

MAGYC

Migration Governance and Asylum Crises



Migration, asylum and international interventions in the Horn of Africa

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MAGYC: The MAGYC (**Migr**Ation **G**overnance and **AsYlum C**risis) project seeks to assess how migration governance has responded to the recent “refugee crises” and has since been influenced by it, and how crises at large shape policy responses to migration. This four-year research project (2018–2022) brings together twelve international partners: the Hugo Observatory from the University of Liège (Coordinator), Sciences Po, the University of Economics in Bratislava, the GIGA institute of Global and Area Studies, Lund University, the IDMC, SOAS University of London, the University of Milan, the Lebanese American University, the University of Macedonia, Sabanci University, IfPO/CNRS.

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MAGYC Working Paper

How do international interventions shape the politics of asylum and migration and impact mobility in the Horn? Since the 1990s, African and external actors, whether governmental or non-governmental, have jointly shaped the dynamics of migration and asylum governance, combining military and humanitarian interventions with asylum management and migration control. This chapter explores the impact of international interventions on the securitisation of migration governance. These interventions have meshed regional politics and foreign logics brought by Northern American and European actors over the course of the 1990s to the 2020s. The first section investigates how migration has progressively become securitised under the influence of foreign military and humanitarian interventions, the second section looks at the impact of securitisation on the governance of asylum and migration, and the third section examines how the European Union (EU) has accelerated the process of externalisation of migration control in the Horn in the wake of the 2015 asylum crisis. Overall, interventions have fostered the politics of migration and asylum containment in countries and region of origin of forcibly displaced people.

Introduction

The 'greater Horn of Africa', including Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda, to which one could add Yemen, is known for its world records in refugee numbers and its continuous crises and wars. Not only are the countries, both country and origin, transit and destination for migrants and asylum seekers, but they also host a space of both seasonal and permanent migration and intense forced displacement. These logics are deeply connecting migration and exile to long-term dynamics of transnational mobility, nomadism, and circulations at various scales. Crises and conflicts affect populations both locally and across borders, creating mass waves of migration and large long-lasting stocks of asylum seekers and internally displaced people. Just like other regions of the Global South where 86% of the world's forcibly displaced are hosted,ⁱ the displacement and migration take place in political and institutional contexts which are both persistently welcoming and politically volatile.

This chapter deals with the logics of international and local actors regarding people's mobility. How do international interventions shape the politics of asylum and migration and impact mobility? In the making of migration and asylum governance in the Horn, local, national and regional African politics have meshed with successive international interventions that involved a mix of actors and institutions from foreign powers to multilateral and regional organisations and non-governmental entities.ⁱⁱ African and external actors, whether governmental or non-governmental, have jointly shaped the dynamics of migration and asylum governance since the 1990s, combining military and humanitarian interventions with asylum management and migration control.

In order to offer a coherent narrative of the successive phases of migration and asylum governance, this chapter relies upon a pluralistic understanding of the migration-security nexus. Security classically refers in international relations to the sum of representations and strategies that individual or collective actors elaborate to achieve 'safety from harm' and 'freedom from threats': it ranges from material operations – classically in security studies the 'threat, use and control of military force' – to discursive practices. It is now well known that migration opened a contested terrain in security studies building both upon the discursive construction of migration as a security issue and the institutional and political appropriation of migration as a domain of expertise of police and military actors through the 1990s notably in Western Europe and North America.ⁱⁱⁱ As Didier Bigo noted, 'the production of discourses that link migration and security has become part of the political game in Western democracies.'^{iv}

In the Horn however, securitisation processes hinged on specific discursive and operational grounds, which meshed regional politics and foreign logics brought by Northern American and European actors over the course of the

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1990s to the 2020s. It also relates to a complex pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial history of borders as 'barriers' but also as 'conduits and opportunities',^v both for forced and for voluntary mobile people. Cross-border and internal mobility in the Horn can thus be conceptualised as a source of safety from physical harm for persecuted communities, a vector of economic sustainability for households through remittances, and a part of 'a ceaseless flux among [African] population'^{vi} which 'makes Africa'.^{vii} Migrants and refugees are used in local and international politics, portrayed as threats^{viii} or instrumental for diplomatic leverage.^{ix}

The securitisation of mobility in the Horn and in Africa more generally has notably been impacted by the securitisation of migration and asylum policies in Europe, through the 'externalisation' of border control to non-European governments in cooperation with international organisations and private actors.^x This last trend exports European securitisation to non-European territories with various consequences, including not only the legitimisation and funding of specific governmental or private diplomatic partners, but also the shaping of new migration and asylum realities, including (forced) immobility or settlement in 'third countries', return or secondary flows also called 'border-induced displacements'.^{xi} As such, European externalisation policies function as a driver of (im)mobility alongside other more common drivers like draught, 'famine, civil wars, ethnic rivalries, despotic regimes and conflicts'^{xii} and violence, which themselves have both African and external roots.

Building upon previous publications^{xiii} and fieldwork conducted in Sudan and Kenya, this chapter explores the impact of international interventions on the securitisation of migration governance in the Horn. We argue that the migration-security nexus, in its both material and discursive aspects, epitomises two dimensions of security: the security of the state and the security of migrants and refugees. These two meanings feed in the migration-security nexus and shape the governance of migration and asylum in the Horn from the 1990s to the 2020s. The strategic interest of the states of the Horn and foreign powers embedded in multilevel diplomacies versus the protection of people on the move along the line of international conventions^{xiv} and normative claims assemble competing logics and yield contrasted outcomes. In the context of the Horn, this notably translates into policies that attempt to distinguish (irregular) migrants from refugees, and grant rights and benefits to the latter and criminalise the former.

The first section of this chapter investigates how migration has progressively become securitised in the Horn of Africa and across the Red Sea under the influence of foreign military and humanitarian interventions. The second section looks at the impact of securitisation on the governance of asylum and migration. The third section examines how the European Union (EU) has accelerated the process of externalisation of migration control in the Horn in the wake of the 2015 asylum crisis.

Securitising mobility: humanitarianism, military control, and development aid

International interventions did not happen in a vacuum of asylum and migration policies in the Horn, as was shown for Kenya, Tanzania, and Guinea by James Milner.^{xv} Throughout the second half of 20th century, few material obstacles were opposed to people's international mobility in the Horn and borders remained open to circulation. More broadly across African countries and in the Middle East, governments generally adopted an 'open door policy' towards asylum seekers and economic migrants, with little distinction across groups of people on the move and sometimes even crafted advanced asylum policies as in Sudan.^{xvi} National policies also reflected at the regional level through the Convention of 1969 governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, charted by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Border crossers were hardly ever stopped at the border which offered few if no formal screening. More importantly, they were allowed to settle in rural and urban areas with little control and often offered access to the limited public services (schools, health) available to local population (at least in theory). Such policies translated at the national and local levels strongly relied upon the support of international organisation and humanitarian assistance, both for displaced populations and for local communities. Partnering mostly with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), host countries in the Horn created both formal and informal conditions for displaced people to enjoy a right of asylum.

Eritrean refugees during the liberation war against Ethiopia (1962–1991) were welcome in Sudan and settled either in Khartoum or in a network of refugee camps in the Eastern governorates of Gedaref, Kassala and the Red Sea.^{xvii} They could also go to Yemen and the rest of the Middle East benefitting from the favourable perception of the Eritrean liberation struggle against Ethiopia, which was viewed as a 'colonizer' in the context of socialist pan-Arab solidarity.^{xviii} After 1991, Somali refugees could cross over the Kenyan border and their exile led to the formation of the Dadaab settlements, one of the largest UNHCR-managed groups of camps in the world.^{xix} During the War in Darfur from 2003 onwards, refugees could cross over to Chad and receive support in UNHCR camps, even though most were displaced internally in Darfur or through Sudan. After decades of conflicts and displacement crises in formerly united Sudan, and since the beginning of the South Sudanese civil war in 2013, forcibly displaced people started to move around South Sudan and cross the border into Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya building the largest refugee crisis in the world in 2016.^{xx}

Commitment to non-refoulement has long been a cornerstone of African policies towards forcibly displaced and such attitude was also commonly extended to non-registered refugees or the so-called 'migrants' with no specific discrimination. Exile or emigration in this context was commonly seen as a resource to mitigate the negative impact of economic, environmental,

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and political crises. Migrants and forcibly displaced leave their homes to travel to the nearest haven inside their country or the closest neighbouring state or in the Middle East and the rest of Africa. Such migration and asylum management were the joint result of local policy options, social dynamics on the grounds, as well as external intervention of international donors and agencies as documented in various East and Central African contexts^{xxi} and across the Middle East.^{xxii}

The matrix of asylum politics in the Horn meshed local, regional, international, and transnational politics. If African governments generally adopted open door policies and fostered local integration, they also capitalised on the presence of refugees as potential leverage in favour or against either home states or host states. Welcoming refugees was politicised in a context of interdependent regional politics and systemic crises that spilled over state borders.^{xxiii} In such perspective, spaces of transnational politics echoed both state politics and diaspora mobilisation. An ideal type of such dynamics, Uganda has a history of working refugees over to influence regional politics, whether Tutsi refugees from Rwanda since the 1960s,^{xxiv} South Sudanese during the North-South Sudan wars^{xxv} or Congolese in the 1990s.^{xxvi}

The Eritrean refugees also represent an ideal type of such dynamics. They constituted a strong political network from the 1960s to the 1990s and were the backbone of the liberation struggle against Ethiopia. Eritrean transnational activism extended from Sudan to Yemen to Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iraq, etc. After Eritrean independence, the diaspora became a more contested political space, with embassies trying to control and extract revenue from refugees, in particular to support the 1998–2000 war with Ethiopia, and opposition parties attempting to mobilise against the dictatorship.^{xxvii} In the late 1990s in Sudan, Eritrean refugees choosing not to return to Eritrea for fear of persecution and famine worked as diplomatic leverage for Khartoum against the regime of Issayas Afewerki, which had tied new diplomatic relations with Israel. Conversely, Eritrea used the presence of the Sudanese Eastern Front opposition in Asmara in 2005 to put pressure on the Khartoum government during the signing of the Naivasha accord between North and South Sudan. In such examples, the way refugees are welcome can be understood as embedded in local or regional political strategies.

Borderlands are particularly fertile grounds for the politicisation of transnational spaces, and refugee camps are often part and parcel of these marginal yet central places where domination, agency, identities and resources are constantly negotiated.^{xxviii} The socio-political 'productivity' of refugee camps is also illustrated by camps of the border of Ethiopia and Somaliland,^{xxix} in the seven Dadaab camps neighbouring the Somali-Kenyan border where socio-economic dynamics of exile and smuggling tied to political mobilisation of tribal and armed groups and in the Kenyan camp of Kakuma for South Sudanese refugees.

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While the politics of migration and asylum management was mostly local and regional, with the support of humanitarian agencies during the second half of the 20th century, foreign governments became key players in migration governance from the 1990s onwards. Until the 1990s, humanitarian assistance was brought by interventions of UN organisations and international NGOs with each of the displacement crises. In contrast, the 1990s signalled the beginning of a different kind of interventions involving more directly power politics and combining development, humanitarian assistance and military operations to organise the progressive securitisation of mobility across the region and the Red Sea.

During the 1990s, international interventions brought about a military-humanitarian-development complex after the fall of Siyaad Barre and the beginning of the Somali civil war. Interventions in Somalia^{xxx} organised throughout the 1990s combined humanitarian goals, development aid and political objectives supported with large military involvement.^{xxxi} They did not only fail to achieve the goals of stabilisation and state building, but also profoundly changed the rationale of foreign interventions and the broader representations of the sub-region in the public opinion.^{xxxii} A series of local attacks in the late 1990s and early 2000s^{xxxiii} and the launching of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) after 9/11 brought the US back in the region depicted as the 'Horn of conflicts', notably considering Somalia as a 'bastion of Terror' located on the fringes of the Middle East.^{xxxiv} The region became a priority for the Bush administration^{xxxv} and the US opened their first and only military base in Africa in Camp Lemonnier Naval Expeditionary Base, Djibouti in 2002. An integrated military command of the Horn of Africa was set up while military-humanitarian-development interagency cooperation was trumpeted as central, as well as local cooperation with regional power such as Ethiopia and regional organisations.

Such developments mostly resulted in increased militarisation of humanitarian aid. Mobility came to be seen as an important dimension in the workings of the military-humanitarian complex. Managing and controlling people's mobility became part and parcel of the 'liberal interventionism' of the US and other Western powers in the 1990s.^{xxxvi} Mobility became increasingly framed as a threat, as illustrated by the targeting of migration networks accused of financing terrorism^{xxxvii} rather than a solution to insecurities created by wars and crises. Military operations focusing on arm trafficking, piracy and terror networks have also impacted migration and exile networks. The Somalia arm embargo, adopted in 1992 and reinforced in 2003, can be seen as a turning point in the criminalisation of refugees, migrants, internally displaced, all being potentially suspected to participate in arms smuggling. In Somalia, as struggles continued between the provisional governments and clans in the south and centre of the country, Somaliland and Puntland worked as zones of refuge and transit for displaced people seeking to cross over to Aden. Yet, the enhanced cooperation between the US and Yemen after 9/11 prevented free crossing from Somaliland to Yemen. The criminalisation of exile paved the way for

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smugglers and traffickers to become the sole operators of the movement of people, in connection to blooming piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea in the 2000s.

Somalis, Ethiopians, and Eritreans became captives of the Horn. The containment of mobility organised by military presence and international organisations provided humanitarian assistance in Somalia, Sudan, and Kenya, but migrants and asylum seekers were left with no other option but to fall back on criminal networks to cross over to the Arabian Peninsula hoping to get to one of the Gulf countries transiting via Yemen. Military interventions however did not only address forced displacement; they were also themselves causes of exile as they generated shocks of insecurity. In 2006 and during the US-Ethiopian intervention of 2007 in Somalia, the average number of daily arrivals of Somali refugees in Dadaab jumped from 100 to 300 according to UNHCR.^{xxxviii} The population in the camp rose by 25% with the February 2007 Islamic courts-led insurgency to reach 184,000 residents. Both a pyromaniac and a fireman, the US earmarked USAID Somalia budget for refugee management via the ICRC and UNHCR for 4M out of 88M in 2006.^{xxxix} The management of refugees has always been highly politicised in the sub-region; yet, the securitisation of mobility changed the context in which local governments and humanitarian and inter-governmental organisations operate. The following explores the variations over time in the politics of long-term asylum and mixed flows involving asylum seekers, trafficked people and undocumented migrants.

Addressing protracted asylum: integration and encampment

The Horn is seen as a playground for 'emergency doctors' as Béatrice Pouligny calls international aid and humanitarian workers dealing with famines, draughts, flooding, massacres, and attacks.^{xl} Yet, displacement and mobility is a long-term phenomenon. One of the core difficulties to which IOs are confronted in the Horn – and elsewhere – is the *longue durée* of displacement and its embeddedness within complex social, political, and economic processes. In this regard, IOs not only operate as external actors imposing a humanitarian management of mobility and settlement but also adapt to the social economic and political dynamics of local governments and refugee and migrant populations on the grounds.

From the 1990s to the 2000s, both inter-governmental and non-governmental humanitarian agencies started to impose a kind of asylum governance that mostly relied upon settlements in camps. As such, camps were meant to be neutral spaces where refugees could be temporarily hosted with little prospect of integration and less political engagement with local contexts. African border remained open to refugees who were generally granted access to the (limited) services available, but who were strongly encouraged to settle in camps in order to benefit from humanitarian aid. Contrary to previous periods, UNHCR-managed camps were seen as the main solution to manage asylum

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in Africa profoundly changing the situation of the new waves of refugees. Such strategy contrasted with other continents where spontaneous urban or rural settlements were the norm. In Kenya, for instance, local integration had become more difficult to manage in the early 1990s, as 'hundreds of thousands of refugees arrived mostly from Somalia, but also from Ethiopia (1992), Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda and DRC'.^{xli}

Since the 1990s, humanitarian agencies and local governments have met with their inability to organise repatriations and with the question of long-term sustainability of refugeeism. Despite UNHCR and national programmes pressing for 'voluntary returns', forcibly displaced population across the region do not seem to be ready to permanently move back to the 'homeland' especially in contexts of endemic and continuing violence, political instability, and economic insecurity. In spite of the end of the war and the independence of Eritrea, Eritrean refugees in Sudan mostly refused to repatriate after a cessation clause for their protection was declared in 2002 by the UNHCR. Around 300 000 'former Eritrean refugees' remained in or returned to Sudan and the agency had no other choice but to continue to provide protection and assistance.^{xlii} In 2013, a Tripartite Agreement Governing the Voluntary Repatriation of Somali Refugees Living in Kenya was signed by the Government of the Republic of Kenya, the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia and UNHCR, and yet, the UNHCR-IOM 2014 survey found that only 2.6% of Somali refugees in the Dadaab complex wanted to return to Somalia.^{xliii} The survey showed that 'lack of security' was overwhelmingly determining decisions and perspectives, alongside lack of employment, shelter and education opportunities.

In the early 2000s, UNHCR policies and more broadly the humanitarian management of mobility were geared towards the centralisation of refugee population in mega camps, supposed to be 'more easily' managed. Between 1997 and 1999, for instance, all of the 8 small camps that existed in Kenya in the coastal area (Mombasa), near Nairobi, and in the North were closed and remaining population brought to Dadaab and Kakuma.^{xliv} In Sudan as well, the agency embarked upon an ambitious camp closure and camp consolidation policy in Eastern Sudan.^{xlv} Yet, the UNHCR and other relief agencies had to deal with repeated crises – such as the 1998 war between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The notion of 'protracted situation' coined in 2004^{xlvi} imposed itself as the best way to describe the predicament of refugees in the Horn, as prospects of repatriation dwindled with the repetitions of crises and violent displacement across and within borders.^{xlvii}

Importantly, the overall strategy was to progressively transfer the management of refugees and displaced to local governments. Under the pressure of securitisation induced by foreign intervention, the *laissez faire* policies and attitude started to wear off in the 1990s, and governments in the region started to negotiate with international organisations the management of forced migration. The Kenyan government, for instance, sought to change its refugee policy from the 1990s to the 2010s to 'protect' its Eastern border from Somalia

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incursions and claim sovereignty over the refugee recognition process. In 2006, the government of Kenya drafted a Refugees Act which came into force in 2007 alongside Refugees Regulations in 2009 (Reception, Registration and Adjudication). The Act created a Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA), which was meant to take over UNHCR operations of Refugee Status Determination (RSD) in processing applications. In practice, RSD continued to be processed via UNHCR offices until 2014 when the DRA assumed a small share of RSD operations, mainly endorsing UNHCR project – never quite fulfilled – of full transfer of capacities and responsibilities.^{xlviii}

In the context of the empowerment of governments and local communities, policies also thought to make sure that local communities and host states also benefit from the humanitarian assistance provided to refugee. Such concern had long been present in programmes^{xlix} and practices on the grounds but it became a cornerstone of policies in the late 1990s and early 2000s with the acknowledgement of the long-term dimension of refugee issues in the region. Strategies of camp consolidation and the mixing of humanitarian assistance and long-term development goals foster a comprehensive approach to asylum management: host communities should also benefit from the aid given to refugees.ⁱ The agencies thus sought to rebuff a lingering perception of refugees as a ‘burden’ which Tom Kulhman discussed for Eritreans in Sudanⁱⁱ and Merle Kreibaum for Congolese in Uganda.ⁱⁱⁱ

In line with the idea of extending the benefits of humanitarian assistance to local populations, initiatives bloomed to address the long-term settlement of refugees. In June 2015, the Government of Turkana County in Kenya decided to offer the ‘Kalobeyei site’ to settle refugees from South Sudan and release the demographic pressure on the Kakuma refugee camp ‘which was (by June 2015) hosting a population of 183,000 individuals, as compared to the capacity of 70,000 that it was designed for’.^{liii} UNHCR and the DRA planned to accommodate up to 8,000 refugees with and 23,600 locals in this ‘hybrid settlement’ via the ‘Comprehensive Refugee and Host Community Plan in Turkana West’ where development aid became accessible to locals and refugees alike (services, education, livelihood opportunities).^{liv}

In Uganda, the management of the South Sudanese refugee crisis since 2013^{lv} is also exemplary of this trend of asylum politics in the Horn and the country was often portrayed in the late 2010s as a ‘role model’ for refugee integration although land distribution was in fact used as a development policy in dry regions where non-farmer refugees were sent and forced to stay and cultivate small plots of infertile lands. While ensuring access to land and local integration, Uganda thus exploited refugees and in context of scarce resources (Rhino Camp, Bidi Bidi and Nakivale settlements), tensions with locals soon emerged. While serving as a pilot country of the 2016 Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF),^{lvi} the governments’ strategy aimed at exploiting vulnerable populations for economic development and potentially restraining the dynamics of political and social integration which mostly functioned in urban

environment. Such logics also applied in the case of Sudan: on the one hand, rural settlement of Eritrean refugees in Eastern Sudan were chosen first as spaces of relegation where political integration and activism could be contained and on the other, camps offered reservoirs of manpower for the large agricultural schemes of the Gash Barka region.^{lvii}

Mixed migration and the externalisation of European migration control

Both within and out of the Horn, humanitarian agencies are confronted with the dilemmas of fighting human trafficking and protecting vulnerable populations on the move along the lines of the Palermo Protocol.^{lviii} The securitisation of migration in the Horn went together with a criminalisation of mobility which contradicts article 5 of the protocol but creates the systemic conditions for the monopoly of informal actors and smugglers over opportunities of exile and migration. During the 2000s and early 2010s, sailing season (from September to March) brought hundreds of thousands of Somalis and Ethiopians across the Gulf of Aden with daily reports of shipwrecks or violence on board. Sailing from Puntland and Somaliland or Djibouti Somalis, Eritreans and Ethiopians reach Yemen – the only country in the Arabian Peninsula that is party to the 1951 Convention – hoping to travel towards one of the neighbouring GCC countries. Most of them live in urban settlements and only a few reside in the al-Kharaz camp. During the same decade, crises and violence also started to arise in host countries (Kenya in 2007, Yemen with the Houthi rebellion since 2005, Sudan with the partition, etc.); conditions in refugee hosting region worsen^{lix} and anti-immigrant sentiments arose in some contexts. Exiles from the Horn in some instances started to look for alternative routes – beyond Kenya, Yemen and Sudan – further from the region through East Africa towards South Africa, towards Israel and Europe.

In 2006, the phrase 'mixed migration' emerged to describe these flows and offer a pragmatic framework to manage them for lack of better 'labelling'. In February 2006, Antonio Guterres, then head of the UNHCR, gave a speech in front of the European parliament announcing a 'change of paradigm': the reduction in refugee numbers in Western democracies may reflect barriers erected to deter irregular migration as it is becoming increasingly difficult to be welcome anywhere safe for those who need to flee and as attempts to leave are getting riskier taking the example of smuggling in the Gulf of Aden and in the Mediterranean.^{lx} The policies and programmes developed by the UNHCR started to take in 'migrant' categories under a broad but non-binding protection agenda^{lxi} and new agencies took more prominent roles in the government of humanitarian emergencies in the context of the UN 'protection cluster', notably the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Yet, the notion of mixed migration remains an *ad-hoc* framework of action rather than a legal norm enforcing protection for all categories of people on the move: the overall criminalisation of mobility prevails, and the new agenda of donors

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and European and North American governments imposes a containment on out-migration from Africa.

In fact, despite emerging minor trends through Libya towards Europe and through Tanzania towards South Africa, the overwhelming majority of displaced populations from the Horn remains in the Horn as revealed in UNHCR data.^{lxii} While FRONTEX data on irregular border crossings through the Mediterranean shows a rapid increase of migrants from the Horn in the early 2010s, notably during the Libyan revolution and civil war, they still only represent an extremely small share of all undocumented crossings towards Europe as shown in 1.

Table 1 Numbers of Irregular Border Crossings recorded by FRONTEX from 2009 to 2019 and share of nationalities from the Horn among them (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda, Yemen)

	Total horn	All IBCs	Share of nationalities from the horn (%)
2009	11,644	104,503	11
2010	6,520	103,991	6
2011	5,889	140,989	4
2012	8,087	72,382	11
2013	18,078	107,339	17
2014	46,594	282,873	16
2015	71,306	1,822,177	4
2016	43,087	511,047	8
2017	18,274	204,654	9
2018	8,235	149,036	6
2019	6,587	141,741	5

The trend towards the transfer of migration and asylum management to the governments of the region accelerated during the 2015 migration 'crisis', when the EU (and EU member states) extended to the Horn of Africa the broader process of externalisation of EU migration policy, which had first targeted the Maghreb and East European countries in the 2000s. The launch of the Khartoum process^{lxiii} in Rome in October 2014 and the creation of the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) in November 2015, at the Valletta Summit on Migration,^{lxiv} marked a new stage towards the securitisation of mobility in the Horn characterised by a greater involvement of Europe, in a region traditionally dominated by the US foreign interests, and a new focus on migration routes crossing the Horn of Africa and the Sahel-Saharan region, viewed as spaces of outward and transit migration towards Europe.

The Khartoum process and the EUTF are rooted in the broader process of externalisation of EU migration policies that started in the early 2000s with the aim to outsource migration control to third countries and, by doing so, to avoid migrants reaching EU shores and claim international protection.^{lxv} The Rabat

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process, adopted in 2006 to foster policy cooperation on migration between Europe and North and West Africa, represents a policy model for the Khartoum process. It aims to derive a solution to 'irregular' migration more closely linked to countries of origin and transit and to shift the responsibility for the management of European borders to third countries by funding projects that enhance border security, upgrade national legislation, and disrupt migrant smuggling and human trafficking. Simultaneously, such processes also represent opportunities for third countries' regime to extend their authority and influence, both internally and externally.^{lxvi}

The externalisation of EU migration policy in the Horn started to develop in the early 2010s,^{lxvii} but the migration crisis boosted European willingness to control mobility in the region. Italy was instrumental in the acceleration of EU migration policy initiatives in the Horn. Italy took the presidency of the Council of Europe in July 2014 and set the external dimension of migration as a key priority. In November 2014, Rome hosted the launching of the Khartoum process, which was followed by the signature of bilateral dialogues and agreements between European countries and countries from the Horn. The launching of the Khartoum process was, however, at the expense of another regional policy initiative on migration led by the African Union, the African Union-Horn of Africa Initiative on Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling (AU-HoAI), founded in 2012 and launched in October 2014.^{lxviii} Subsequently, the year 2015 saw a multiplication of EU-led migration policy initiatives in Africa,^{lxix} particularly in the Horn, which mounted at the Valletta Summit with an initial endowment of 1.8 billion euros for the EUTF, mostly allocated by the European Development Fund (EDF).^{lxx}

The allocation of the EUTF budget illustrates the geographical expansion of EU external migration policy towards the Sahel-Saharan region and the Horn, viewed as spaces of outward and transit migration towards Europe. For example, out of a total of 3.9 billion euros spent from November 2015 to May 2019 for EUTF projects, 1.4 billion went to the Horn of Africa and 1.95 billion to the Lake Chad, in contrast to 0.6 billion for North Africa.^{lxxi}

The geographical expansion of EU external migration policy is accompanied by a deepening of structural interventions into African policy making. The EUTF represents a strategic instrument for the EU to ensure full coherence between cooperation actions and EU's migration policy. Accordingly, EUTF flexible processes, which are designed to adapt to the context and needs identified on the spot, give donors the opportunity to promote their own domestic priorities. Most projects are proposed and designed by EU member states embassies and EU delegations, often in coordination with partner governments. Under the guidance of the Strategic Board, final decisions to fund are taken by the regional Operation Committees for the three regions covered by the EUTF (Horn of Africa, Sahel and Lake Chad, and North Africa). Discussions from EUTF Strategic Board Meeting^{lxxii} show that funds are allocated to countries depending on the number of nationals crossing the

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Mediterranean and that funding of development-oriented projects depends on their readiness to cooperate on migration issues, in particular readmission agreement.^{lxxiii} Ethiopia, for example, is among the first recipient countries of the EUTF and one of the six focus countries of the Migration Partnership Framework. Negotiations on funding between the Ethiopian government and EU representatives were tightly linked to negotiations on readmission, until Ethiopia signed an arrangement in December 2017. Discussions from EUTF Strategic Board Meeting also show that project assessment depends on the project's contribution to migration management and reduction of irregular flows, even for projects that are not directly linked with migration governance (e.g. livelihood opportunities and resilience-building).

Among the three regions covered by the EUTF, the Horn of Africa is the most development-focused with the aim to address the 'root causes' of migration (71% of projects).^{lxxiv} Whatever the potential of development to reduce migration,^{lxxv} especially in a region characterised by long-lasting and multifaceted crises and protracted refugee situations, the Commission insisted that the EUTF should be more focused on migration governance and displacement responses: return process, migration governance, EU-Africa migration dialogue, comprehensive refugee response, securitisation and stabilisation.^{lxxvi} For example, 265 million euros have been allocated to the CRRF^{lxxvii} to contribute to the refugees' integration in their host countries. In contrast, only 1.5% of the total of EUTF spending has been dedicated to the development of regular migration schemes.^{lxxviii}

The Khartoum process appears particularly problematic when it results in transferring responsibility for managing migration to regimes known for being responsible for refugee flows and involved in trafficking. In 2016, for example, the EU Parliament voted a Resolution on Sudan calling the Commission and Member States for complete transparency concerning the Better migration management project in Sudan (BMM)^{lxxix} and raising concerns that Rapid Support Forces (which are directly involved in the War in Darfur) purport to fight illegal migration on behalf of EU (following a declaration of the Commander of the RSF that his forces were patrolling the border with Egypt and Libya and, by doing so, fighting illegal migration on behalf of the EU).^{lxxx}

To conclude, the risks of funding repressive security apparatus and thus prompting more migration flows should thus be taken very seriously. Regimes of the Horn have no interest in limiting migration flows from and through their territory, besides gaining greater international legitimacy, thanks to EU cooperation. In addition, they have shown little interest in international cooperation and adherence to collective norms and standards. Furthermore, the lack of an impartial judicial system in the region impedes any attempts to develop sound hosting policy. Conflating human trafficking and human smuggling rather allows current regimes to take security-oriented action to combat trafficking, while overlooking broader requirement, such as democratic governance and the rule of law. Similarly, incentives to hold

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refugees visible, counted and seen, rather than integrated and catered for, may have a deterrent impact on how countries in the region manage their refugee populations. For example, the EU pressure to adopt readmission agreements may have a counter effect, as countries of the Horn could delay the adoption of laws protecting refugees because they fear that their country will be turned into a processing centre. Overall, the supposedly humanitarian concern used to conceal the underlying purpose of migration control (i.e. the fight against trafficking and smuggling) fuels practices that are combatted.

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Retrieved from http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/gr2018/pdf/GR2018_English_Full_lowres.pdf.

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iii Huysmans, Jef and Squire, Vicki. 2009. "Migration and Security." In *Handbook of Security Studies*, edited by Miriam Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer, 169–179. London: Routledge. Retrieved from

<https://oro.open.ac.uk/17257/2/B2FAA87.pdf>; Huysmans, Jef. 2020. "The European Union and the Securitization of Migration." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 38, no. 5: 751–77. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5965.00263>; Weiner, Myron. 1992. "Security, Stability, and International Migration." *International Security* 17, no. 3: 91–126. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539131>.

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v Nugent, Paul and Asiwaju, A. I., eds. 1996. *African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits, and Opportunities*. London/New York: U.S.A Pinter.

vi Kopytoff, Igor. 1989. *The African Frontier: The Reproduction of Traditional African Societies*. 1. Midland book ed, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

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x Boswell, Christina. 2003. "The "External Dimension" of EU Immigration and Asylum Policy." *International Affairs* 79, no. 3: 619–38. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.00326>.

xi Moreno-Lax, Violeta and Lemberg-Pedersen, Martin. 2019. "Border-Induced Displacement: The Ethical and Legal Implications of Distance-Creation through Externalization." *Questions of International Law* 56, no. 1: 5–33.

xii Kopytoff, Igor. 1989. *The African Frontier: The Reproduction of Traditional African Societies*. 1. Midland book ed, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

^{xiii} Notably Thiollet, H el ene. "La mobilit e dans la Corne de l'Afrique : entre urgence humanitaire et contrainte s ecuritaire." *Migrations soci et e*, January 2009, 75–88.

xiv The 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol, the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. Eritrea is the only country in the Horn that is not a party to any of these Conventions. None of the Horn countries have signed the 1990 convention.

xv Milner, James. 2009. "The Politics of Asylum in Africa." In *Refugees, the State and the Politics of Asylum in Africa*, edited by James Milner, 161–188. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230246799_8.

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xviii Thiollet, H el ene. 2017. "Exodes et Politiques d'asile. Le Cas Erythrien." In *Migrations, R efugi es, Exil: Colloque Annuel 2016*, edited by Coll ege de France and Patrick Boucheron, 261–288. Coll ege de France. Paris: Odile Jacob.

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- xx UNHCR. 2018. *Global Report 2018, Global Report*. Geneva: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Retrieved from http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/gr2018/pdf/GR2018_English_Full_lowres.pdf.
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- xxiii Marchal, Roland and Messiant, Christine. 1997. *Les Chemins de La Guerre et de La Paix: Fins de Conflit En Afrique Orientale et Australe*. Paris: Karthala.
- xxiv In the 1960s, the majority of Rwandan refugees had settled spontaneously in Uganda outside of controlled settlement or camps, and they participated in local in trans-border politics despite governmental policies which aimed at controlling them. Uganda notably voted a Control of Alien Refugees Act (CARA) in 1960 which established discretionary political control on Rwandan refugees. See Long, Katy. 2012. "Rwanda's First Refugees: Tutsi Exile and International Response 1959–64." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 6, no. 2: 211–29. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2012.669571>; Meeren, R. Van Der. 1996. "Three Decades in Exile: Rwandan Refugees 1960–1990." *Journal of Refugee Studies* 9, no. 3: 252–67. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/9.3.252>.
- xxv In the late 1980s and 1990s, the Ugandan government supported the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), while the government of Sudan supported the Lord Resistance Army (LRA).
- xxvi Rwandese politics were strongly impacted by Paul Kagame's Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) that waged war from its Ugandan rear base. Conversely, Rwandans in Uganda supported the rise of Yoweri Museveni in 1980.
- xxvii Based on interviews conducted by one of the authors in 2005, 2006 and 2007 with Eritrean refugees in Sudan. See Thiollet, Hélène. 2007. *Migrations et intégrations dans le sud de la mer Rouge : migrants et réfugiés érythréens au Soudan, au Yémen et en Arabie Saoudite 1991–2007*. Paris: Sciences Po.

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xxx United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM 1) from April to December 1992, Unified Task Force (UNITAF) from 5 December 1992 to 4 May 1993 (a US initiative under the code name Operation Restore Hope), and UNOSOM 2 from March 1993 to March 1995.

xxxi In 1994, President's Clinton administration launches the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI). Mixing military and development goals, the initiative sought to compensate the 1993 debacle. The GHAI was placed under direct supervision of the President and the head of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) "to promote rapid transitions from relief to development." The initiative offers to reshape the management of crises and development in the Horn by linking disaster bureau teams and practices – connected to the US military operations – to development offices, previously independent. The GHAI becomes the overarching umbrella for the network of US agencies and programmes in the Horn.

xxxii In 1993, the so-called "Black Hawk Down incident" during Operation Restore Hope, which resulted in the death of 18 US soldiers, particularly affected the US politicians and public opinion.

xxxiii The 1998 bombing of US embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam by al-Qaeda, the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in Aden in 2000 and the 2002 attacks of the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Malindi and another in Mombasa, Kenya.

xxxiv Markakis, John. 2003. "The Horn of Conflict." *Review of African Political Economy* 30, no. 97: 359–62.

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Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.2307/20033830>; Prendergast, John and Thomas-Jensen, Colin. 2007.

"Blowing the Horn." *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 2: 59–74.

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xxxv Stout, David. 2007. "U.S. to Create a Single Command for Military Operations in Africa." *New York Times*,

7.

xxxvi Jamison, Matthew. 2004. "Humanitarian Intervention since 1990 and "Liberal Interventionism." In *Humanitarian Intervention: A History*, edited by Brendan Simms and D. J. B. Trim, 365–380. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511921292.016>.

xxxvii In 2001, the US decided to freeze the assets of al-Barakaat, a transnational firm which operated money transfers for Somali emigrants and refugees in the Gulf, Europe and North America since the 1980s. The company was accused of supporting terrorist organisations, including al-Qaeda. The cost of the securitisation of migration management was dramatically high for both diasporas and local communities as demonstrated by Cindy Horst and Nick van Hear. 2002. "Counting the Cost: Refugees, Remittances and the 'War against Terrorism.'" *Forced Migration Review* 14: 32–34.

xxxviii U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). 2006. "Somalia – Complex Emergency", Situation Report." Washington, D.C.

xxxix Ibid.

xl Pouligny, Béatrice. 2006. "L'humanitaire non gouvernemental face à la guerre. Évolutions et enjeux." In *Guerres et sociétés*, edited by Pierre Hasner and Roland Marchal, 545–569. Paris: Éditions Karthala. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.3917/kart.hassne.2003.01.0545>.

xli O'Callaghan, SORCHA and Sturge, Georgina. 2018. *Against the Odds: Refugee Integration in Kenya*. Working Paper, Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper. London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI). Retrieved from <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/12542.pdf>.

xlii Thiollet, Hélène. 2014. "Wad Sharifey, Kishm el-Girbâ, Asotriba... Op. cit.

xliii UNHCR and IOM. "Joint Return Intention Survey Report 2014." 80. Retrieved from <https://perma.cc/57W6-Z8A6>, accessed 17 June 2020.

xliv Garlick, Madeline et al. 2015. "UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service, Building on the Foundation: Formative Evaluation of the Refugee Status Determination (RSD) Transition Process in Kenya." UNHCR's Policy Development and Evaluation Service (PDES). Geneva: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): 103. Retrieved from <https://www.unhcr.org/5551f3c49.pdf>.

xlv Thiollet, Hélène. 2014. "Wad Sharifey, Kishm el-Girbâ, Asotriba..." Op. cit.

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xlvi Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, Standing Committee, 30th Meeting,

"Protracted Refugee Situations," 10 June 2004, EC/54/SC/CRP.14. Retrieved from

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xlvii Crisp, Jeff. 2002. *No Solutions in Sight: The Problem of Protracted Refugee Situations in Africa*. San Diego:

Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, CCIS, University of California. Working Paper 68, 30 p. Retrieved

from <http://www.ccis-ucsd.org/PUBLICATIONS/wrkg68.pdf>.

xlviii Garlick, Madeline et al. 2015. Op. cit.

xlix The "refugee aid and development [RAD] approach" was coined in the 1980s but only really emerged as a

cornerstone of UNHCR strategies and formal programmes in the 2000s, for instance, with Self-Reliance

Strategy [SRS] programme designed by the Government of Uganda and UNHCR Kampala Branch Office. See

Meyer, Sarah. 2006. *The "Refugee Aid and Development" Approach in Uganda: Empowerment and Self-*

Reliance of Refugees in Practice. UNHCR Research Paper, New Issues in Refugee Research. Geneva: UN High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Retrieved from

<https://www.unhcr.org/uk/research/working/4538eb172/refugee-aid-development-approach-uganda-empowerment-self-reliance-refugees.html>.

l The RAD "approach is based on achieving self-reliance for refugees, while simultaneously addressing the

burden of refugees on developing host countries" in Meyer, Sarah. 2006. Op. cit. 2.

li Kuhlman, Tom. 1990. *Burden or Boon?: Eritrean Refugees in the Sudan*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books.

lii Kreibaum, Merle. 2016. "Their Suffering, Our Burden? How Congolese Refugees Affect the Ugandan

Population." *World Development* 78: 262–87. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.10.019>.

liii UNHCR. 2016. *Alternatives to Camps. Making it Work. Good Practice and Guidance Series*. Geneva: UN High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Retrieved from

<https://www.unhcr.org/protection/operations/560cf9279/key-action-1-settlement-shelter-response-printable-version.html>.

liv This new programme will directly and indirectly benefit the Turkana West population which comprises

approximately 186,000 refugees and 320,000 host population. The site-based approach replaces the

population or refugee-focused approach to "build people's skills and capabilities to successfully function in [an

enabled] new environment and to enhance the overall local economy." The strategy emerged from the

conclusion "that the existence of the Kakuma refugee camp had had a net positive impact on the County's

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economy over the years, and that a policy of inclusion (rather than separated camps) would be even more beneficial for the host population.” See UNHCR. 2018. *Kalobeyei Integrated Social and Economic Development Programme (KISED P): Kalobeyei Integrated Socio-Economic Development Plan in Turkana West*. Geneva:

UNHCR. – odkaz?

lv In 2014, around 400,000 refugees fled from South Sudan with the beginning of the civil war and the numbers peaked in the Fall of 2017 with 2.5M international refugees, most of them fleeing to Uganda, but also to Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and DRC. In 2020, Uganda hosted over 800,000 of the 2.2M South Sudanese international refugees.

lvi The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) builds upon previous policy trends on refugee integration and self-reliance and is detailed in Annex One of the 19 September 2016 New York Declaration, and as part of the Global Compact on Refugees of 2018. See

<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/63267>.

lvii Thiollet, H  l  ne. 2014. Op. cit.; Kibreab, Gaim. 1987. “Rural Refugee Land Settlements in Eastern Sudan: On the Road to Self-Sufficiency?” In *Refugees and Development in Africa*, edited by Peter Nobel, 63–71. Seminar Proceedings, no. 19. Uppsala, Stockholm: Sweden Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

lviii Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime by General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000.

lix UNHCR. 2007. Malnutrition in Kenyan Refugee Camps. See

<https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2007/7/468a3e3e6/kenya-malnutrition-levels-refugee-camps-cause-alarm.html>.

lx See discourse at <https://www.unhcr.org/admin/hcspeeches/43fb121d4/statement-mr-antonio-guterres-united-nations-high-commissioner-refugees.html>.

lxi 10 points action plan on mixed migration, see <https://www.unhcr.org/the-10-point-plan-in-action.html>.

lxii UNHCR. 2018. *Global Report 2018, Global Report*. Geneva: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Retrieved from http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/gr2018/pdf/GR2018_English_Full_lowres.pdf.

lxiii The Khartoum process (or European Union-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative) is a regional dialogue among countries of origin, transit and destination along the East Africa migratory route. It gathers representatives of the European Union, the African Union, EU member states, states of the Horn of Africa

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(Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Eritrea) and Egypt and Tunisia with the aim to 'undertake concrete actions to prevent and tackle the challenge of human trafficking and smuggling of migrants' (see 'Declaration of the Ministerial Conference of the Khartoum Process.' Rome, 28th November 2014, available at <https://www.khartoumprocess.net/resources/library/download/file?fid=20.60>).

lxiv European and African leaders agreed at the Valletta Summit on Migration on a political declaration and an action plan on development, refugee protection and migration. Simultaneously, they announced the creation of the EUTF aims to address the root causes of instability, forced displacement and irregular migration and to contribute to better migration management (see EUTF web page, "Our Mission," available at https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/index_en).

lxv On the externalisation of EU migration policy, see Lavenex, Sandra. 2006. "Shifting Up and Out: The Foreign Policy of European Immigration Control." *West European Politics* 29, no. 2: 329–350; Triandafyllidou, Anna. 2014. "Multi-Levelling and Externalizing Migration and Asylum, Lessons from the Southern European Islands." *Island Studies Journal* 9, no. 1: 7–22; Carrera, Sergio, Pieter Leonhard den Hertog, Arie, Panizzon, Marion and Kostakopoulou, Dora. 2019. *EU External Migration Policies in an Era of Global Mobilities: Intersecting Policy Universes*. Leiden Boston: Brill Nijhoff.

lxvi Cassarino, Jean-Pierre. 2018. "Beyond the Criminalisation of Migration: A Non-Western Perspective." *International Journal of Migration and Border Studies* 4, no. 4: 397–411.

lxvii For example, the EU-Horn of Africa Strategic Framework adopted by the Council of the European Union in November 2011 explicitly refers to article 13 of the Cotonou agreement, which deals with the external dimension of EU migration policies (see The Council of the European Union. *Council Conclusions on the Horn of Africa*, 3124th Foreign Affairs IRS Council Meeting Brussels, 14 November 2011, available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126052.pdf; European Parliament, Directorate General for External Policies of the European Union, Policy Department, September 2012, *The EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa: A Critical Assessment of Impact and Opportunities*, available at [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EXPO-AFET_ET\(2012\)433799](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EXPO-AFET_ET(2012)433799)).

lxviii Reitano, Tuesday. 2016. *The Khartoum Process, a Sustainable Response to Human Smuggling and Trafficking?* Institute for Security Studies & The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, Policy Brief No. 93, p. 4.

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lxi In April, the EU council committed to reinforce cooperation with Africa to prevent illegal migration; in May, the EU Commission set out the European Agenda on Migration; in October, the Council adopted the EU-Horn of Africa Regional Plan 2015–2020 (see Council Conclusions on the EU Horn of Africa Regional Action Plan 2015–2020, available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/press/press-releases/2015/10/26/fac-conclusions-horn-africa/>).

lxx See European Commission, *An European Agenda on Migration, 2015 Valletta Summit of Migration*, available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21933/euagendafor-migration_trustfund-v10.pdf.

lxxi Oxfam. 2020. *The EU Trust Fund for Africa Trapped Between aid Policy and Migration Politics*. Oxfam Briefing Paper, available at <https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/eu-trust-fund-africa-trapped-between-aid-policy-and-migration-politics>.

lxxii Oxfam. 2020. Op. cit.

lxxiii According to the definition of the EU Commission, readmission agreements are international agreements that address procedures, on a reciprocal basis, for one state to return non-nationals in an irregular situation to their home state or to a state through which they have transited (retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/e-library/glossary/readmission-agreement_en).

lxxiv Oxfam. 2020. Op. cit. The EUTF includes country-based projects, projects implemented in more than one country of the same region (Horn of Africa or Lake Chad/Sahel or North Africa) and cross-window/cross-region projects.

lxxv Haas, Hein de. 2007. "Turning the Tide? Why Development Will Not Stop Migration." *Development and Change* 38, no. 5: 819–841.

lxxvi In a response to criticism of the European Court of Auditors (see European Court of Auditors. 2018. *European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa: Flexible But Lacking Focus*. Special Report No. 32, available at <https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/DocItem.aspx?did=48342>).

lxxvii On the CRRF, see Research and Evidence Facility (REF). 2020. "Comprehensive Refugee Responses in the Horn of Africa: Regional Leadership on Education, Livelihoods and Durable solutions." EU Trust Fund for Africa (Horn of Africa Window) Research and Evidence Facility.

lxxviii Oxfam. 2020. Op. cit.

lxxix The BMM is first key project launch in December 2015 under the Khartoum process. Coordinated by the German development agency (GIZ), it was implemented by IOM and UNODC with the aim to develop national

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legislation, improve migration management and improve access to justice and protection for migrants and victims. The budget was 40 million euros for the first phase (2015–2019). The second phase, which includes Egypt, Libya and Tunisia in addition to initial countries from the Horn, was launched in May 2019 with a 30 million euros' budget.

lxxx European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2016 on Sudan (2016/2911(RSP)), available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016IP0379>. A year later, the vice-chair of the EU Parliament's subcommittee for human rights called for a thorough EU investigation on the BMM. See Nelson, Arthur. 2017. "EU Urged to End Cooperation with Sudan After Refugees Whipped and Deported." *The Guardian*, available at <https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/2017/feb/27/eu-urged-to-end-cooperation-with-sudan-after-refugees-whipped-and-deported>.