



MAGYC
Migration Governance and Asylum Crises

Re-embedding local “crises” in global migration dynamics: Calais and Pazarkule

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MAGYC: The MAGYC (**Migr**Ation **G**overnance and **AsYlum C**risis) project seeks to assess how migration governance has responded to the recent “refugee crises” and has since been influenced by it, and how crises at large shape policy responses to migration. This four-year research project (2018–2023) brings together twelve international partners: the Hugo Observatory from the University of Liège (Coordinator), Sciences Po, the University of Economics in Bratislava, the GIGA institute of Global and Area Studies, Lund University, the IDMC, SOAS University of London, the University of Milan, the Lebanese American University, the University of Macedonia, Sabanci University, IfPO/CNRS.

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MAGYC Deliverable

In complementing the previous deliverables of Work package 1 with the objective of understanding the drivers of migratory crises across space and time and the other MAGYC research outputs demonstrating the governance of migratory crises with a special focus on the implications of externalization policies, this deliverable attempts the re-embed local “crises” of Calais and Pazarkule in global migration dynamics. In terms of the conceptual framework, it incorporates not only the classical notion of externalization involving the third countries in one’s border management but also the notion of “internal externalization” through “politics of exhaustion” and “practices of neglect”, whereby states increasingly deploy the body of the refugee to externalize their responsibility for protection. The deliverable compares these two border crises in relation to the push and pull factors of migrants and the local governance in relation to both humanitarian response and border management policies. The results point out to the utility of employing a wider conceptualization of externalization as well as the limits of these policies.

Introduction

“In July 2020, EU-Belarus visa facilitation and readmission agreements entered into force¹. The European Commission has accused Belarus’s authoritarian leader of luring migrants with the false promise of easy entry to the EU and instrumentalizing migrants, following the arrival of 2000 migrants at the country’s border with Poland².”

Since the beginning of the 2000’s, the EU’s migration governance became to be heavily dominated by this idea of externalization which rests on an attempt to engage sending and transit countries in strengthening border controls, combatting illegal entry, migrant smuggling and trafficking, as well as in readmitting irregular immigrants (Boswell 2003). This process led to non-EU partners on migration to become aware of their empowered position vis-à-vis the EU and its Member States in the “fight against irregular migration” (Cassarino, 2020) and resorted to heavy instrumentalisation of migration,

¹ https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/visa-facilitation-and-readmission-agreements-between-european-union-and-belarus-enter-force_en

² ‘Belarus migrants: EU accuses Lukashenko of gangster-style abuse.’ November 10, 2020 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-59215769>

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together with threats of defecting from this cooperation. Though the limits of this policy brought about heavy criticism, it continues to be the leading perspective in EU migration management as seen on EU's New Pact on Migration and Asylum.

Several work packages of the MAGYC Project explore the implications of this policy on cooperation with third countries, refugee protection, discourses and perceptions inside and outside of the EU and the doubling of this policy with heavy securitization and widespread use of the 'crisis' discourse. This working paper attempts to bridge these two lines of research on two cases of border conflict; the ongoing incidents in Calais at the French and UK border and the fortunately shortlived Pazarkule events in Edirne at the Turkish and Greek border of 2020. These cases, especially the latter, also represent good examples of the policy of externalization of migration, the process of empowerment of policy partners and resulting instrumentalization of migration. This cycle is also exemplified by the recent border conflict between at the Polish-Belarusian border, underlining its potential for spread and repetition, hence its political relevance.

In investigating these conflicts, the implications of externalization policies on drivers of migration and on migration governance will be analysed. For this, an extensive and all encompassing conceptualisation of externalization will be utilized which incorporates not only the classical notion of involving the third countries in one's border management but also the notion of “internal externalization” through “politics of exhaustion” (Welander, 2019) and “practices of neglect” (Loughnan, 2022), whereby states increasingly deploy the body of the refugee to externalise their responsibility for protection.

In reembedding the aforesaid cases in this literature and this workpackage's findings on crisis level migratory flows, this descriptive working paper will attempt to address the following questions:

- What were the reasons for these incidents and the different pull and push factors that brought the migrants to these places?
- Who were the prominent actor constellations in the field and what kind of a migration management methodology has been adopted?
- How were the incidents perceived and labeled as crisis?
- How were the incidents related to the externalization policy?
- And what was the implications of this policy and migration governance methodology on human lives?

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The plan of this deliverable is as follows. In the first section the literature on externalization of migration governance will be briefly laid out. This section will be followed by a section setting the context in both research sites where a detailed chronology of both contexts will also be laid out. Following the description of the methodology, the results of data collection in relation to the implications of the policy of externalization will be laid out in order to reembed these two specific border crisis within the general conceptual framework MAGYC project build upon. In doing this, special attention will be paid to migrant trajectories for a clear understanding of different push and pull mechanisms, to the role of NGOs focusing on humanitarian relief and the national and international governance of the borders.

Literature and theoretical framework

Since the 1990s, the EU's immigration policy has evolved in terms of its external component which is not straightforward to identify as it might take many distinct forms. In an effort to characterize the Member States' actions outside of their conventional borders, a variety of words has been used: 'external relations', 'foreign policy', 'extra-territorialisation', 'juxtaposed control', 'remote control', 'outsourcing', and 'offshoring' (Guiraudon, 2003; Lavanex, 2006; Bialasiewicz, 2012). In general, the EU's incorporation of migration into its interactions with and mobilization of third countries is regarded to as the external dimension. The external dimension is also identified as one of the three legs of the more recent EU Pact on Migration and Asylum being negotiated. According to Zapata-Barrero (2013), externalization of migration refers to the “design the expanding scope of its rules beyond EU borders” In a similar vein, externalization refers to a sequence of procedures involving the geographical and administrative extension of a state's migration and refugee policy into other nations.

The EU's extension or transfer of migration and asylum management to third countries has been defined as the “spatial” and “legal stretching” of migration control beyond national borders (Casas-Cortes et al., 2016). While also the EU's externalization of migration and asylum, especially in border studies, corresponds to the definition of 'transportable' and 'deployable border policies' according to Weizman (2007), externalization takes place where the migrants are, according to Casas-Cortes (2016). There are several ways that these 'transportable' and 'deployable' externalization policies and practices can be implemented vis a vis third-party nations. For instance, the dissemination of

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non-negotiable and predetermined European norms to third countries under conditionality logics of enlargement is commonly known as the “Europeanization of Europe's neighborhood” (Karadag, 2019).

As the migration and refugee policy within the EU and its member states becoming highly political, EU officials increasingly prioritized promoting collaboration with sending and transit nations on immigration and asylum policy (Gökalp-Aras, 2021). The European Union's Commission reports, treaties, and communication documents point out legal externalization policies. Under this banner of collaboration with third countries, two distinctly different approaches can be discerned. Boswell (2003) differentiates them “externalization of migration management” and “root cause” approach. The first relate to the types of collaboration that externalize existing domestic or EU migratory control instruments to third countries, mostly in the immediate periphery of the EU. The second kind of externalization targets the countries of origin with the objective of preventing further out-migration with the strategy entailing actions intended to alter the circumstances that impact people's decisions to migrate or their preferred destinations. While the measures taken in the first include strengthening the borders, preventing illegal entries, combating human and migrant smuggling, the second one aims for immigrants to stay in their origin countries via improving their economic and social conditions.

There are multiple ways to achieve the externalization of migration policies. Papadopoulos (2007) points out to three main ways to ensure the so-called externalization of migration policies. First one is the “remote control,” which involves the shift of border controls to third nations or border countries, the most common conceptualization of externalization. The second is “remote protection,” mainly related to humanitarian protection beyond the national boundaries and probably the least developed of the three method. And finally third one concerns with “capacity-building” in some sending and transit nations, mostly through the transfer of expertise, technology apparatus, and institutions, an important foci of this policy approach. Papadopoulos further argues that the EU's externalization policies are not limited to the introduction of some technological and administrative breakthroughs, but also a new way of conceptualizing and organizing the European landscape by redrawing the maps of security risks and creating zones of (in)security. (2007, pp.98-99). As cited in Deliverable 8.1 of MAGYC project, mainstreaming migration into foreign policies and using conditionality (to tie development aid, visa facilitation or the signing of a trade agreement to the implementation of

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migration control policies by third countries) are the key governmental strategies that have been used to promote this externalisation process.

Casas-Cortes defined the EU's policy of externalizing migration management with the concept of “itinerant geopolitics of governing mobility.” According to them, new institutional arrangements and different configurations of border management change the traditional relationship between state power and the region, leading to a series of yet unresolved debates that lead to an institutional and legal stalemate in the field of foreign relations (Casas-Cortes et al., 2016). In addition, as an important part of this policy, the mobility partnership (MP) agreements have been ratified between the EU and Eastern European and African countries in a long-term bilateral framework to facilitate policy dialogue with third countries. MP focus is on externalizing migration management through readmission agreements and visa facilitation agreements. In this context, while signing nine MP with the EU and related third countries, it has signed seventeen readmission agreements.

As argued by Jaulin et al. (2020) in D.8.1 “the objectives behind these policies have remained constant within a spectrum that ranges from addressing the structural causes of emigration (often called “root causes”) to deterring emigrants from leaving their countries of origin, to containing migration in third countries of transit, to preventing unauthorized border crossings, and to enabling the deportation of irregular migrants identified in Europe.” According to Gokalp Aras (2020) as crisis response and differentiated externalisation have become the ‘new normal’, reflected in the EU's New Pact on Migration and Asylum (the EU Pact), adopted in September 2020. Since 2015, rather than formal and standardised cooperation with third countries, the EU has been adopting more tailor-made, informal, flexible, and differentiated externalisation strategies.

In her assesment of the UK-France border management and criticism of a heavy focus on the British hostile environment to migration management, Welander (2021) points out to the utility of the term “internal externalisation” (first coined by Barbero and Donadio, 2019) and defined as the UK border controls to France being dependent upon an inherently harmful set of (micro) practices and methods, best understood as a “politics of exhaustion,” a new technology of border control and mobility governance. These set of policies aims to deter, exclude and control through the mental and physical exhaustion of individuals.

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In emphasizing the malign outcome of the bordering tactics in Calais, Welander (2019) further argues that a theorization of the politics of exhaustion as a strategic approach to migration control serves to underscore the extent to which the externalization in the UK-France setting in many ways mirrors the violent and harmful nature of the more accentuated and widely denounced examples of externalization in the context of Italy-Libya, Spain-Morocco, Australia, Indonesia and beyond. As of 2021, Greece-Turkey border conflict can be added to the list. She further argues that, irrespective of the intent behind some of the more seemingly benign forms of practices and methods, the bordering tactics are essentially malignant in their outcomes, which Bonneville calls as ‘deterrence’ in essence. In this vein, the case under scope does not fit the concept of externalization because UK is externalizing migration governance to France but also because of the politics of exhaustion followed by France.

Loughnan (2022) further evaluates on this point by suggesting that while externalisation is usually enacted through agreements between states, through practices such as interdiction at sea, offshore processing and deportation, if it is also understood as a set of practices which relocate responsibility for border control away from signatory states with the aim of diluting Convention obligations, we need also to consider those practices often overlooked in our focus on institutional agreements and relationships: such practices also comprise part of the ‘arsenal’ of externalisation. Loughnan (2022) suggest that externalization can be enacted in a different strategy through the term she coins as active neglect. Here, neglect indicates the absence of *doing* anything, or simply providing any care. In this sense, neglect is imbued with passivity even while it refers to a failure to care for something/someone for whom we have responsibility. Focusing mainly in the Australian governance of Manus Island, she argues that through these practices of neglect, states increasingly deploy the body of the refugee to externalise their responsibility for protection. Accordingly, the creation of hostile conditions aimed at compelling refugees to ‘decide’ to give up on their asylum claims comprises such ‘action at a distance’: signatory states preserve control while avoiding responsibility through this new tool of ‘externalisation. *Loughnan 2022*

This working paper is closely related to the output produced in Workpackage 8 as it pays particular attention to local and intra-regional political dynamics in non-EU countries, including inter-state and non-state relations, formal and informal dynamics, and the role of international organisations operating locally. As WP 8 asks how policies deployed at the border and beyond the

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borders of the EU have an impact on mobility across different regions; how EU and international governance mechanisms intersect with local, national, regional and transnational dynamics; and how these mechanisms shape the interests and policies of target states, both in terms of migration diplomacy and domestic politics, this deliverable links this literature with the crisis discourses explored in WPs 3 and 4 in embedding crisis in local contexts and illustrating the different forms of externalization discussed above both conceptually and empirically.

Methodology

The fieldwork for this working paper has been carried out for the two prominent sites where border encounters and the so called “crisis” took place the most namely Calais and Edirne, Pazarkule. In addition to the desk research consisting of an academic literature review, a traditional and social media analysis as well as NGO and INGO reports, site visits have been undertaken to both locations for a better picture of the conflicts, local, national NGOs have been interviewed. In doing this, several facilities such as detention centers, NGO stock depots, border facilities were visited. In addition, for both regions, academics who have extensive field experience and have written about the issue have been interviewed. For both venues, queries have been made to access to local authorities but it was only possible for Edirne to talk to them. Nevertheless, the frequent public social media statements of the local authorities in Calais gave a reliable impression on the position of authorities there with regards to our research questions. Moreover, the field visits were carried out during the pandemic, July 2021 for Turkey and November 2021 for France, which also enabled us to gather some information about the impact of the pandemic not only on the displaced populations but also on the new policies and practices. Finally, for the Pazarkule case, two returnees from the border -one from Syria and another from Iran, have been interviewed. As the sites of gathering were scattered and our fieldvisit intersected with a crackdown, to protect the displaced, the research team did not attempt to access them directly and instead interviewed more NGOs in daily contact with them, in order to gather more information about them. All in all, 17 interviews have been conducted in the research sites.

In addition to original interviews conducted by the research team, during the period of writing this deliverable, three important reports in each research site has been published by NGOs, INGOs, academics and journalists. Each of these

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reports incorporate a thorough data collection with direct interview evidence to the conditions in the field.

For the Turkish case

- SGDD/ASAM Edirne Pazarkule Mudahesi Raporu
https://sgdd.org.tr/yayinlar/sgdd_asam_edirne_rapor_tr.pdf
- <https://www.hayatadestek.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/200302-edirne-pazarkule-saha-durum-raporu.pdf>
- https://www.amnesty.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/FINAL-15.16-Caught-in-a-political-game_FINAL-with-cover.pdf
-

For the French case

- "Investigating 30 Years of the Political Factory of Deterrence", Plateforme des Soutiens aux Migrant.e.s (PSM) by Pierre Bonnevalle
- https://dev.psmigrants.org/documents/8/Rapport_P._Bonnevalle_.pdf
<https://www.jcwi.org.uk/Handlers/Download.ashx?IDMF=2508a089-0e41-4398-8688-ef7e37f2b010>
- Amnesty International Targeting solidarity - Criminalization and harrassment of people defending refugee and migrant rights in northern France
- Marta Lotto, ON THE BORDER, Life in transit at the French-British border"

To augment these recent reports, the research team interviewed those involved in the preparation of these reports in order to gain further insight into the main questions of this deliverable related to the governance of these two crises and migrant trajectories.

Setting the context

-Calais

France's northern coastline, from Grande-Synthe to Cherbourg, has historically been a place of passage, transit and waiting for a crossing to Great Britain. For over 30 years, the border has “hosted”, depending on the period, between 1,500 and 15,000 individuals, with diverse migratory pathways, origins and stories (Bonnevalle 2022). While in the 1990s it was often people from the former communist dictatorships in Eastern Europe or from the war zones in the Balkans who were stranded in Calais, thereafter it was mainly displaced people from

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Afghanistan and neighbouring Pakistan, from the East African countries of Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea. During this period, various bilateral agreements and conventions have strengthened this border, further impeding the crossing of persons to whom this right is not granted (Lotto 2021). Accordingly, the border security has been enhanced with the surveillance systems deployed from the Channel to the North Sea. Currently, Eurotunnel and the ports connecting France to the United Kingdom clearly demonstrate these efforts as they are surrounded by barriers, high fences, infrared detection systems, CCTV cameras and light projectors as well as an increased police presence and patrols equipped with drones in order to detect any attempted crossings (Lotto, 2021)

As elaborated by Welander(2021), the UK by setting up extraterritorial arrangements on French territory to deny leave to enter, fundamentally altering the way the UK operates at its border, through what is called “juxtaposed border arrangements” through the 1991 Sangatte Protocol, the 2003 Le Touquet Treaty, and later bilateral agreements. Even though rights groups have argued that this policy is in breach of the UK’s international legal obligations by “circumventing the right to asylum and as a result also the protection against non-refoulement” (Refugee Rights Europe, 2020; see also Amnesty International, 2017), they became the cornerstone of the externalization of the UK border to France, which from the perspective of exiles mean that safe and legal routes to seek asylum in Britain are next to non-existent. The timeline below lists the background of this externalization dating back to Sangatte and the protocol signed between France and the UK with the same name and the succeeding treaties and developments marking this process of juxtaposed border arrangements.

Timeline-Calais

1991	The Protocol between the government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the government of the French Republic concerning frontier controls and policing, co-operation in criminal justice, public safety and mutual assistance relating to the Channel fixed link, (or Sangatte protocol) is signed between France and the United Kingdom. It allows for each country to set their border checkpoints in the other country.
1998-1999	Due to the Kosovo war, there is an influx of migrants wanting to go to the United Kingdom.
September 1999	Opening of the Sangatte Humanitarian Emergency Shelter and Reception Centre, managed by the French Red Cross. According to the red Cross, more than 67 000 migrants transited through this centre. Most of them came from Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan.

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December 2002	Nicolas Sarkozy, at the time the French Minister of Interior, ordered the shutdown of the Sangatte centre. Following this, the number of migrants decreased slightly but they did not have a fixed place to live anymore. They mostly live in illegal settlements, which are regularly evacuated and destroyed by the French authorities. One of those camps, in the surrounding forest, became the first “jungle”.
2009	Evacuation and destruction of the first Jungle. Migrants were temporarily arrested but released soon afterwards without anywhere to go.
2014-2015	The number of migrants increases from around 800 in July 2014 to 3000 in June 2015 to more than 6000 in October 2015. The French government organises the spreading of the migrants in various centres across France, but the number of migrants in Calais keeps increasing. Du to this increase, the government sets up a reception centre, the Jules Ferry Centre, around which a camp will expand. The population of this camp will considerably increase, resulting in what is considered a “second” jungle.
2016	In March, the “Calais Jungle” is partly destroyed, and its inhabitants are redirected to Reception and Guidance Centres elsewhere in the country. In September, the definitive destruction of the Jungle is ordered by Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve. More than 7000 people are evacuated. They are again spread over the French territory, with a lot of them going to Paris.
December 2016 – January 2017	Migrants start coming back to Calais. The city and the Region apply a “zero tolerance for migrants”, notably prohibiting associations to serve food, in order to avoid a return of “Fixation points”. At the same time, the Grande-Synthe camp sees an influx of migrants.
2018	France and the UK restated their joint commitment to this border control arrangement once again with the Sandhurst Treaty, which updates the Le Touquet Treaty, seeks both to speed up the processing of migrants in northern France and to increase security provision at Calais

Bosworth (2022) argues that this approach redesigned Calais and Dunkerque, which while do not quite fit the island model, despite being located ‘offshore’ from a British perspective, they are ‘onshore’ for France, they are not sites of ‘exception’, but rather are subject to the same set of human rights frameworks that both countries have ratified and follow. In these sites of temporary confinement, France and the UK share power, however uneasily and incompletely and both countries are subject to the same set of human rights

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frameworks that they have ratified and follow. Conflicting with these commitments, the aforesaid juxtaposed controls between France and the UK were introduced and enhanced over the course of the last thirty years, to create what became a perpetual ‘jungle’, where people on the move are trapped and deterred. Furthermore in practice these controls meant that, within these geographical spaces, the British Border Force can stop and search individuals and freight vehicles on French soil, while their French PAF colleagues do the same on British territory; anyone found with irregular immigration status or who claims asylum, as well as people who are suspected of serious criminal or terrorist offences (or indeed of being a victim of modern slavery), may be briefly detained in STHFs for up to 24 hours or, exceptionally, for 48 hours (Bosworth, 2022). Since 2010, the British and French have run a joint ‘operational coordination centre’ in Calais to share intelligence. Finally, the UK also provides extensive funds for new technology and fencing around the border sites in France.

In the words of Olivier Cahn interviewed by Pierre Bonnevale, the situation being experienced in Calais, at least since the closure of Sangatte, is a situation of outsourcing the border and the migration issue. Accordingly,

“This is typically the policy that the British have asked the EU to impose on Morocco, Libya and Turkey. So we pay, they manage. What is interesting is that the British have also imposed it on France, which is not in the position of economic dependence that Turkey or Morocco may have with regard to the EU, and that France accepts this kind of treatment”.

This is precisely why this working paper also focuses on a classical case of externalization between the European Union and Turkey, in flesh and bone, with the EU-Turkey Migration Deal of 18th of March 2016. The EU-Turkey deal perfectly exemplifies the mainstreaming migration into foreign policies and using conditionality to tie development aid, visa facilitation or the signing of a trade agreement to the implementation of migration control policies by third countries. Signed around the same time with Compacts Jordan and Lebanon, with the EU-Turkey migration deal of March 2016, the EU made sure of strict migration and border policies to be pursued by Turkey in return for financial aid to fund the expenses related to building capacity in relation to border security and a potential for visa free entry to the EU for Turkish citizens. It is ‘thanks’ to these funds that Turkey now has a wall on its border with Syria, Iraq, and Iran equipped with high end surveillance technologies. And it is also ‘thanks’ to this treaty that the EU could isolate itself from the flows of migrants destined to Europe being trapped in Turkey.

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-Edirne, Pazarkule

Edirne is the central city of Turkey's North-West Thrace region bordering both Bulgaria and Greece with five border gates including Pazarkule. The city is also known as “the door to Europe” for Turkey, as well as a door to Turkey for many migrants who want to go to Europe just as for those arriving from Balkan countries. As mentioned by Huseyinoglu and Utku (2021), the city remained an important city for migrants using the Balkan route and hence negotiations between Turkey and the European Union (EU) in the post-Cold War era has added a new role to this town: Deterring irregular migrants from reaching Europe (especially after the 2002 Readmission Protocol between Greece and Turkey).

The incident that triggered Turkey to suspend its commitments to the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal as well as the crisis at the border town of Pazarkule of Edirne was the death of 34 Turkish soldiers during Turkey's operations in Syria's Idlib province on 27 February 2020. For about a year preceding this incident, the Turkish president had been threatening the EU with the suspension of the so called “Deal” and opening the border with Greece. The incident in Idlib meant that the mass influx of close to one million Syrians could come into Turkey. In the wake of these developments, the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced that Turkey would stop controlling outflows from its western borders, sparking a crisis with the EU. In particular, the statement followed that migration is not just Turkey's problem and that Turkey is not seeing enough support from Europe. On February 29th, the president stated that the EU should keep its promises and that Turkey is not obliged to keep and take care of all of these refugees.

As a result, an estimated 12,000-25,000 refugees, asylum-seekers, and migrants³ from 29 countries gathered on the border with Greece. Several accounts by NGOs and migrants interviewed which were present in Pazarkule suggest that the authorities were encouraging migrants to go to Pazarkule, some even arguing that the irregular migrants under administrative control, waiting to be returned to their countries of origin were allowed to go to Pazarkule. Greece responded by closing its borders, with strong operational and political support from the EU and temporarily suspended asylum applications – a violation of international law that EU officials were reluctant to condemn.⁴

³ <https://www.unhcr.org/tr/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2020/05/UNHCR-Turkey-Operational-Update-March-2020.pdf>

⁴ https://www.epc.eu/content/PDF/2020/The_upcoming_New_Pact_on_Migration_and_Asylum.pdf

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During this border conflict, several crossings were possible through the river Meric and across the Aegean Sea but the main area of accumulation of migrants was the Pazarkule crossing. The timeline below illustrates the unfolding of the developments in Pazarkule which did not turn into a Calais as many feared and the outbreak of the Covid pandemic and the EU’s desire to mend the relations with Turkey have contributed to this outcome.

Timeline Pazarkule

27-28 February 2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- An airstrike in Syria's Idlib province killed at least 34 Turkish soldiers deployed to support the Syrian opposition in the face of a bruising Russian-backed Syrian government offensive.- In the same night, a senior Turkish official told Reuters that Turkey has decided to no longer stop Syrian refugees from reaching Europe by land and sea. Turkish police, coast guard and border security officials have been ordered to stand down. Link- Turkey's governing AK Party spokesperson Omer Celik announced that Turkey “will no longer be able to hold refugees”. Link- Following the government's announcement, thousands of migrants started a rushed journey to Turkey's Pazarkule (in Edirne) border gate on the Greek-Turkish border and to the Evros River. Migrants on their way to Edirne were broadcast live on national TV and covered in mainstream media. Link- Tweet by Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis: “I want to be clear: no illegal entries into Greece will be tolerated. We are increasing our border security.”
29 February	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- President Erdogan: “We opened the doors, as of this morning, it (the number of migrants who leave Turkey) has reached 18 thousand. Today, it can probably reach 25-30 thousand. We will not close these doors in the future. We do not have to feed so many refugees.” Link
1-7 March	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- IOM reported that at least 13,000 people gathered at the formal border crossing points at Pazarkule and Ipsala and multiple informal border crossings, in groups of between several dozen and more than 3,000 in the first two days. Link- Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis announced that “we will not be accepting any new asylum applications for 1 month.” Tweet- Amnesty International issued a statement indicating that the inhumane measures taken by the Greek authorities to prevent asylum seekers from entering the country are a terrible betrayal of Greece's human rights obligations and will endanger the lives of people fleeing the violence. Link- Turkish Ministry of Interior Soylu announced that Turkey “will bring a thousand special operations police to the border of Meriç to prevent pushbacks”. Link
12 March	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- The European Commission launched a new assisted voluntary return scheme to Greek authorities to promote the voluntary return of up to 5000 migrants present in the islands. Link

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17 March	- Governorship of Edirne: “Since February 27, 2020, 147,132 asylum seekers have crossed into Greece. As a result of the intervention of Greece, a total of 3 migrants lost their lives and 214 migrants were injured. During this period, 7096 migrants applied to the hospital for various reasons and received medical help.”
18 March	- The Turkish government announced that it will close its borders with EU countries Greece and Bulgaria as part of the COVID-19 measures. Link - After the decision, migrants started to be sent to other cities by buses. NGO representatives warned that migrants were stuck in Istanbul Esenler Bus Terminal. Link
20-21 March	- Returns from Pazarkule to Istanbul and other cities continued. To migration who need to go to a different city after Istanbul were given a “travel permit” that is valid for two days with the stamp of Immigration Administration. Link
27 March	- As a preventive measure and in order to contain any spread of the virus within the Pazarkule area, the remaining 5,848 persons in Pazarkule were evacuated and were transferred by buses to closed facilities in nine provinces under the coordination of Edirne Governor’s Office. Link
31 March	- DGMM issued a press statement on precautionary steps taken for people who were transferred from Pazarkule and moved into quarantine at various removal centres across the country. The press release stated that upon conclusion of the quarantine period, and as per instructions from the Minister of Interior, no foreigner would be prevented from returning to provinces of registration. Link

On March 9, shortly after the crisis began and following a [meeting](#) between President Erdoğan and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in Brussels, both sides reiterated their commitment to the deal and expressed interest in improving it⁵. Since then, all migrants have been [evacuated](#) from the border area on the Turkish side and were transported to their previous host cities in Turkey, after a two-week quarantine⁶. Those who crossed the Greek border were put in camps, and the EU sought to expedite the resettlement of unaccompanied minors.

The links and similarities between the policies of externalisation in relation to both Pazarkule and Calais border crisis may not appear as evident at first. Two points can be raised in relation to this comparison. As well put by Deniz Senol Sert, an academic expert who was also in the field immediately following the Pazarkule incident;

⁵ https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_20_429

⁶ Ibid.

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“After several threats by the Turkish President Erdogan got materialized with the opening of Turkish border with Greece, within hours, the roads were filled with people trying to get to the border, in the hopes of crossing to the EU. When people started accumulating at the border of Turkey and Greece, in this tiny part of Edirne called Pazarkule, our biggest fear was a second infamous Calais nightmare which would last years to come was actually emerging at our very border.”

So on the one hand, any border crisis taking place at an externalized ‘space’ show the limits of this policy in terms of management of migratory flows as well as the fears of a space of ‘perpetual crisis’ from emerging. And secondly, while the Turkish case illicit the classical externalization to backfire in the hands of a third country that is no more willing to continue to serve as a buffer and opts to instrumentalize the conflict when preferences diverge, the case of Calais exemplifies the perfect case of ‘internal externalization’, where responsibility to act is outsourced to an unknown.

Profile of the Migrants and Push Pull Factors affecting their migration trajectories

Understanding the profiles of migrants and identifying the various push and pull factors involved in migrants’ decisions is essential both for re-embedding these local crises in greater migration crises and for understanding the governance mechanisms implemented in these contexts. Due to the adhoc and dynamic nature of the mobility involved in both cases, it is not possible to have data for the entire population. For instance, since the Ukrainian War Ukrainian refugees became an important group but they were non existent and hence not mentioned for the periods before. Still, reports of needs assessments and surveys conducted at different times, expert interviews and accounts of migrants help complement the missing pieces in the overall picture for both cases for the period of the field research, prior to the arrival of Ukrainian refugees.

Regarding Calais, there is not a lot of systematically collected data about the demography of the migrants. According to a 2015 article by *Le Monde*⁷ (with an admittedly small sample size), the most represented communities in Calais are Eritrean, Sudanese, Afghan and Syrian. 48% of those migrants belonged to the upper class in their country and 20% to the middle class. According to a 2017 report of the association *l’Auberge des Migrants* interrogated 214

⁷ https://www.lemonde.fr/immigration-et-diversite/article/2015/04/16/portrait-du-migrant-calaisien-par-dela-les-idees-recues_4616828_1654200.html

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migrants on the 700 that were in Calais camps at the time⁸. “They are on average 21 years old, the youngest of them is only 13 years old. Of the 214 exiles interviewed, 86 are from Afghanistan, 74 from Eritrea, 28 from Ethiopia, 16 from Sudan.” Logically given their location, the large majority of them want to go to the United Kingdom. 123 of them want to join family, friends or acquaintances in the country. These numbers are consistent with a recent report of Amnesty International, according to which most of the people on the move in Calais and Grande-Synthe come from Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Sudan. In the twenty-two living spaces in which interviews were conducted, twenty-three people from Sudan, seventeen people born in Iraq, seven Afghan people, four Eritreans, four Ethiopians, two Iranians, one Vietnamese and one Nigerian. Lotto

These nationalities were confirmed in all the interviews conducted in the field with members of several NGOs but some other demographic characteristics of migrants have also been brought up. In her report Lotto also mentions the over-representation of men informal coastal camps. This issue has been brought up in the interviews conducted. In fact, young males are the largest group in Calais and women and older people are a much smaller group in stark contrast with Pazarkule. Evidently, this is closely connected to the level of danger and length of journey perceived by the migrants regarding this migratory route as well as the profile of the population in the immediate hinterland of the border. According to Lotto the unaccompanied minors also constitute an important part of this population. Of the fifty-nine people interviewed had an average age of twenty-five years and thirteen of them were minors. In the words of one NGO representative interviewed:

“Over the years we were delivering breakfast, we came across mostly young man, but recently we started to see some women and since 2021, a lot of minors. Of course this makes us concerned about their specific needs.”

The migration trajectories also various in that, depending on the method and time it takes to cross the border, exiles are stranded in Calais for different periods of time. As put by one our interviewees:

“Some people arrived here last week and they have already managed to cross, others wait for months. It depends on the funds they have available for smugglers, the relative availability of crossing

⁸ <https://www.leparisien.fr/societe/qui-sont-les-migrants-de-calais-05-10-2017-7310667.php>

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alternatives at the time being and their luck of course. Just last week 1100 people managed to cross the border mainly by sea.”

According to Pierre Bonnevalle, exiled people stranded at the Franco-British border do not fall into any specific legal category; they are in transit to Britain, waiting to obtain legal status in France and hindered in their movements by the French State. They have a diversity of profiles that are difficult to grasp. Although they do not have legal status in France, they also cannot be legally returned by the French State because their country of origin refuses to issue passes or because it is said to be “unsafe” due to the persecution they may face on their return, or because the country is mired in conflict ” Bonnevalle

Pierre Bonnevalle identified three main categories explaining the different push factors. Accordingly, as expected, the first one are refugees, people who are fleeing persecution, who fear imprisonment or persecution because of their political activities or those of their relatives, or because of their ethnicity, or who are fleeing rebel militias or even enlistment in the national army. The second group includes people who are fleeing widespread conflicts in destabilized countries due to war or civil conflict, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and Palestine, Somalia or in Sri Lanka, as well as those fleeing dictatorial regimes such as Iran or Eritrea. The third category includes people “seeking a better life”, who are fleeing poverty or a lack of future prospects, and people undertaking a migratory journey in order to earn income to help family back in their country.”Bonnevalle

These points were also confirmed by our interviews in the field. According to one interviewee:

“People mainly come because they are fleeing persecution. In the rare situations where this is not the case, they get deported anyhow. This has happened lately with some Albanians. So most of the people we see here are asylum seekers with very high likelihood of being granted a refugee status in the UK.”

In terms of the pull factors informing this mobility, getting a better status which would allow them to work, family unification, speaking the language, getting better education are mentioned the most by our interviewees. They also agreed that most asylees have an idealized view of the UK and that they expect to be employed and get refugee status without much obstacles once there. Of course this view is also related to their relatively negative experiences in the continental Europe. While interviewed for the report of Amnesty International that they wanted to be reunited with family members and friends,

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or to work, and pursue integration opportunities in the UK, others stated that they ended up in the area after having waited for months to get a decision on their asylum claim in France and other European countries.

Lotte supports this idealized view of their destination country and asserts that accounts of the UK reinforce a fantasy of a country that is more welcoming, or less hostile, than the countries crossed. Accordingly, structural issues, such as the difficulties of settling somewhere in Europe are important experiences pushing people elsewhere. As a result, UK is an integral part of the collective imagination and discourse, and is portrayed as the country in which people can find their place. In the words of a twenty three year old who had been trying to board a lorry every day for 4 months interviewed by her:

“In Europe, rejection rates are very high. A lot of people are rejected. I know people in Germany who decided to stay and after months they were rejected. It's hard for them. I'm not going to stay here to hang around and wait! I know people who went to give their fingerprints all over, only to get rejections! In Italy, there is no support: people live on the streets. I am now obliged to leave Europe [...] In England, there are more facilities, and they don't focus on the issue of papers, you can progress even without papers.”

Moving to the border crisis at the Turkish-Greek border, in terms of gathering information regarding the profile of migrants there, this setting is rather advantageous as there is a predominant area, gated by the Turkish authorities shortly after people started gathering there and collecting data was relatively easy as compared to a scattered zone. According to an assessment carried out by the leading NGO in the field between March 3rd and 14th, of the 9,107 migrants were in Pazarkule, -different from Calais, children and women constitute a considerable part of the asylees, 16 percent and 13 percent respectively. It has been attested by NGOs and migrants who have been in the area that their share was even higher in the initial days, but as the hopes for crossing the border waned, women and children were among the first to leave the area. In terms of their countries of origin, over three thousand were from Afghanistan and Syria, followed by Iran (649), Somali (492) and Iraq (447).

An independent human rights lawyer, also an activist who was involved in bringing humanitarian aid and providing legal counseling pointed out to the diversity of the group as well as the presence of members of vulnerable groups during our interviews:

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“In terms of migration projectories, there were people who were in Turkey (waiting resettlement) for over 5 years as well as those who were transiting Turkey. Most striking for me was the number of many pregnant women in the crowd. We even had a birth to take place during those weeks in Pazarkule.”

According to the interviews with a member of the local bar association:

“People expected the border to open. They were expecting easier crossings as was the case in 2015. There were rumors that according to the international law, after 28 days, the EU would have to open the border according to international law.”

A state officer interviewed indicated that people were there for all kinds of reasons. But for those who had been stranded in Turkey, the majority, waiting for resettlement in Turkey, the prospects are quite dim. Pazarkule for them provided a viable alternative. According to an NGO representative who was at the field collecting needs data and delivering aid, people had many reasons for being there. He stated that there were those who could not pay their electricity bill, those who were running away from Taliban or those who identified as LGBTI+.

Another NGO worker and lawyer underlined the precarious conditions of refugees in Turkey as an important push factor.

“There were many asylum seekers in Pazarkule. These people are actually refugees of course but because they cannot access this status in Turkey and the rights that come attached to it such as the right to work, they want to go to Europe.”

Even though Turkey is a signatory of the Geneva Convention, due to its geographical limitation, those from outside of the countries of Council of Europe are not granted an official refugee status. In practice this means there are not even a handful of refugees in Turkey and the remaining asylum seekers are granted either international protection or temporary protection as in the case of Syrians and await resettlement for an indefinite period of time.

The words of the coordinator of an NGO that was in the field during the Pazarkule crisis illustrate the multiplicity and cumulative impact of migration drivers on migrants' decisions:

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“The economic recession and the restrictions on access to healthcare and education was an important push factor for the Afghanis to leave Iran and come to Turkey initially. Of course initially, it was due to the instability in Afghanistan that they had left their countries. So since 2019 there was a trend of increase migration. If it were not for Covid pandemic, things would have been just like in 2016 with hundreds of thousands crossing.”

The previous networks of migrants and especially the scattered Syrian diaspora was also a intervening push factor. Many people who had fled to the EU countries in 2015 still had family in Turkey with which they could not be unified. Another important set of driving factors especially for those who are not transiting but actually living in Turkey are related to the conditions in the country. Throughout the interviews, the economic recession and coming to the limits of societal acceptance were frequently mentioned. In particular, when the Turkish economy started to go into a recession beginning of 2019 with the price increases and rising unemployment, migrants who were working under precarious conditions were first being affected/laid off etc. Partly related to this, the public attitudes towards Syrians took a negative turn and small level inter-group conflicts started to emerge. A deliverable of MAGYC workpackage 5 by Bac and Apaydin illustrate how this affected the voting behavior in Turkish elections. Without doubt, migrants themselves were also experiencing the implications of this negative turn in their daily lives as also illustrated by the following quote.

According to a refugee woman interviewed as part of this research, a combination of different push and pull factors along her migration trajectory motivated her decision to try her chances in Pazarkule with her 6 children. First she left Saudi Arabia where she had initially escaped due to lack of access to basic rights, from Syria she went to Azez in North West Syria due to lack of security, and she left there to protect her children and crossed the border to Turkey. The economic hardships, social cohesion issues, and her network in Europe served as final push and pull factors for her to go to Pazarkule when she heard the border is opened.

“My brother had crossed through Aegean sea and had gone to Sweden in 2015. I was working as an English teacher in Saudi arabia but then they did not allow me to work there anymore or my kids to attend public school. We tried to go back to Syria but the conditions were very dire. Young girls were being kidnapped, people were being shot in the middle of the street. I was very scared and first

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escaped to the Turkish and opposition controlled area Azez in Syria and stayed there for 4 months. One day my 12 year old son came with empty bullets shells. I knew anyhow that different groups were recruiting young boys to fight for them. I told my sister if I stay here I will lose my children. I tried to jump over the border that was secured with a 4 meter wall with my 5 children while pregnant 11 times. Every time we paid the smugglers who threw us over the wall like potato sacks, we tried so many times because we had no other option. Finally, we succeeded on our 12th time.”

To sum up, there was more of multiplicity of reasons in driving the migrants to the bordertown of Pazarkule as compared to Calais. Still, the lack of legal routes for migration/asylum/resettlement, their inability to establish a life with integrity, get granted a secure status, and integrate to their previous host countries were important push factors just like in Calais. Another similarity between the two cases in this regard is migrants' desire to secure a permanent status (mostly as a refugee) and unite with their families.

Governance : Border conflict and Humanitarian Aid

One of the objectives of the MAGYC project is to unpack and understand the governance mechanisms that emerge following mass migratory movements. Especially with the last wave of Ukrainian refugees into Europe, it became clear that what gets to be labelled as a migration crisis is not a function of sheer numbers but also closely as a result of how it was governed. What follows is that poor governance and inability to cooperate to share the responsibility in a fair way results in migratory crises. With this in mind, this section of this deliverable will delve into the specific mechanisms of governance prevalent in both research sites in terms of two important dimensions; how the conflict at the border is being governed and how the humanitarian situation is handled. This investigation will also allow for better linking of these policies to the various methods of externalization discussed earlier.

Governing the border

As the timeline above illustrates, the border conflict in Sangatte/Calais is one that dates back a few decades and has become a worst case scenario of border conflicts. Since Toquet Accord, the French state and the border municipalities have been receiving money from the UK and the British police can be present in Calais, Dunquerque, and Boulogne-Sur Mer, a textbook definition of classical form of externalization. According to Bonnevale (2021)

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the one word that can summarize the governance goal on the coast is “deterrence”.

“This doctrine has only strengthened despite its repeated failures according to the objectives pursued by the public authorities to prevent the presence of exiled people. The aim is to deploy an increasingly coercive approach in order to fill the gaps identified in the arrangements previously in effect. Deterrence is established by the EU, the State and sometimes municipalities to prevent the presence of exiled people on European territory, on French soil, near transit areas, but also in Britain.”

One would expect this strict deterrence policy to be somewhat relaxed and the health of the asylees would be considered due to the Covid pandemic. However, the reality described by the NGOs in the field and researchers working on the issue point out to the contrary, as they all argue it was used to further limit and control mobility across the border.

When the strictly security oriented control of the French-UK border is considered, the series of agreements and resulting financial and operational collaboration should be pointed out to. In the words of Bonnevalle (2022) the bilateral agreements signed since the late 1980s conceal a subcontracting process undertaken by Britain involving all carriers, particularly French ones. The English put pressure on French carriers to fight against irregular immigration through fortification of their infrastructure and security technologies or face sanctions. Accordingly, only between 1998 and 2012, at least €38 million was spent on the purchase of equipment, the installation of fences and surveillance infrastructure as well as the use of private security guards. Furthermore, from 2012 to 2017, nearly €300 million was spent to further increase the border security.

In the meantime, the deterrence policy continued with frequent evacuations. With the dismantlement of the Calais jungle, following then prime minister Macron's policy direction, the public authorities adopt a so-called “zero fixation point” security policy as of 2016 (Caillaux, N. & Henriot, P. ; 2021). On the ground, this policy results in frequent evictions, dismantling, confiscation and destruction of the shelters of people in transit. According to a representative NGO actively involved in monitoring and reporting the human rights violations we interviewed in Calais:

“The data we collect clearly illustrates the state violence through evictions and confiscations. There are evacuations every 48 hours.

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The basic needs of the people are not met and there is not even any social diagnostic conducted before evicting people. The policy is to prevent people from settling or starting a new jungle as well as crossing to the other side. All these evictions and police violence are acts of intimidation geared towards tiring people. I have seen police setting up traps to confiscate tents or directly pee on tents while people are in them. How can people keep their dignity under these conditions?”

Another NGO workers questions the utility of this policy at even a bare minimum, even when the human rights violations are put aside:

“Authorities are not smart. Evictions means wasteful money and people come back here anyhow.”

All in all, in the area of border management, the process of externalization takes place full fledged at the French-UK border with strong operational and infrastructural support from the UK, further manifested with the deterrence policy implemented on the ground. These findings also support the idea of internal externalization which become more evident in the governance of humanitarian response to be discussed below.

While the UK externalizes the border management to France and encourages its deterrence policy financially, in kind, and in personnel, Turkey illustrates a case in which border control is outsourced to Turkey in return for financial and political support by the EU. In the words of Karadag (2022) the country sits at the axis of long-standing externalisation policies of the Global North and Europe’s so-called ‘periphery’ and has played a particularly active role in resisting and leveraging its political power in response to the this externalisation policy. (Karadag 2022) This externalisation process led to non-EU partners on migration to become aware of their empowered position vis-à-vis the EU and its Member States in the “fight against irregular migration” across the board. Furthermore, as argued by Cassarino (2020) they started to disclose and defend their own representation of what cooperation on migration governance would entail as seen in the cases of Morocco and Belarus as well.

Turkey, having opened its borders with Greece in search of more support from the EU in Turkish controlled areas of Syria and in Idlib, resorted to this instrumentalization of migrants to bolster its negotiation power vis a vis the EU. As part of this scare tactic, Turkish interior minister Süleyman Soylu claimed that

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
as of March 7, over 143,000 migrants had left Turkey for Greece. The Greek authorities said these figures were inaccurate: according to them, 1,500 people had crossed without permission, and 26,000 were apprehended⁹.

The number of crossings from the Turkish side of the border to the Greek side are heavily disputed with a huge gap between the numbers reported by both sides. An academic expert interviewed summarized the reason behind this as follows:

“It is hard to know the exact number of people who actually managed to cross the border during the Pazarkule crisis. The Turkish authorities were clearly overreporting the numbers. Why? To show how big of a threat/problem Turkey can cause for the EU as a leverage. The Greek authorities were underreporting the numbers of people who crossed. Why? To deter more people from coming and show everyone Greece can control its borders. The actual number, should be something in between.”

A recent article by Arcila Calderon et al. (2022) illustrate through an analysis of satellite data activity during this period estimates the number to be somewhere in between and argues neither of these stated numbers to be true, estimates it to be somewhere in between and illustrates it with the following maps of mobile phone signal count. As shown, the numbers at the height of the crisis, on February 28 alone illustrate a much higher number than argued by Greece.

Figure 1: Satellite data of cell phone signals for Turkish carriers during Pazarkule crisis and after compared from Arcila Calderon et al. (2022)



⁹ <https://insideturkey.news/2020/03/11/trapped-by-the-eu-turkey-border-crisis/>

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According to the authorities, while Pazarkule was the symbol of the border dispute, due to the very heavy response from the Greek side of the border, most crossings took place from the south of town along the Meric river. One civil servant interviewed indicated having personally witnessed 3000 people to cross over the river at one time. Still, crossing the river or the Aegean sea in many cases did not equate an ability to apply for the refugee status due to the widespread use of pushbacks by the Greek side. According to the ASAM report, based on an extensive needs assessment conducted in the field, of the 2,756 people interviewed 668 have indicated to be pushed back by the Greek Armed Forces¹⁰.

Many of these migrants who made it to the Greek border often encountered harsh treatment. In a report on March 6, the Turkish Medical Association alleged human rights violations that included people “beaten by Greek armed forces and being sent back after having their belongings and clothes seized”. It also raised concerns about injuries caused by pepper spray, and the lack of clean water and sanitation in the no-man’s land where many people are still camped out. In the words of a representative of a Turkish state authority:

“The inhumane treatment of people from the Greek side supported by Frontex was quite remarkable. In order to intensify the impact of teargas bombs thrown into the area where people are accumulated, the Greek side placed huge fans which would blow the gas to the Turkish side of the border and make sure no reverse wind would bring it back. Many people with breathing problems as well as children were quite negatively affected by this.”

According to a lawyer who was assigned to monitor the cases by the bar association, there were numerous acts of push back where asylum seekers were returned after their belongings were confiscated and being beaten up by militia forces. According, most of these people were not interested in litigation in the hopes of crossing the border one day. He further elaborated as follows:

“We could reach the victims of pushbacks. They were in horrible condition and the treatment they received was appalling. We told them about their rights, we offered to be their advocate pro bono and take their case and bring it to the European Court of Human

¹⁰ https://sgdd.org.tr/yayinlar/sgdd_asam_edirne_rapor_tr.pdf

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rights. They had all the necessary evidence, video recordings, medical reports etc. But they did not want to pursue these rightful cases because they were hopeful they would one day arrive to Greece and be able to put an asylum claim. They were worried that if they sue against Greece, that would risk their currently non-existent asylum claims in the future.”

When they were asked about their opinion on the emergence of the crisis, four expert interviewees indicated that the crisis was personally triggered/fabricated by the Turkish President, and that the state was actively involved in bringing the migrants to the border area. Both interviewed migrants who were in Pazarkule indicated that while not everyone is aware of this, they fully see that they were manipulated and instrumentalized in Turkish foreign policy vis. a vis. the EU. Nonetheless, they believed that they could cross the border. These are the words of a Syrian refugee woman who was in Pazarkule with her family:

“I blame both sides for what happened. I blame Greeks for closing the borders and treating us refugees inhumanly. I blame the Turkish government for using us. If you know the Greek side won't open the border why do you push these simple people. Some lost their jobs and houses furniture. We felt like we are being used like a tool.”

The Pazarkule case illustrates both the classical EU externalization policies of empowering a third country with border management in return for material incentives gone wrong and the heavy instrumentalization of migration as a result. After Pazarkule, a similar experience manifested itself in the EU-Belarus border, albeit did not reach to this stage mainly due to the lack of high number of migrants willing to use that route. These policies have not only gone wrong because of the sudden threat of migrant arrivals from the EU perspective, but because first the EU had to take things “in its own hands” manifesting a policy of a violent border defence and accompanying pushbacks, harming its normative stance in its foreign policy. Second, the governance of this border crisis showed the vulnerabilities and potential of this policy empowering third countries' in negotiating with the EU.

Governing the Humanitarian Response

The second dimension of crisis governance and a potential for a second kind of externalization policy, relates to the humanitarian policy necessitated by the presence of large groups of vulnerable populations with basic needs in facing

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dire conditions. In this regard, one of the main differences between two cases relates to reception/the governance of humanitarian aid. This is in large part motivated by the different foreign policy intentions of France and Turkey with the UK and the EU respectively. The clear preference of the Turkish authorities to promote crossings even if that means instrumentalization of migrants is juxtaposed against the more collaborative position of France in preventing crossings. This is well summarized by Bonnevalle (2021).

“The EU and Britain drove a race to the top in security, coupled with legal and administrative barriers. The aim was to “trace” exiled people, while preventing them from accessing the Schengen Area and asylum procedures, while, on the Franco-British border, France was preventing them from leaving it”

The reception/or lack thereof also depends on the status of the asylees in France, where those with status not worthy of asylum -such as Albanians, are immediately deported while the other groups are discouraged to remain in the area or try crossing. On the other hand, the status of migrants does not play a role in determining the deservingness of migrants at the Turkish border. All the reports and needs assessment conducted in the region by state authorities, international organizations and NGOs point out to the diversity of the migrants both in terms of their nationality as well as their status. As put by an NGO representative interviewed:

“Since September 10, 2021, it is forbidden to distribute free food and/or drinks in Calais city center. This prefectorial decree is renewed every month. We do it anyway but we risk getting high fines, which sometimes happens. We can even be taken into custody, which also happened a few times.”

According to Lotto (2021) the places where informal camps are set up are, hidden from view in wooded areas or on low-traffic sites. Near the camps, water points are sometimes installed by state-run associations and as a result of long battles, particularly legal ones, waged by non-mandated associations. Where state-run associations do not intervene, solidarity associations have set up water points. Neither showers nor toilets are found in the vicinity of these living areas. This is also consistent with the observations of the research team at the time of the fieldwork.

As opposed to Calais, where NGOs are officially banned and actively fined for operating to help the asylees, in Pazarkule, the authorities took an active role

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in bringing humanitarian aid and coordinating NGOs to complement their services actively. Clearly, this has a lot to do with the Turkish governments' desire to gain leverage against the EU, especially in light of its ongoing operation in Idlib. On the other hand, while the local authorities in Calais are not fully content with the funds and investment they receive from the UK, they still do not have any intent to defer on their side of the deal. In the words of an NGO worker:

“In Greece or Turkish border, there is at least shelter. Here, people's tents can be confiscated by the policy any day. They ban us from helping, they cut trees to clear the area to prevent tents from setting up there and us from helping.”

While the Covid-19 pandemic was the reason for the border conflict to come to an end in the Turkish case, according to many NGO activists interviewed in Calais, it was seen as an excuse to ban them from helping exiles. One interviewee suggested the following:

“The municipality of Calais has implemented no driving/no parking bans in some areas with the excuse of the pandemic, issuing fines to stop people from helping.”

The time of the fieldwork in Calais by the MAGYC research team also coincided with an important collective reaction by the locals to the lack of reception policy and mass/frequent evictions. Following the death of a young Sudanese exile, Yasser, on September 28, 2021, one priest and two humanitarian workers started a hunger strike on October 11th, supported by more than 50,000 citizens and 180 associations and collectives. They demanded an end to evictions from camps during the winter break, an end to the confiscation and destruction of personal effects, and a constructive citizen dialogue with associations to enable them to distribute basic necessities¹¹. During his three visits to Calais, Didier Leschi, Director General of the French Office for Immigration and Integration essentially made two announcements: the creation of a 300-place airlock for exiled people who wish to be directed to permanent accommodation away from Calais and the commitment that exiled people will be notified 45 minutes before the

¹¹ <https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/35740/activists-on-hunger-strike-to-support-calais-migrants>

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evacuations. On November 17, 2021, after 37 days, Anaïs Vogel and Ludovic Holbein announce the end of their hunger strike in a press release.¹²

When the collaboration with national or international stakeholders is concerned, according to Pierre Bonnevale, they were left with no other choice but to come in to congruence with the national and local immigration policies of long time mayor Natacha Bourchart. He describes the space for the associations present as one of “monologue rather than dialogue.” Currently, associations meet every week among themselves and with the local administration every two months. All NGOs interviewed describe the meetings with the local administration as non-candid and futile as they do not believe their voices are being heard.

Assessing the governance of humanitarian response in Calais, it is evident that the basic needs of people on the move are neither prioritized nor recognized. To the contrary, from bylaws that hinder NGOs and citizens from helping exiles to continuous policy intimidation, evacuations, and confiscation of exiles' tents and belongings, the French state actively neglects the needs of refugees. This is fully consistent with Loughnan (2022)'s internal externalization concept whereby the state holds no responsibility for the suffering which emanates from neglect and all services are withdrawn with the intention of producing suffering so that people clear the area. The Calais case elicits not only the lack of proper reception by the national authorities but it also exemplifies a rare case where even NGOs or even locals are not allowed to fill in the gaps in the humanitarian response to the crisis. This criminalization of all the activities by locals or NGOs is a big challenge to their response to the exiles.

The Turkish case is quite different in this regard as the Turkish state actually preferred the migrants to accumulate in the border and even cross, to create a stronger pressure on the EU. As a result, during the crisis, Ministry of Interior and Directorate General of Migration tried to meet the immediate needs of the migrants in the area and collaborated with various international and national stakeholders, humanitarian aid agencies as well as local initiatives.

“These were migrants with various legal statuses. You had beneficiaries of international protection, temporary protection (the majority of Syrians in Turkey), holders of student visas, people who had residence cards or people who had no documentation for 10 years

¹² <https://www.voxpublic.org/Greve-de-la-faim-a-Calais-pour-denoncer-la-maltraitance-des-exile-es.html?lang=fr>

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or those who have previously been in return centers awaiting deportation. They were not treated differently due to their status but priority was given to provide humanitarian aid to vulnerable groups such as women and children”

Still the expectation was that more Syrians would cross. According to the authorities, this would be good internationally as they are clearly refugees, so there is no question on their deservingness. But this expectation was also grounded in domestic politics. The growing anti-Syrian sentiments among Turkish public could be somewhat assuaged if the government could show that they are ‘sending them’ to Europe. ”

During this period, in the border area closed by the national authorities, thousands of people stayed and attempted to cross to the Greek side. Regular needs assessments were conducted to identify the profile of migrants, migration experiences, basic needs, vulnerable groups such as pregnant women, LGBTI+ individuals, unaccompanied minors and people with disabilities. In distributing humanitarian aid, these groups and women in general were prioritized. In regards to the coordination mechanism, an officer representing the local state authority pointed out to the following:

“Having identified the needs regularly, it was necessary to collect and distribute the items in collaboration with national and international stakeholders. Daily coordination meetings have been held which have been set up by the governor and local authorities, where NGOs and representatives from the migrant community also participated. There we listened to the needs, tried to understand the vulnerabilities and communicated them with the state and non-state institutions.”

The leading NGO in the field responsible for distributing the humanitarian aid collected provided a breakdown of the items provided to migrants. Of the boxed humanitarian aid items, 626.014 were food items, 128.948 were personal hygiene material, 249.083 drinks, 76.535 were additional miscellaneous humanitarian aid items. In addition to the aid distributed, a medical clinic tent was set up for primary care and more severe cases were referred to the state hospital in Edirne where they were treated free of charge.

While this is a very different picture as compared to Calais, it is also important to note that this reception too had its limits. According to a local expert interviewed, the government sources actually did not want the migrants in the

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border forever because they would exert the maximum pressure on the EU if they actually cross the border. As a result the state refrained from supporting migrants to a level that would disincentivize crossings. In the words of a local legal expert:

“Initially, the area by the Pazarkule border crossing was open, anyone could enter and leave but later the authorities closed the area with migrants in, allowing only a few with permission in and out. This was to keep people together and increase the pressure. While basic aid/food was provided once or twice a day, the weather was cold but no tents were distributed in the beginning even when they were provided by NGOs from outside. Because if they lived in tents, they wouldn't be as motivated to attempt to cross the border. People tried to cut the trees bushes around to make fire or build makeshift shelters with the nylons they could find. Finally, not all NGOs were allowed to access the area or bring in aid. We had to find a migrant from inside the border camp to help us transport the materials inside the camp and distribute them.”

An Iranian refugee who was one of these interlocutors described the process as follows:

“I am an Iranian Bahai refugee awaiting resettlement in Turkey since 2016. Looking at other people like myself, soon after I came to Turkey I realized that resettlement is a distant dream. So, I went to Pazarkule, in the hopes of determining my own destiny. In the initial days of the border crisis, all was good, humanitarian aid was sufficient. As time passed and it became clear crossing the border was not going to be that easy, people started to get sick due to the cold and lack of hygiene. Authorities wanted a better control so the area was surrounded by fences and we would give fingerprint to leave the premises and had to come back at night. At that point I had decided to leave. But I met some humanitarian aid platforms who were not allowed inside (mainly because they were not pro-government). I started helping them with distributing their aid they had for us, I started giving interviews to national and international media. So I evolved from just another migrant who came there to cross to one who was helping people and communicating their cause/our cause to the outside world.”

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As outlined in the timeline section in detail, following the outbreak of the pandemic and the visit of EU Commissioner Van der Leyen, the Turkish government announced that the border with Greece would be resecured and the camp would be dismantled as part of the Covid-19 measures. Following this, migrants in Pazarkule were given travel permits, sent to the cities they came from either by buses or financial incentives were provided by NGOs to cover their expenses. Finally, in the following days, the remaining migrants were evacuated to the closed facilities of Directorate General of migration management across 9 provinces.

When the governance of both the border conflict and humanitarian response is taken into consideration, the Pazarkule border crisis illustrates another case of “externalization” gone wrong. While the conditions of migrants stranded in the border area are considerably better as compared to Calais, this is partly due to the Turkish government’s preference to keep pressure on the Greek border and increase its leverage in its negotiations with the EU through having migrants stay there and try to cross. The policy of surrounding the area with fences and keeping humanitarian aid in limited quantity. As stated by an NGO representative in Calais,

“For as long as there are no legal routes, these crossings are going to continue.”

This crisis gave Turkey another foreign policy objective, which is to document and demonstrate the violent treatment and even pushbacks experienced by migrants in the hands of Greek authorities, Frontex and Greek civilians. In the end, what people feared, “Pazarkule” becoming another Calais did not materialize, however thousands of migrants suffered in the process for following the Turkish president’s statements and being rejected by the EU unconditionally. In that regard, while at a lesser extent than Calais, even though their immediate needs were not neglected, their lives were interrupted, their intentions and dreams were ignored in line with Loughnan’s internal externalization.

Conclusions

In an attempt to re-embed the local migratory crises in global migration dynamics, this MAGYC deliverable focused on the two border crises which seem quite different from each other at first, namely the town of Calais at the French-British border and the town of Pazarkule, Edirne, at the Greek-Turkish

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border. Considering the concept of externalization, it may seem that the former is a case of the UK externalizing its migration management and regarding the latter, the EU is doing the same with Turkey in order to stop migratory flows but in both cases leading to a border crises. The desk research, media review, field visits and face to face interviews conducted focused on various push and pull factors affecting the migration decisions of individuals' who are trapped in these areas, as well as the governance of the borders and humanitarian aid. The results illustrate that in addition to the classical conceptualization of externalization, Loughnan's focus on internal externalization, focusing on how the state holds no responsibility for the suffering which emanates from neglect and withdrawal of basic services, goes a long way in understanding both cases. While this manifests itself in the policy of deterrence and intimidation revealing itself via the criminalization of NGO aid and mass evictions, it is evident in the Turkish case, albeit with less intensity with a heavy instrumentalization of migrants with not much regard to their agency and preferences. This way, this deliverable illustrated the wider implications of externalization policies.

Future research can incorporate this more extensive conceptualization of externalization to numerous cases of externalization gone wrong starting with EU borders such as Morocco and Belarus, but also considering other geographies such as USA or Australia. More research is also needed in differentiating the varying responses to similar challenges, the critical juncture moments that makes policy makes opt for internal externalization with a potential focus on party politics at the local level.

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