market, education, and social services, as well as to communicate their plans and deliver their services to the local population. For instance, the proximity and close contact between ESTIA beneficiaries and local stakeholders offers ground for evaluating the effectiveness of local integration efforts.
- Tap into private sector funding as it could facilitate current public efforts to integrate the migrant population into the Greek labour market.
- Furthermore, EU countries with alternative dispersal schemes for the migrant population could take advantage of the EU toolbox to

facilitate comparative analysis and promote mutual learning.

Supporting the role of civil society actors with non-deported refused asylum seekers¹⁵

Since 2015, civil society actors in Europe have been exceptionally proactive in taking up initiatives in favour of human and migrants’ rights, trying to soften the implementation of migration policies (Glorius and Doormenik 2020; Dimitriadis *et al.* 2021). Their **engagement entails not only support to people’s basic needs** (through food banks, housing and health assistance) but also **in different domains of integration**, including legal advice, language courses, vocational training and information about job opportunities. In Italy, the activities of CSAs have taken place in a context characterised by “1) restrictive migration policies at the national, 2) indifference and reluctance of local institutions in relation to the asylum governance and/or policies of exclusion towards refugees and asylum seekers promoted by municipalities, and 3) widespread suspicion towards pro-migrant NGOs” (Dimitriadis *et al.* 2022:1-2). Therefore, CSAs had to overcome a series of barriers that constrained refugees and asylum seekers’ survival and integration in the host society, including high numbers of refused asylum seekers and an increasing number of non-deported refused asylum seekers. **Non-deported refused asylum seekers face particular vulnerabilities including exclusion to formal employment opportunities and welfare services**, which may lead many to homelessness and social marginalisation.

Even if CSAs try to fill the gaps in refugees and asylum seekers’ reception and integration, lack of human and financial resources, and limitations and flaws in CSAs’ activities have left a substantial number of non-deported refused asylum seekers deprived of support and at risk of further marginalisation. Yet, **collaboration between state authorities and CSAs can contribute** to some responses related to the issues of migrants who do

15. Further Reading: Dimitriadis, I., Ambrosini, M., Bonizzoni, P. [Civil Society Actors assisting refugees and asylum seekers in small cities](#). MAGYC Policy Brief, D6.7, July 2022.

not have a right to stay—even without the formal or direct engagement of the state.¹⁶ To start, this collaboration requires **recognition of CSAs as relevant partners** of public authorities in the local governance of immigration and asylum policies in both big and small cities. **Providing funding for CSAs** that cover the basic needs of non-deported refused asylum seekers can be a solution that goes beyond the risk of CSAs losing their autonomy. Furthermore, as deportation policies are not “successfully” implemented, local governments should stop turning a blind eye to the provision of some services to non-deported refused asylum seekers.

An important step towards local integration concerns the **issuing of temporary stay permits** for non-deported refused asylum seekers to be able to look for jobs in the formal labour market as they currently only have access to informal jobs. **Opportunities for vocational training and internship** can be a further measure to facilitate integration in the labour market. This will, in turn, facilitate access to housing and other services, favouring long-term acceptance of migrants from host communities. For instance, Germany has implemented a project that enables the regularisation of refused asylum seekers (EMN 2016): “despite the rejection of one’s application, asylum seekers have the right to access vocational training programmes and seek employment. Beneficiaries are given three years to complete vocational training and two years to remain and work in the country” (Dimitriadis *et al.* 2022:6).

Fostering horizontal collaborations to achieve integration and social cohesion¹⁷

In 2015, while asylum applications were significantly increasing in all European countries, Sweden experienced an exceptionally steep increase with the number of applications doubling from 2014 (Migrationsverket, 2020). To tackle the challenges

16. This considering that “public authorities can hardly provide services to this population, because this could openly contradict principles of national sovereignty and closure to unwanted immigration” (Dimitriadis *et al.* 2022:6).

17. Further reading: Islar, M., Fry, C., Jerneck, A., Olsson, L. and Binte-Habib, A. [How civil society can help achieve social cohesion and integration in times of crisis in Sweden](#). MAGYC Policy brief D6.7, July 2022.

of reception, many local governments—including the Swedish city of Malmö—started to collaborate intensively with civil society. Recognising their expertise as well as their substantial infrastructure for migrant assistance, Swedish authorities “integrated civil society initiatives into migration management to enhance participation and bottom-up approaches and thus tapped into the innovative solutions and the quick mobilisation that characterise the pro-migrant civil sector (SOU 2019)” (Islar *et al.* 2022:2).

By offering alternative and more inclusive practices, civil society organisations had a substantial role in meeting demands in migrant reception, especially given that they were able to quickly mobilise resources and create solutions based on the lived realities of migrants in the city. Their actions were especially important for the successful integration of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, which was key to fostering social cohesion. Yet, civil society actors **struggle to find a balance between being a provider of social services whilst also aiming to influence social change**. Furthermore, in Sweden there is a strong underutilised potential in civil society organisations to contribute to the integration of migrants and asylum seekers. Although an overwhelming majority of civil society organisations are positive towards migrants, only 20% reported any financial support for integration activities, and only 8% collaborate with municipalities on integration (Islar *et al.* 2022).

Given that **horizontal collaboration between civil society actors and the local government** are shown to be key at fostering social cohesion in the context of crises we recommend for:

- Horizontal collaborations to be closely connected to different actors across governance levels and arenas. In this way, **new forms of governance** that bring solutions to support social cohesion can be introduced.
- Horizontal collaborations **to focus on long-term policy changes** aimed at addressing the structural causes behind weak cohesion and inclusion. As they stand, these collaborations tend to have a short-term purpose of easing the most urgent issues.
- The role of civil society should not be limited to the role of social service providers that fill the gaps left by governments or assist in horizontal collaborations during times of crises. Instead,

it is recommended that civil society holds a comprehensive role where **their on-the-ground information and knowledge are used to build long-term strategies** for inclusive migration governance and increased preparedness for future crises. In this way, horizontal collaborations can be vehicles for processes to achieve social cohesion and inclusion.

In addition, a successful strategy to overcome some of the bureaucratic barriers that informal networks might experience in Swedish migration governance is for **institutionalised civil society organisations to receive government grants and to share financial resources** with—or outsource tasks to—less formalised groups or networks. For instance, in Malmö, Skåne Stadsmissionen is responsible for a housing project for which it received state funding and then initiated a joint project by contacting other local civil society actors.

Taking Geopolitics into account for integration: a multi-scalar process¹⁸

MAGYC research on the role of Diaspora organisations on the integration of Kurdish refugees and asylum-seekers in Europe highlighted that these organisations often play important roles as “brokers” and facilitators of processes of integration by connecting newly-arrived refugees and asylum seekers with existing resources, services and support. Nonetheless, in cases where “state support for new arrivals is lacking, or there is a lack of established diaspora organisations that have a history of partnering with local policy actors, **new arrivals can be in danger of falling into a situation of extreme precarity and/or being exploited** by informal actors or diaspora organisations that take advantage of newcomers’ extreme vulnerability” (Adamson and Dag 2022:6). In extreme situations of intra-diasporic forms of dependency, vulnerable newcomers can be forced to be politically engaged by necessity and not by choice.

Given that individual refugees and asylum-seekers

do not simply leave one context and start a new life in another context but instead continue to be influenced by developments in their homelands and remain embedded in broader geopolitical dynamics that affect their everyday lives, political engagement is not an issue—in fact, even when integrated into their host societies, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers can be expected to remain politically engaged with and interested in their countries of origin—the political exploitation of vulnerable newcomers by predatory actors in the diaspora is. To avoid this situation and ensure vulnerable newcomers can make their own choices about levels and types of political engagement, **processes of integration should be thought of as taking place within a multi-scalar context**. This means, in other words, that besides providing access to legal status and forms of support, “successful integration processes should provide individuals with the resources and support to successfully function and flourish in their country of reception, as well as to engage productively with broader transnational, geopolitical and diasporic contexts” (Adamson and Dag 2022: 6).

Furthermore, states and local communities can provide new arrivals with **greater and more open access to legal channels for reception and integration**, so that services and assistance can be accessed directly and without fear. **Policy makers could also partner with and support diaspora organisations** that have the capacity, expertise, experience and orientation to serve as reliable brokers for new arrivals in the process of integration.

The role of Geopolitics has been made more evident when it comes to Kurdish asylum-seekers originating from Turkey and/or Kurds displaced by operations in the Syrian-Turkish border region. These populations, regrettably, “often get caught up in the foreign policy dynamics and bargaining process stemming from Turkey’s role as a European Union candidate state, NATO member, and, increasingly, a state that has become key to the EU’s overall external migration prevention and control strategy” (Adamson and Tsourapas 2019)” (Adamson and Dag 2022: 5). Thus, in order to make it more difficult for refugee and asylum ‘crises’ to be subject to geopolitical instrumentalization, we recommend **expansive and open policies of refugee reception**, which can also ease the path to integration.

18. Further reading: Adamson, F. and Dag, V. [Integration of Kurdish Refugees in Europe: A Diasporic Perspective](#). MAGYC Policy Brief, D5.5, August 2022.

Conclusion

The MAGYC summary report gathered the most policy-relevant results of the 4-year MAGYC project, which aimed at assessing how migration governance has been influenced by the 2014/2015 ‘migration/refugee crisis’, and how crises at large shape policy responses on migration. Bringing 12 international partners, the project collected qualitative data in 28 countries across Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, the Horn of Africa, West Africa and Latin America. Arguing that the migration crisis was first and foremost a matter of perception¹⁹ induced by the *acceleration* and *concentration* of migration (rather than a matter of absolute numbers), MAGYC’s research domain 1—Governing *times* of crisis—analysed the acceleration of migration whereas domain 2—Governing *spaces* in crisis—studied the concentration of migration. This report selected and summarised key findings from each of these domains.

Selected results from **Governing times of crisis** highlight that, although ‘migration crises’ are often perceived as ephemeral phenomena, structural dimensions (e.g. economic, environmental) that alter migration dynamics at the global level can contribute to these ‘crises’. Also, we discussed what and who defines a ‘migration crisis’, introducing the migration as crisis framework—an empirically-grounded constructivist framework to understand migration crises. We then turned to the EU response to the migration ‘crisis’: more specifically, to the

reconfiguration of EU migration governance by the crisis discourse. Lastly, we explored how forced migration governance functions as a state-making strategy for different state and non-state actors in origin, transit, and host countries.

As for **Governing spaces in crisis**, selected results introduced the concept of battlegrounds of migration, which deepens our understanding on the multilevel governance of asylum and immigration. Focusing on the local level, we moved on to examine the role of the civil sector in refugee reception and integration by highlighting the strength of “weak ties”. Then, we described the role of Kurdish Diaspora organisations as brokers or interlocutors between arriving refugees and new “host societies”. Both of these serve us to highlight the need for models of integration that are transnational and multi-scalar. Lastly, we moved to the national and regional levels to discuss the concepts of refugee rentier states in the Global South, and the consequences of externalisation policies in times of crisis.

By appraising policy responses in light of the ‘crisis’ and assessing their efficiency for the long-term governance of migration, the project drew **policy recommendations for more efficient, forward looking and sustainable governance of mobility**. Instead of being inspired by enduring misconceptions about migration realities and a strongly distorted evaluation of policy efficiency, our policy recommendations seek to break away from path dependency and are thus more aligned with the experiences of experts, civil society actors and migrants, refugees and asylum seekers themselves (in Europe and beyond). This report focused on two sets of policy recommendations: one regarding

19. This was, in fact, made more prominent during the last wave of Ukrainian refugees into Europe: it became clear that what gets to be labelled as a ‘migration crisis’ is not a function of sheer numbers but instead is a result of how flows are governed. What follows is that poor governance and inability to cooperate and share responsibility in a fair way results in migratory crises.

EU externalisation policies, the other exploring pathways to **support the reception and integration** of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in Europe.

Although the MAGYC project has brought about very relevant and timely results and policy recommendations, as researchers we notice that policy makers tend to be disconnected from research (even the one they fund) due to strong public and political pressures. The level of politicisation of migration debates and their disconnection from empirical realities was, in fact, discussed during the MAGYC final conference in a round table that brought together sister projects ADMIGOV, ASILE, BRIDGE and TRAFIG. There, discussants wondered how to establish a nexus between policy makers and academics in order to avoid this disconnection between evidence and policy making, which was highlighted as a structural issue. If the purpose of funding research on migration governance was to “inform policies, programming and actions contributing to EU and global migration governance based on human rights and through multilateral development partnerships”—as stated in the H2020 funding programme to which the MAGYC project belonged to —²⁰ it is necessary for donors to contribute to research uptake and policy discussions, and plan for these from the onset of the funding.

As for the research implications of the MAGYC project, these are manifold. To start, our research about ‘migration crisis’ in Europe opens avenues for comparisons with new developments, for example around Ukrainian exiles and other contexts such as Central American asylum seekers crossing US borders. Furthermore, by better connecting migration governance with the politics of war making and international intervention across the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, the MAGYC project has brought about broader theoretical innovations around the notion of migration diplomacy in international politics, which are useful to future research.

20. MIGRATION-02-2018-Towards forward-looking migration governance: addressing the challenges, assessing capacities and designing future strategies.

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List of MAGYC research deliverables

Work package 1

Structural determinants of migration crises

[The correlations between long-term trends and migration dynamics](#) (D1.1) Basak Yavcan, Liège University

[Evolution scenarios of migration dynamics under long-term socio-economic, demographic and environmental trends](#) (D1.2) Basak Yavcan, Liège University

[The influence of long-term socio-economic trends on migration dynamics](#) (D1.3) Basak Yavcan, Liège University

[The influence of long-term demographic trends on migration dynamics](#) (D1.4) Basak Yavcan, Liège University

[The influence of long-term environmental trends on migration dynamics](#) (D1.5) Basak Yavcan, Liège University

[Re-embedding local “crises” in global migration dynamics: Calais and Pazarkule](#) (D1.6) Basak Yavcan, Liège University

Work Package 2

Migration and Asylum governance through times of crises: continuity and changes in the governance configuration

[Does crisis matter for European migration governance? A Framework Paper](#) (D2.1) Shoshana Fine, Liège University

[Turkey and the European Union Refugee Deal: Assessing Turkish Migration Policies and the External Protection of European Borders](#) (D2.2) Meltem Muftuler-Bac, Sabanci University

[Refugee Governance in Crisis: The Case of the EU-Lebanon Compact](#) (D2.3) Tamirace Fakhoury, Lebanese American University

[The EU-Egypt Partnership Priorities and the Egyptian Migration State](#) (D2.4) Gerasimos Tsourapas, University of Birmingham, Sciences Po.

[European externalization policies and a migration crisis imaginary: the cases of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey](#) (D2.5) Tamirace Fakhoury (Department of Politics and Society, Aalborg University) *et al.*

[The Jordan Compact](#) (D2.6) Gerasimos Tsourapas, University of Glasgow, Sciences Po

Work Package 3

Constructing the crisis: actors, representations and narratives

[Migration as crisis - Framework paper](#) (D3.1) Céline Cantat, Sciences Po CERI

[Migration as Crisis in and across Europe Actors, strategies and representations - Special Issue Proposal](#) (D.3.2.a) Céline Cantat, Sciences Po CERI *et al.*

[Non-State Actors and the Politics of Migration Crises. Policy changes, multilevel governance and political opportunities - Special Issue Proposal](#) (D.3.2.b) Céline Cantat, Sciences Po CERI *et al.*

[The construction of the crisis-invasion discourse by different stakeholders in Italy - Working paper](#) (D.3.3) Iraklis Dimitriadis, University of Milan

[The asylum management process at the local level – Policy Brief](#) (D.3.4) Iraklis Dimitriadis, University of Milan; Maurizio Ambrosini, University of Milan

[The Representation of the “Refugee Crisis” in Italy: Constructing a Crisis-Invasion Discourse](#) (D3.5) Iraklis Dimitriadis, University of Milan

[Framing asylum at the local level: experts’ narratives of conflictual dynamics in the post-reception period in Italy](#) (D3.6) Iraklis Dimitriadis, University of Milan; Maurizio Ambrosini, University of Milan

[Turkish perceptions of the EU migration deal based on Turkish Parliamentary Debates](#) (D3.7) Samet Apaydin, Sabanci University; Meltem Muftuler-Bac, Sabanci University

[Open access timelines and mapping of the revolution and war in Syria \(2011-2017\) based on narratives \(videos, images, testimonies\) from below](#) (D.3.8) Kamel Dorai, CNRS / IFPO

Work Package 4

Comparing crises: Lessons from “migration crises” in North Africa, the Middle East and the Greater Horn of Africa

[Perceiving Migration Crises: A view from the European neighbourhood](#) (D4.1) Christiane Fröhlich, German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA)

[Forced migration governance at critical junctures of state formation in Tunisia](#) (D4.2) Lea Müller-Funk, German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) / Danube University Krems; Katharina Natter, Leiden University

[Greenwashing Repression, Natural Disaster and the Legitimation of Forced Migration and Non-Assistance in Syria and Eritrea/Tigray](#) (D4.3) Christiane Fröhlich, German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA); Nicole Hirt, German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA)

[The Governance of Syrian Refugees in the Middle East: Lessons from the Jordan and Lebanon Compacts](#) (D4.4) Christiane Fröhlich, German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA); André Bank, German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA)

[Mobility control as state-making in civil war: Forcing exit, selective return and strategic laissez-faire](#) (D4.5) Christiane Fröhlich, German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA); Lea Müller-Funk, Danube University Krems

[Negotiating circular migration from Niger to Lybia and back: between policies and non policies – Policy Brief](#) (D4.6) Mattea Weihe, Sea-Watch e.V. *et al.*

[Forced Migration from Eritrea and Regime Stabilization – Policy Brief](#) (D4.7) Nicole Hirt, German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA)

[Forced Migration Governance in Jordan and Lebanon: Lessons from two EU Compacts – Policy Brief](#) (D4.8) Christiane Fröhlich, German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA); André Bank, German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA)

Work Package 5

The effect of asylum seekers concentration in space in times of crisis. Looking at labour market, welfare, education, and environment governance across Europe

[Maps of Asylum Seekers' Sites](#) (D5.1) Paula Puškárová, Bratislava University of Economics - EUBA

[Integration of Kurdish Refugees in Europe: A Diasporic Perspective – Jointly published policy brief](#) (D5.5) Fiona B. Adamson, SOAS, University of London; Veysi Dag, SOAS University of London

[The Returns to Language Skills of Immigrants in Europe](#) (D5.6.1) Matej Vitáloš, Bratislava University of Economics - EUBA

[Possible Changes Over Time: Poverty Among Migrants and Asylum Seekers in the European Union](#) (D5.6.2) Mykhaylo Kunychka, Bratislava University of Economics - EUBA; Leonid Raneta, Bratislava University of Economics - EUBA

[Central European Leaders' Attitude Towards the Migration and the Migration Crisis](#) (D5.6.3) Peter Csanyi, Bratislava University of Economics - EUBA; Rudolf Kucharčík, Bratislava University of Economics - EUBA

[Constrained to be \(im\)mobile? Refugees' and Asylum seekers' practices to integrate in restrictive socio-economic urban contexts in Northern Italy](#) (D5.6.4) Iraklis Dimitriadis, University of Milan

[Refugees and asylum seekers in informal and precarious jobs: the role of temporalities in the early labour market insertion from the professionals' and volunteers' perspectives](#) (D5.6.5) Iraklis Dimitriadis, University of Milan

[Toward a Multi-Scalar Understanding of Integration: Kurdish Refugees between State, Diaspora and Geopolitics](#) (D5.6.6) Fiona B. Adamson, SOAS, University of London *et al.*

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Multi-scalar study of the response

Broad explorative literature study on the multi-scalar policy practices in relation to migration and integration within EU (D6.1) Iraklis Dimitriadis, University of Milan *et al.*

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D6.4.2 The Socioeconomic Integration of People in Need of International Protection: the Case of Greece, Dimitra Manou *et al.*, University of Macedonia

D6.4.3 Governing from Below: Kurdish Refugees on the Margins of European Societies Veysi Dag, SOAS University of London

D6.4.4 Horizontal local governance and social inclusion: The case of municipality-civil society engagement during refugee reception in Malmö, Sweden Claudia Fry, Lund University; Mine Islar, Lund University

D6.7.1 Civil society actors assisting refugees and asylum seekers in small cities Iraklis Dimitriadis, University of Milan *et al.*

D6.7.2 Migration governance in Greece Anastasia Blouchoutzi *et al.*, University of Macedonia

D6.7.3 How civil society can help achieve social cohesion and integration in times of crisis in Sweden Mine Islar *et al.*, University of Lund

Work package 7

The displacement continuum: assessing continuity between internal displacement and international mobilities along the voluntary to forced migration continuum

'Even if they reopened the airports' Barriers to cross-border movement expose Yemenis to repeated internal displacement (D7.1) Schadi Semnani, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre – IDMC

Yemen: the implications of forced immobility (D7.2) Chloe Sydney, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre – IDMC

IDMC 2020 Global Report on Internal Displacement (D7.4) Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre – IDMC

Nigeria: returning migrants at risk of new displacement or secondary migration (D7.5) Chloe Sydney, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre – IDMC

Nigeria: Returning migrants at risk of new displacement or secondary migration – Policy Brief (D7.6) Chloe Sydney, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre – IDMC

IDMC 2021 Global Report on Internal Displacement (D7.8) Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre – IDMC

Work Package 8

External dimension of the crisis

Externalization Policies and their Impacts on Migrant and Refugee Flows to Europe in Times of Crisis: A preliminary study (D8.1) Thibaut Jaulin, Sciences Po Bordeaux *et al.*

Borders Start with Numbers. Measuring Migration in Times of Crisis (D8.2) Thibaut Jaulin, Sciences Po Bordeaux *et al.*

Migrants, Refugees, and Policies: A Gravitational Analysis of Irregular Population Movements in Times of Crisis – Policy Brief (D8.3) Thibaut Jaulin, Sciences Po Bordeaux *et al.*

Formal and Informal Dimensions of Turkish Migration Governance: Linkages between Domestic and Transnational Politics (D8.4) Samet Apaydin, Sabanci University; Meltem Muftuler-Bac, Sabanci University

Qui accueille les réfugiés syriens au Liban ? Le rôle de l'État, des organisations internationales et des organisations non gouvernementales (D8.5) Kamel Dorai, CNRS – Ifpo; Imad Amer, CNRS – Ifpo

Migration Governance in Civil War: The Case of the Kurdish Conflict (D8.6) Fiona Adamson, SOAS, University of London

Externalization of Migration Governance, Turkish Migration Regime and the Protection of European Union's External Borders (D8.7) Meltem Muftuler-Bac, Sabanci University

From 'Multi-Level' to 'Entangled': ReSpatialising Migration Governance in Turkey (D8.8) Fiona Adamson, SOAS, University of London

Migration diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean (D8.9) Thibaut Jaulin, Sciences Po Bordeaux

Comparative Perspectives on Migration Diplomacy (D8.10) Fiona Adamson, SOAS, University of London *et al.*

Is the forced/voluntary dichotomy really shaping migration governance? (D8.11) Héléne Thiollet, Sciences Po CERI, ICM *et al.*

Migration Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa – Policy brief (D8.12) Thibaut Jaulin, Sciences Po Bordeaux; Héléne Thiollet, Sciences Po

Migration, asylum and international interventions in the Horn of Africa (D8.13) Thibaut Jaulin, Sciences Po Bordeaux; Héléne Thiollet, Sciences Po

List of selected MAGYC funded peer-reviewed articles

Constrained to be (im)mobile? Refugees' and Asylum seekers' practices to integrate in restrictive socio-economic urban contexts in Northern Italy Iraklis Dimitriadis, University of Milan; Maurizio Ambrosini, University of Milan

Deal-making, diplomacy and transactional forced migration Fiona B. Adamson, SOAS, University of London *et al.*

Mobility Control as State-Making in Civil War: Forcing Exit, Selective Return and Strategic Laissez-Faire Christiane Fröhlich, German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA); Lea Müller-Funk, Danube University Krems

De-Bordering Solidarity: Civil Society Actors Assisting Refused Asylum Seekers in Small Cities

Iraklis Dimitriadis, University of Milan; Maurizio Ambrosini, University of Milan

Self-governing from below: Kurdish refugees on the periphery of European societies Veysi Dag, SOAS, University of London

The Regional Allocation of Asylum Seekers in Greece: A Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis Approach Anastasia Blouchoutzi, University of Macedonia, *et al.*

The perils of refugee rentierism in the post-2011 Middle East Gerasimos Tsourapas, University of Glasgow

The governance of Syrian refugees in the Middle East: Lessons from the Jordan and Lebanon Compacts Andre Bank, German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA); Christiane Fröhlich, German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA)

Externalization of migration governance, Turkey's migration regime, and the protection of the European Union's external borders Meltem Müftüler-Bac, University of Sabanci

A PROMETHEE MCDM Application in Social Inclusion: The Case of Foreign-Born Population in the EU Dimitra Manou, University of Macedonia, *et al.*

Horizontal Local Governance and Social Inclusion: The Case of Municipality-Civil Society Engagement During Refugee Reception in Malmö, Sweden Claudia Fry, University of Lund; Mine Islar, University of Lund

Externalization Policies and their Impacts on Migrant and Refugee Flows to Europe during the "Crisis." A preliminary study Thibaut Jaulin, Sciences Po Bordeaux, *et al.*

Networks do not float freely: (Dis)entangling the politics of Tamil diaspora inclusion in development governance Catherine Craven, SOAS, University of London

'The Battleground of Asylum and Immigration Policies: a Conceptual Inquiry' Maurizio Ambrosini, University of Milan

Reflections on the Gap Hypothesis in the Immigration Policy of the Slovak Republic Ján Lidák (College of International and Public Relations Prague); Radoslav Štefančík (University of Economics Bratislava)

State(s) of Negotiation: Drivers of Forced Migration Governance in Most of the World Lea Müller-Funk, Danube University Krems *et al.*

"Once the road is safe": Displacement and return in north-eastern Nigeria Chloe Sydney, International Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC)

Refugee commodification: the diffusion of refugee rent-seeking in the Global South Gerasimos Tsourapas, University of Glasgow, *et al.*

Migration and Asylum Seekers Governance in the EU: The Case of Berlin Municipality Mykhaylo Kunychka, Bratislava University of Economics; Leonid Raneta, Bratislava University of Economics

The Urban Governance of Asylum as a "Battleground": Policies of Exclusion and Efforts of Inclusion in Italian Towns Maurizio Ambrosini, University of Milan

Reflective Practice and the Contribution of Refugee-Researchers Veysi Dag, SOAS University of London

The Migration State in the Global South: Nationalizing, Developmental, and Neoliberal Models of Migration Management Fiona B. Adamson, SOAS, University of London; Gerasimos Tsourapas, University of Glasgow

The Migration State in the Global South: Nationalizing, Developmental, and Neoliberal Models of Migration Management Fiona B. Adamson, SOAS, University of London; Gerasimos Tsourapas, University of Glasgow

The Road from Yemen (Parts 1-6) Schadi Semnani International Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), *et al.*

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
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
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
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
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
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This synthesis report brings together the most relevant findings from the MAGYC (Migration Governance and asylum Crises) project as well as their policy implications. This project assessed how migration governance responded to the 2015/16 refugee “crisis” and has since been influenced by it, and how crises at large shape policy responses to migration.

Running from November 2018 to April 2023, this research project brought together 12 partners: the Hugo Observatory from the University of Liège (Coordinator), Sciences Po, the University of Economics in Bratislava, the GIGA institute of Global and Area Studies, Lund University, the IDMC, SOAS University of London, the University of Milan, the Lebanese American University, the University of Macedonia, Sabanci University and IfPO/CNRS.



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